The Impact of Employee Representation Plans Upon the Development of Management-Worker Relationships in the United States. by Gullett, Carlos Ray
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1970
The Impact of Employee Representation Plans
Upon the Development of Management-Worker
Relationships in the United States.
Carlos Ray Gullett
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gullett, Carlos Ray, "The Impact of Employee Representation Plans Upon the Development of Management-Worker Relationships in
the United States." (1970). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1855.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1855
71-6575
GULLETT, Carlos Ray, 1941-
THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION PLANS 
UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT-WORKER 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural 
and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1970 
Business Administration
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
@  1971 
Carlos Ray Gullett
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION PLANS 
UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT-WORKER RELATIONSHIPS
IN THE UNITED STATES
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Management and Marketing
by
Carlos Ray Gullett 
M.B.A., North Texas State University, 1964
August, 197 0
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to 
Drs. Edmund R. Gray and F. Marion Fletcher for their 
guidance and encouragement in the writing of this disser­
tation. They have in a number of instances kept the 
research and writing from taking a wrong turn and have thus 
saved the writer from pursuing fruitless paths.
The nine firms which participated in this study 
were quite generous in allowing examinations of their 
records and in supplying the names of employees for inter­
views. Without their cooperation this study could not 
have been done.
Thanks for typing assistance is due to' Peggy 
Pressley, Brenda Flaming, and to my wife, Sharon. A special 
thank you should be given to my wife for her understanding 
and frequent help during the preparation of this work.
FOREWORD
The history of management thought in this country 
is a fascinating field of study. Perhaps its attraction 
lies in its reflection of the changing attitudes of society 
over the past one hundred years.
Management's relations with workers, both as in­
dividuals and in organized groups comprise a significant 
portion of this history. This study has sought to investi­
gate one segment of the evolving management-employee 
relationship, that of employee representation plans.
In the first few decades of this century organi­
zations were undergoing significant changes. They were 
growing larger and thus taking on more bureaucratic charac­
teristics . Labor unions were also growing, and by the end 
of World War I they were considered by many managements to 
be a significant threat to their businesses.
Both the growth of businesses and the growth of 
unions were factors which created and enhanced the problems 
which management had in effectively motivating its work 
force. The response of a number of firms was to create an 
employee representation plan. These plans were designed to 
re-establish contact between the top and bottom levels of 
the large organization and to make it unnecessary for 
workers to affiliate with an outside labor organization.
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This presentation takes the position that these 
plans made significant contributions to the development of 
personnel administration in the firms which used them.
The description and analysis which follows presents this 
point of view in some detail.
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ABSTRACT
Employee representation plans, while usually 
acknowledged in the literature of personnel management and 
industrial relations, have never been comprehensively 
described and analyzed. A gap has thus existed in this 
area of management and labor history. The purpose of this 
research was to fill this gap and to provide new insights 
into the contributions of representation plans to the 
development of personnel administration in the United 
States. Implications for today’s management-employee 
relations were also sought.
This study first provides a historical overview of 
the factors leading to the initiation, growth and develop­
ment, and demise of employee representation plans in the 
United States. The analysis is divided into four time 
periods: The pre-World War I era; the period during the
war; the decade of the 1920's; and the final years of 
employee representation in the 1930's. Forces influencing 
the plans in each time period are discussed.
A description of the formal design of represen­
tation plans is next provided. This information is supplied 
in order to give the reader added historical perspective 
and to gain insight into the role which managements saw for 
their plans.
An in-depth case analysis of the representation 
plan of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey follows. Data 
from both company files and personal interviews allow the 
subject to be treated in detail.
The hypothesized contributions of the plan to 
management-worker relationships in the above company are 
investigated. These contributions include: the effect of
the plan upon communication channels; the plan’s impact upon 
benefits received by workers and upon grievance processing; 
the relationship of the plan to the creation and growth of 
the personnel department; organization climate and the 
representation plan; the effect of the plan upon later 
unionization and development of union leaders. In each of 
these areas a positive relationship is found.
To verify or modify the conclusions of the Standard 
Oil Company of New Jersey investigation, a survey of eight 
other firms which utilized these plans is then undertaken. 
The hypothesized contributions of the plans are again 
examined in each of the eight companies. Substantially 
the same conclusions are reached.
Employee representation is thus found to have made 
a number of contributions to personnel administration in 
the companies which were investigated. These results are 
generalized to other firms which utilized representation.
The rationale for making this generalization is explained 
in Chapter I of the study.
xiii
The research adds to the existing knowledge of 
management and labor history. It offers lessons for 
current-day managers with regard to their relations with 
non-union employees s especially the white collar and pro­
fessional groups. Its lessons apply equally to governmental 
employees and to university students.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
Employee representation plans, sometimes described
as plans of industrial democracy or less flatteringly as
company unions, were for the most part a phenomenon of the
period between the two world wars. They were seen by some
as practical idealism and an awakening of the new spirit of
cooperation between the employer and his employees.'*' Others
viewed them simply as devices to circumvent unionization of
2the work force and as a disguised paternalism.
Employee representation in essence involved some 
form of formalized management-worker dialogue, usually 
implemented through shop committees composed of representa­
tives of management and workers. Common problems, sugges­
tions for changes in work methods, and grievances and 
requests of workers were common topics for discussion in 
such meetings. Representatives of both sides commonly voted 
on problems to determine their resolution. Deadlocked
-*-C. B. Seger, "Employee Representation and Personnel 
Work in a Large Scale Organization With Many Plants," Pro­
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, IX (January, 
1922),545.
^William Green, "The Challenge of the Union," 
American Federationist, XXXII (March, 1925), 161-164.
issues were resolved by higher management levels or in a few 
instances by impartial arbitrators.
The representation systems were in every company 
investigated initiated and sponsored by the employer, 
although employees were in some cases encouraged to aid in 
their design. These plans were restricted to one firm with 
the result that there were no local, regional, or national 
employee representation associations as are commonly found 
in labor union organizations.
The period of greatest strength for employee repre­
sentation was the decade of the 1920's, although the national 
labor legislation of the 1930's resulted in the adoption of 
plans by some employers who had not previously been inter­
ested in them.
Throughout their existence, the representation 
systems were bitterly opposed by labor unions. They were 
viewed as designed and operated by the employer in order to 
manipulate employees and to keep unionization from occuring 
in their firms. In the 19 3 0's, labor organizations played 
an active part in seeking legislation and court rulings 
which would eliminate the representation plans.
In 19 38 a decision by the Supreme Court specifically 
outlawed employee representation systems. This effectively
3marked the end of their formal functioning in this country. 
They were ruled to be employer dominated labor organizations
^NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3 03 U.S. 261
(1938).
and thus in violation of the provisions of the National
iiLabor Relations Act.
The Problem
A survey of both current and historical literature 
on the subject of employee representation indicates that 
there is no comprehensive work on this subject. Fragmentary 
studies were undertaken during the early 1900's, but there 
has not been an in-depth study of employee representation 
and its influence upon management thought and practice and 
upon employee attitudes and behavior.
Present day references to the plans are most fre­
quently found in texts dealing with labor economics, labor 
history, and personnel management. They are for the most 
part dealt with only briefly in these sources and are 
generally regarded as one of a kit of tools used by manage­
ment to foster the open shop movement of the 192 0's and to
5circumvent labor legislation of the 19 3 0's. Although there 
is much truth in such assertions, a thorough examination of 
existing sources of material on the subject reveals a 
number of unexplored contributions to present-day personnel 
management theory made by employee representation systems.
4Ibid.
^For example, see Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in 
American History (New York: Harper and Row, 19 64); and
Paul Pigors and Charles A. Meyers, Personnel Administration 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), Chapter 8.
Purpose of the Study
A thorough historical'analysis of these representa­
tion systems should seek to accomplish three goals: first,
to analyze extraorganizational and intraorganizational factors 
which led to the formation, operation, and demise of the 
plans; second, to discuss the functioning of the plans, both 
in formal design and in actual practice; third, to determine 
the impact of employee representation upon employer-employee 
relations. With reference to the third objective, the 
following areas are worthy of specific study:
1. The effect of the plans upon management's 
ability to effectively explain its actions.
2. The effect upon management's ability to better 
understand the feelings of workers as a result 
of the workers' asking more questions, making 
demands, and stating grievances.





4. The influence of the plans upon the creation or 
development of departments of personnel.
5. The impact of the plans upon the organization 
climate within the surveyed firms.
6. The effect upon the ability of labor unions to 
organize firms using employee representation 
plans.
7. The development of labor union leaders or nego­
tiators from workers' representatives.
The writer sees the study's primary contribution as 
one of adding to existing knowledge of the evolving nature 
of management-worker relationships, particularly with
5
reference to behavioral assumptions and practices of manage­
ment. Such a study can aid both the academician and the 
practitioner in better understanding how their field 
developed. The lessons learned through representation might 
also suggest at least partial solutions to personnel problems 
confronting management today.
Research Methodology
Research methodology included the collection of 
information from both primary and secondary sources. Secon­
dary sources were books and periodicals, most of which were 
written during the period in which the representation 
systems were in existence. Although no one source yielded 
the sort of comprehensive analysis which this study will 
attempt, a significant amount of information was found which 
lent itself to synthesis and analysis.
Primary data were collected from the following
sources:
1. Personal interviews
2. Written responses to questions
3. The files of cooperating companies
Only a relatively small number of the firms which 
used representation are in existence today. Twenty firms
^See Appendix B for the questionnaire used for 
these interviews and for written responses.
were contacted by mail."'7 Information concerning the design
• pand operation of the plan was requested. These companies 
included those which were given publicity in writings of the 
representation era and which are still in existence today. 
Although the identities of all firms which utilized employee 
representation plans may not have been discovered, three 
months of extensive secondary research were spent in gather­
ing this type of information. The research indicated that 
many of the firms which used employee representation have 
since gone out of business or lost their identities through 
merger or acquisition. A look at representation membership 
figures (given in Chapter II) indicates that there were 
companies which adopted and used plans but apparently 
received no publicity. The literature did indicate that 
many of the smaller and lesser-known firms followed the 
patterns set by the better publicized plans of the larger
organizations. In 1926 there were 913 plans reported as
9functioning in the United States.
7 •These firms were Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio; Standard Oil Company of 
Indiana; Filene's of Boston; Westinghouse Electric Corpora­
tion; Revere Cooper and Brass, Inc.; Dennison Manufacturing 
Company; General Electric Company; Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company; Proctor and Gamble Corporation; Eastman Kodak Com­
pany; Durham Hosiery Mills; Hart Schaffner, and Marx Company 
International Harvester Company; E. I. Du Pont De Nemours S 
Company; American Telephone and Telegraph Company; Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation; Armco Steel Corporation; United States 
Steel Company; Elgin Watch Company.
9See Appendix A for a copy of the letter requesting 
this information.
9National Industrial Conference Board, Collective 
Bargaining Through Employee Representation (New York: 
National Industrial Conference Board, 1933), pp. 8-9.
7
Of the twenty firms contacted, nine responded favor­
ably. ̂  The other eleven firms either did not have the 
information requested or were unwilling to release it from 
their files. Those who gave a favorable response sent copies 
of their plans along with, in most cases, other material 
from company files which dealt with employee representation.
While no claim is made that either the initial number 
of firms contacted or the number of firms that responded is 
statistically significant, it is believed that valid conclu­
sions can be drawn from the data received concerning the 
formal design of representation systems of these years.
Most of the firms which responded were and are leaders in 
their industries. In the case of the Standard Oil Companies, 
Mackenzie King who installed their plans had also constructed 
similar representation systems in a number of other firms. 
King’s influence was also felt in firms with which he had no 
direct contact. In addition, a survey of secondary sources 
published during the existence of these plans tends to con­
firm the conclusions which will be drawn from the primary 
data.
The case study method was employed to analyze 
Standard Oil of New Jersey’s experience with employee repre­
sentation. To test the validity of the conclusions which
l^The firms which responded favorably included: 
Standard Oil of New Jersey; Standard Oil of Indiana; Armco 
Steel; Dennison Manufacturing Company; International 
Harvester; American Telephone and Telegraph; Bethlehem Steel; 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company.
were drawn, a survey of eight other prominent firms which 
had used representation systems was also undertaken. Two 
potential areas of similarity between the Standard Oil of 
New Jersey plan and those of the other eight companies were 
first investigated. The presumption was made that if these 
points were similar, valid comparisons could be made between 
the findings concerning these eight plans and the plan of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey. These two areas of comparison 
were the employersf motivations for beginning their plans 
and the design and stated purposes of the plans.
The survey did not explore any other company in the 
same depth as Standard Oil of New Jersey. This firm pro­
vided the largest volume of primary data of any company 
investigated. A total of eight personal interviews was 
granted by retired employees of the company. A significant 
amount of data from the files of the firm's headquarters in 
New York City was obtained. In addition the company's 
Baton Rouge refinery allowed the use of the minutes of its 
representation meetings.
Personal interviews were conducted in two ways.
When possible, in-person interviews were held. Geographical 
distances, however, limited this approach. Consequently, a 
number of interviews were conducted by long distance tele­
phone. Copies of the questions were sent to each inter­
viewee in advance of the telephone call in order to allow 
him time to collect any information he might have and to 
prepare his answers adequately. In addition to the telephone
interviews, written responses to the questions were asked 
for from the respondents.
This study can be properly described as impression­
istic in nature because it has largely sought to evaluate 
the contributions of employee representation in terms of the 
personal impressions of those who worked under the plans. 
While the second and third chapters rely primarily on secon­
dary sources of information and data from company files, the 
fourth and fifth chapters place major emphasis on personal 
interviews and represent the heart of the study.
Although there was undoubtedly some bias among those 
who were interviewed, it was believed that the number of
individuals who participated are likely to have exposed any
11extreme or highly distorted view held by one person. Com­
pany records, some of which were at one time confidential, 
have provided an added source of validation.
In most instances the interviewees were retired 
from the companies being investigated. This factor should 
add to the objectivity of the information collected. In 
addition those interviewed were assured that the investiga­
tion was being conducted for academic purposes only and 
that if they wished, their names would not be disclosed.
Six persons did ask that their names not be revealed, and 
these requests were honored.
■^A total of twenty-four persons were contacted in 
the nine companies.
10
A balance was sought between manager and non-manager 
interviewees to add further to the objectivity of the in­
vestigation. This objective was not fully achieved, however. 
Those individuals associated with the companies' management 
numbered eighteen of the twenty-four interviewed. Twelve of 
these eighteen had, however, served in non-management 
positions during a portion of their careers.
Scope and Limitations
This study will involve a description and analysis 
of employee representation plans during the period from 19 0 0 
to 19 37. It will trace the forces which led to the creation, 
operation, and demise of the plans in American industry.
Nine plans will be analyzed in depth, both from the 
standpoint of their formal design and their day-to-day 
functioning. Contributions to improved employer-employee 
relations will be explored in detail. The nine companies 
included in the survey represent the following industries: 
oil, rubber, steel, paper products, communications, farm 
implements and heavy machinery, and electrical products.
Limitations of the study include a scarcity of living 
individuals who had first-hand experience with representation 
and incomplete company records relating to these plans.
Plan of Presentation
Chapter II deals with the economic, social, and 
organizational influences upon employee representation in 
this country. A brief discussion of the formal design and
11
operation of representation plans will be provided in 
Chapter III. Chapter IV contains an in-depth study of the 
employee representation plan of Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey. In Chapter V an analysis and comparison of eight 
other plans is undertaken. Chapter VI presents a summary of 
the study, the conclusions which are drawn from it, and 
implications for current-day personnel relationships.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 
UPON EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION PLANS:
AN OVERVIEW
This chapter1 seeks to analyze the reasons for 
employee representation’s rise and fall in the United States. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to look at both extra- 
organizational and intraorganizational factors leading to 
the development of employee representation. This analysis 
does not attempt a thorough description and evaluation of 
management and labor history; it does seek, however, to 
discuss and interpret those factors believed to have been 
conducive to the development of employee representation.
The following analysis will be divided into four 
time periods: the pre-World War I period from approximately
1865; the war years of 1914 to 1918; the 1920’s; and the 
last decade of employee representation, the 1930's. The 
rationale for this division is that there were significant 
forces affecting the formation of employee representation 
during each of these periods. Although some of these forces 
were overlapping in two or more of the time periods, the 
analysis will attempt to show that each time interval had
13
peculiarities of its own in its influence upon representa­
tion systems.
The Period Prior to World War I
A study of American history reveals a spectacular 
growth of business enterprises from the Civil War to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. "Between 1860 and 1900, 
the United States jumped from fourth to first place among 
manufacturing nations of the world."'1'.
The United States was essentially an agrarian econ­
omy in 1865, and its facilities for production were designed 
primarily to service the needs of farmers and their families. 
These firms were for the most part small, selling their 
finished goods in local markets. Some sales took place in 
more distant markets and were usually handled through
pcommissioned agents.
By 1900, however, the growth of business not only in
terms of output produced but also in terms of size of the
business firm itself was great.
Most of the major industries had become dominated by 
a few large enterprises. . . .  In other words, the 
business economy had become industrial. . . .  In the 
terms of the economist and sociologist, a significant 
sector of American industry had become bureaucratic, in 
the sense that business decisions were made within large 
hierarchical structures.3
^Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Knopf, 19 60), p. 5.
^Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big 
Business' in American Industry," Business History Review, 
XXXIII (Spring, 1959), 2.
3Ibid. , p . 3.
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Markets for many firms were no longer local since many of 
the largest ones had built large national marketing organi­
zations. Moreover, the manufacture and processing of 
producers’ goods had grown significantly during the period 
from 1865 to 1900.14
Regardless of the forces leading to the expansion 
and power of the business organization, the large corporation 
was an important force, both socially and economically in 
the United States by 19 00. Its employees, perhaps even more 
than its customers and suppliers, were significantly affected 
by its power over their lives.
Coincident with the growth of the industrial expan­
sion in this country was the flood of immigrants coming 
primarily from the European nations. These individuals, 
most of whom were without funds and many of whom could not 
speak English, were anxious to obtain employment.
The growing manufacturing firms readily found places 
for them, although the attitudes and practices of many , 
employers reflected their lack of interest in the workers as 
individuals. This attitude was common among employers who 
saw the workers primarily in terms of factors of production, 
or more bluntly put, as interchangeable, general purpose 
machine tools. Most of these individuals were peasants or 
agricultural laborers and possessed no special skills. Jobs 
were best designed in terms of simple, repetitive tasks
**Ibid. , p . 4 .
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which could be learned quickly, leading to a minimum train­
ing time and a quick replacement of those who could not meet 
the employer’s standards. Because there were many of these 
unskilled laborers looking for work, replacements for dis­
charged workers were easy to find.
Certainly not all laborers and unskilled workmen in 
industry were foreign born. During this period of immigra­
tion from other countries, there was a concurrent movement 
of individuals from farms to the cities; many of these 
formerly rural workers became laborers in industry.
Evidence does suggest, however, that native-born 
industrial workers were upwardly mobile to a much greater 
extent than were the immigrants. In the early 1900's Leitch, 
for example, found that only ten percent of the employees 
working in the stockyards of Chicago were American citizens 
while at the same time twenty-six different nationalities 
were working in one Arizona mining camp and thirty-two in 
another.^ Another study of the distribution of native and 
foreign-born workers stated in 192 0 that "Though the Americans 
are in the majority in the professions and the skilled and 
industrial trades, they are in the minority in all the 
rest.”®
The tools of Scientific Management, developed during 
this period, were well suited to the design of fragmented,
5Ibid. , p. 84.
^Andre Siegfried, America Comes of Age: A French
Analysis (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p . 151.
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repetitive tasks. Although it is clear that F. W. Taylor 
did not intend his system to be used to make wooden men out
nof the workers, his concepts of task specialization and 
separation of planning from doing nevertheless were aids to 
the employer in designing jobs that the unskilled could 
perform with practically no training. "This incentive [for 
designing simplified jobs] was all the greater because train­
ing immigrants was extremely difficult when many supervisors 
could not speak the language of their men."
An early student of United States labor-management 
relations observed in 1914 that:
The minute subdivision of industrial production, and 
the adaptation of the industrial machine, more than any 
other single characteristic, defines American produc­
tion. . . . This subdivision of processes demands not
only a minimum of technical knowledge, but also a 
passive, stolid labor-class temperament.9
The language problem between management and labor was inten-( I
sified after 1900 when a large majority of the immigrants 
were composed of southern Europeans with customs, beliefs, 
and institutions quite different from those prevailing in 
America at that time. Approximately one million of these 
immigrants came to the United States yearly in the decade
^See Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management 
(Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth College, 1912), pp. 22-55.
pSummer H. Slichter, "The Current Labor Policies of 
American Industries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXVII 
(May, 1929), 394.
^Carleton H. Parker, "The Techniques of American 
Industry," Atlantic Monthly, CXXV (January, 1920), 13, 17.
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after 1900 . Although the business leaders of the time did 
not directly encourage high levels of immigration, they 
apparently were favorable to its continuance.
Wage rates for the unskilled workers were quite low. 
The absence of a large number of skilled workmen and the 
abundance of available unskilled labor contributed to the 
low wage levels. Workmen were experiencing a decline in 
bargaining equality with their employer as compared to pre- 
Civil War days. As the economic power of the employer grew, 
the individual bargaining power of the unskilled employee 
declined.
Although wages were low for the majority of the 
workers from the Civil War until World War I , real wages 
from 18 70 until 189 6 did apparently rise slightly. However, 
from 188 9 to 1914 real wages fell ten percent while per 
capita production was increasing more than thirty percent.
"It is thus evident that wage-earners not only did not 
receive the same share per capita of the increased product 
year after year but actually were receiving at the end of 
the period slightly less goods than at the beginning.
In 1915 President Wilson's Commission on Industrial 
Relations reported that "the very least that a family of 
five persons can live upon in anything approaching decency
■^George H. Mayer and Walter 0. Foster, The United 
States and the Twentieth Century (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1958) , p . 9"!
11Edgar S. Furniss, Labor Problems (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1925), p. 102.
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1 9is $7 0 0 [per year]." It further reported that of the
immigrant families surveyed in an Immigration Commission
*
study, "the figures show conclusively that between one-half 
and two-thirds of these families were living below the 
standards of decent subsistence, while about one-third were 
living in a state which can be described only as abject
"i qpoverty." Certainly, not all American workers, whether 
immigrant or native born, lived in this fashion. And by 
comparison, the American worker enjoyed a much higher stan­
dard of living than his European counterpart. Hugo Munster- 
berg, a professor at Harvard and a native of Germany, 
observed in 1904 that the typical American laborer was
better off in terms of wages, clothing, housing, and enter-
14tainment when compared to his European counterpart. These 
differences, of course, were the primary reasons for the 
influx of European immigrants, many of whom hoped to work in 
industry only long enough to save enough money to buy a farm 
for themselves and their families.
The general social and economic conditions from the 
Civil War to 1914 can be summarized as a period during which 
large scale business developed and grew and a time in which 
the work of many was standardized and fragmented into
1 9United States Commission on Industrial Relations, 
Final Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations 
(Chicago: Barnard and Miller Printers, 1915), pp. 347-349 .
13Ibid., p. 353.
14 .Hugo Munsterberg, The Americans (New York:
McClure, Phillips, 1904), p. 319.
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relatively simple, repetitive tasks. An abundance of un­
skilled immigrant labor was available, willing to work for 
low wages because of the lack of an acceptable alternative. 
Language and cultural barriers separated many of these men 
from their employers and those in management.
A gulf came to exist between management and labor.
Not only was the personal intimacy of the small shop lost 
in the large enterprise but also barriers between men of 
different cultures and interests came about.
Labor policy. What was the result of these changes in
terms of the labor policy of employers and their managerial
representatives? Slichter put it perhaps most succintly
when he said it was chiefly nthe practice of driving workers
15rather than of developing their cooperation and good will." 
Driving was defined as close supervision in a pressured 
atmosphere with force and the threat of discharge as the 
primary motivational tools of the supervisor.
The simplicity of this labor policy resulted in no 
need for a specialized personnel department. The foreman 
was usually free to hire or fire as he saw fit and exerted 
thus great power over the lives of the workers. It was not 
at all uncommon for the foreman to require gifts from his 
subordinates if they were to keep their jobs.
Some employers and managers used the technique of 
divide and conquer as a means of implementing their policy
■^Slichter, loc. cit.
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of driving. Men of different nationalities and languages, 
some traditionally antagonistic to one another, were 
deliberately mixed in work gangs so that there would be 
lowered resistance to the pressure techniques of the foreman 
or supervisor.
This picture of management’s attitude toward workers 
is not intended to be either a complete or a precisely 
accurate one. Instead it is a composite of many of the 
abuses which, while not universal, were plentiful enough to 
be representative of a large part of industrial practices. 
Not all employers behaved in the manner described. A dis­
cussion of their reasons for not doing so and the interest 
of some of them in employee representation will follow in a 
later segment of this chapter.
It must be stressed that pre-Civil War working con­
ditions are not viewed in this presentation as ideal models 
which were later forsaken. Instead the dramatic growth of 
business, the heavy influx of foreign farm and unskilled 
workers, and the emphasis upon quickly learned, greatly 
segmented, repetitive tasks widened the gulf between manager 
and worker.
Although the unskilled or common laborer was at a 
definite economic and social disadvantage in comparison to 
the employer, he did not always accept these conditions 
gracefully and without question.
Labor unrest from 18 65 to 1914 was not uncommon.
The Homestead Steel Strike of 189 2, the Pullman Strike of
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1894, and the recurrent strikes of coalminers are indicative 
of the labor unrest of the times. Even though there was a 
labor surplus in most of these years and both legislation 
and the courts for the most part supported the employer in 
his actions against strikers, employee resistance did occur. 
Union membership was also growing during most of the period; 
by 1914 union membership in the United States reached almost
"I C2.5 million workers.
By 19 00 some employers were disturbed sufficiently 
by union activity to actively organize themselves in 
employers' associations. The primary purpose of such organ­
izations at that time was to prevent the spread of unionism 
and with it strikes and boycotts. Among the groups taking 
part in such activities were the Dayton Employers' Associa­
tion, the Citizen's Industrial Association, and the National
17Association of Manufacturers.
Although unionism and strikes were becoming important 
signs of labor resistance during this period, far more 
difficult to deal with directly were the practices of workers, 
organized and unorganized, of soldiering or restricting out*- 
put. The writings of the time indicate that work restriction
•^National Industrial Conference Board, The Economics 
Almanac (New York: Crowell, 1956), p. 461.
1 7Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 212-213; and
Katherine Coman, The Industrial History of the U.S. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1920), p. 358.
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was widespread. One observer, looking at the industrial 
scene of the early twentieth century commented:
The antagonism between [workers’] ideals and the 
policies of their employers has become more conscious. 
Workers refuse to exert themselves greatly, they repeat 
the phrases "take your time," "go easy," "no hurry;" 
they take vacations from their jobs when they feel like 
it, they are less and less docile and dependable.18
Early representation plans. Against the background of a 
surplus of workers, low wage rates, and the driving philos­
ophy of many employers, it seems somewhat strange that some­
thing as radical as employee representation would find a 
sympathetic ear in businesses of this country. And, indeed, 
the plans which arose were small in number; there were ten 
publicized plans operating in 1914.^  Their importance lies, 
however, in their reasons for formation and their influence 
upon the design and operation of later plans.
The earliest working plan of employee representation
in this country was founded by the William Filene Company,
a Boston department store. Started in 1898, the Filene
Cooperative Association began as an insurance committee,
later expanding into such areas as disciplinary authority
over employees, determination of store rules, and setting of
20penalties for their infraction.
•^Durant Drake, America Faces the Future (New York: 
Macmillan, 1922), p. 250.
•^Earl J. Miller, "Workmen’s Representation in 
Industrial Government," University of Illinois Studies in 
the Social Sciences, X (September-December, 1922), 38-42.
20Ibid., p. 38.
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Among the other firms who introduced employee repre­
sentation prior to this country’s entry into World War I 
were the Nernst Lamp Company of Pittsburgh, the Packard 
Piano Company, Hart Schaffner and Marx, and the Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company.
In these and the other firms which experimented with 
employee representation, initiation came in every case from 
the employer. Despite the fact that the balance of social 
and economic power was on the side of the firm, strikes and 
slowdowns cost the employer money, both in quantity and 
quality of production.
These two factors, the desire for productive effi­
ciency and the fear of strikes and unionization, appear to 
be the dominant motives for the introduction of employee 
representation prior to World War I. Although representation 
plans were far from being dominant in industry at this time, 
they filled nevertheless a need in some firms. The few 
employers who instituted such systems claimed a remarkable 
success for their plans, although it is clear that their 
approach to industrial problems was considered at the least 
somewhat eccentric by other businessmen. As Cochran has 
stated:
Business . . . had been built around the tradition 
of leadership, the ideal of the vigorous, strong-willed, 
decisive entrepreneur. Strict obedience to authority 
from above and a free hand for the man at the helm was 
as much the rule of business as of the army or navy.
Nor was it easy to see how industrial democracy would 
function even if it could be instituted. . . . Labor 
trouble, therefore, represented merely one aspect of the
24
broader conflict between social-democratic theory and 
the ideal of free business enterprise. 21
Although skepticism of such an approach to industrial 
problems was in these pre-war years the majority view, pro­
ponents of the plans gained a significant amount of publicity. 
Writers of the time, primarily economists, sociologists and 
political theorists, were concerned about industrial strife 
and the plight of the many low-income working class citizens. 
Although not always favorably disposed to employee represen­
tation as it was then designed, most of the writers argued
2 2for some means of improving management-worker relationships. 
The means of obtaining such goodwill was, in the minds of a 
few, through the use of employee representation.
Although there was no single individual who alone 
guided the formation of representation councils, three names 
stand out as strong influences in the formation of the early 
plans. These men were John Leitch, W. L. Mackenzie King, 
and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Of the three, John Letich 
wrote most extensively on the subject.
Working as a laborer, a manager, and later as a 
management consultant, Leitch developed a philosophy of 
labor-management relations which he applied in a number of 
firms before World War I. He published two books on the 
subject of representation, Industrial Democracy in 1912 and
^Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of 
Enterprise (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 247-248.
^ For example, see John R. Commons, Industrial Good­
will (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1919), p. 18.
Man-to-Man in 1919. In his second book he included the 
formal framework for an employee representation system which 
was found in his first work. His emphasis in Man-to-Man was 
upon case histories of firms with which he had worked as a 
labor relations consultant. In each instance he explained 
the prior labor problems of the firm and the later introduc­
tion and success of his plan of industrial democracy.
Leitch's book was notable in that it was not only an expla­
nation of how employee representation could function in 
varying circumstances, but it was also an interesting 
description of many of the current labor troubles. In a 
factory which made smoking pipes, he described in the follow­
ing manner the attitudes of the unskilled immigrant workers 
who made up the labor force:
They were unruly; few cared if the work was good or bad. 
They were content to "get by" except for a sprinkling of 
older men who had been employed for years and were past 
the age when they could venture to seek outside employ­
ment. . . . The problem was to get this polyglot crowd
interested in their work, to make them one with the 
company, to introduce a spirit of cooperation which 
would reflect higher pay for the men and a better pro­
duct for the company. It was a serious problem.23
In all of the companies in which he worked Leitch 
introduced four cornerstones in the building of a new labor 
policy. They were justice, cooperation, economy, and 
energy. The capstone of service was then added to these 
four. He defined these concepts in the following manner:
23John Leitch, Man-to-Man: The Story of Industrial
Democracy (New York: ~ Osborn, 1919) , p. B7~i ~
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We recognize that justice to ourselves necessitates 
taking advantage of every opportunity to do the best 
that is in us, and each day improve that growing ability.
Differences of opinion shall be freely and fearlessly 
expressed, but we shall at all times stand ready to 
cooperate with and heartily support the final judgement 
m  all matters.
Recognizing that economy is time, material, and 
energy well spent, we determine to make the best use of 
them, and so shall time, material, and energy become our 
servants while we become the masters of our destiny.
As energy is the power back of action, and action is 
necessary to produce results, we determine to energize 
our minds and hands, concentrating our powers upon the 
most important work before us.
We believe that the only sure and sound construction 
of success as an individual or an institution depends 
upon the quality and quantity of service r e n d e r e d . 2 4
These concepts were introduced one at a time to the workers
over a period of weeks. Each was voted on as a resolution
to be accepted or rejected.
Leitch attempted to see that each concept was put 
into practice by the workers before he introduced another. 
Once, accepted, the five resolutions were regarded as the 
firm's business policy. Leitch insisted that typewritten 
copies of the resolutions be distributed to every worker and 
that each man should carry his copy with him at all times.
With the firm's new business and labor policy 
accepted by the workers, the formal plan of employee repre­
sentation was then constructed. The representation plans 
were modeled after the U.S. government with a house consist­
ing of workers' representatives, a senate composed of 
management representatives, and a cabinet of top management
^John Leitch, "The Background of Industrial Democ­
racy," Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, 
LXXXV (SeptemberT 1919)”, 212-213.
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2 5officials. The systems were entitled plans of industrial 
democracy or by some of Leitch*s contemporaries, Leitch 
plans.
Leitch *s experience led him to believe that indus^- 
trial democracy was equally applicable in companies employing 
skilled craftsmen and in firms such as the pipe manufacturer 
which relied primarily on unskilled labor.
Perhaps the greatest appeal of his system was Leitch
himself. In each case which he described, the force of his
own zeal seems to have had a decisive effect in breaking
down the feelings of hostility between management and labor.
He was described by one contemporary writer as an industrial
evangelist who "always strives to convert the management and
i 9 Rmen before he installs his plan of industrial democracy.  ̂
Speaking to the men of the Packard Piano Company in 1913, 
Leitch showed the apparent desire he had to resolve their 
problems:
"The trouble is," I said, "You are working at cross 
purposes. . . . It is not anybody's fault--it is every­
body's fault. You are to blame and the company is to 
blame, or, if you would like better to put it another 
way, you are not to blame and the company is not to 
blame. . . .  I think I know what the trouble is and I 
am here to help you and the company to help themselves.
I shall not ask you to do anything except listen and ask 
questions. If you think I am on the square we will have 
more meetings and work this thing out. But if you think 
I am trying to put one over on you say so. This is
full discussion of the design and operation of 
this and other representation systems will be found in the 
following chapter.
^Miller, op. cit. , p. 42.
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your meeting and not mine. By your vote you can take me 
or leave m e . 27
Leitch reported that in a period of five weeks he introduced 
the four cornerstones and the capstone of the new labor 
policy. The result was the adoption at the end of the five 
weeks of a plan of industrial democracy and a sharing be­
tween the company and the workers on an equal basis of any 
cost savings achieved in production. The reported effect 
was an end to work slowdowns, inferior quality, and union 
agitation. The men were said to have'''cheered and gone to 
work with a will."2®
As previously mentioned, Leitch viewed his primary 
task as one of changing the basic attitudes of both manage­
ment and worker before attempting the design of a formal 
representation system. His approach was somewhat akin to 
the mental revolution which Frederick W. Taylor found so 
necessary in the introduction of a system of scientific 
management in an organization.
He cited five basic changes that had occurred in 
every firm in which he had installed a plan of industrial 
democracy:
1. An increase in production
2. A decrease in the cost of production
3. A decrease in the turnover of labor
^Leitch, op. cit. , p. 37-38 .
28Ibid., p. kS.
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4. A reputation throughout the community as a 
desirable place to work in and consequently a 
greater ease in hiring men
5. An immunity from strikes and other labor trou­
bles . 29
Although he acknowledged that such results sounded almost 
too good to be true, research indicates that he was largely 
successful in obtaining these goals in the firms with which 
he worked.99
Sounding very much like Douglas MacGregor, Leitch 
explained that such results were primarily the result of 
changed assumptions.
It is simply that we have gotten into the habit of 
thinking that sloth and inattention are the natural 
attributes of the man who works for hire. But is is 
just as natural for a man to exert the best that is in 
him when working in a shop as when playing on a baseball 
team. The real trouble is that we have denied him the 
opportunity and the reward for self expression in the 
average factory; we have organized with so little atten­
tion to the human factor that we have in effect thrown 
away brain power and taken only body power. We have 
become so obsessed with the utility of machines that we 
have tried to make a machine out of a human being.31
And Leitch1s answer to this dehumanization of the workers
was industrial democracy.
By 1915 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was in general 
agreement with John Leitch’s belief in the need to eliminate 
strife and improve efficiency in industry. His personal 
experiences with labor-management conflict had brought home 
to him the need for some method of relieving such problems.
29Ibid. , p. 169.
30^iller, loc. cit.
^Leitch, op. cit. , p. 17 0.
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In the early 1900's Rockefeller and his father had
large interests in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, a
coal-mining and steel-making firm. It was during this
time that there was substantial labor unrest in the coal
mines with the fledgling United Mine Workers of America
attempting to unionize the Colorado coal fields.
The companies resisted.all attempts at unionization.
In the forefront of this resistance was the Rockefeller-
controlled Colorado Fuel and Iron Company and its president,
J. F. Welborn. Although John D. Rockefeller, Jr. actually
took little part in the firm's policy decisions regarding
labor, he had gone on record in support of any action taken
3 2by the company's management in Colorado. In the fall of
1913 a strike was called by the United Mine Workers against
the operators of the coal fields in southern Colorado, one
of which was the Rockefeller-controlled firm. Tension and
animosity was so high on both sides that the governor of
the state requested Welborn to meet with a committee of
aggrieved employees. Although Welborn met with the' committee,
he refused to make any compromises since he believed that
this might be interpreted as de facto recognition of the 
33union.
Violence flared on both sides, resulting in the 
calling of the National Guard by the governor in late 1913.
32Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1960), p. 158.
33Letter from J. F. Welborn. to Mr. McClement, Decem­
ber 4, 1913, in Taft, op. cit., p. 260.
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The leadership of the guard was reported to be strongly 
antagonistic toward the strikers31* with the result that when 
a boy was believed held in the striking workers’ tent 
colony, the guardsmen attacked and burned the tent camp on 
April 10, 1914. Three miners were killed, and two women and 
eleven children were smothered to death in one of the burn­
ing tents.33
This tragedy came to be known as the "Ludlow 
Massacre" and was widely publicized throughout the country. 
The fighting was at last put to a stop when the governor 
requested President Woodrow Wilson to send in federal 
troops.
Although John D. Rockefeller, Jr. took little active 
part in the policy decisions of the firm, his ownership 
interests in it and his earlier statements of public support 
for the management of the firm caused him to receive a 
significant amount of adverse publicity.33 Writing in 1916 
he revealed his own feelings about the violence that had 
occurred:
I frankly confess that I felt there was something 
fundamentally wrong in a condition of affairs which made 
possible the loss of human lives, engendered hatred and 
bitterness, and brought suffering and privation upon 
hundreds of human beings. I determined, therefore, that
3 UPaul M. Angle, Crossroads: 1913 (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963), p. '242.
q cGraham Adams, Jr., Age of Industrial Violence,
1910-15 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 159.
q  c H. S. Ferns and B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie
King (London: William Heinemann, 1955), pp. 191-193.
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in so far as it lay within my power I would seek some 
means of avoiding the possibility of similar conflicts 
arising elsewhere or in the future.3'
Rockefeller’s desire to overcome the strife and the 
residual bitterness in the Colorado coal fields led him to 
contact with the help of an official of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, W. L. Mackenzie King. King, a former Canadian 
Minister of Labor, was a respected student of labor rela­
tions and author of his country's Industrial Disputes Act.
He in later years was to become one of Canada’s most dis­
tinguished Prime Ministers.
King's first meeting with Rockefeller was in June, 
191*4, six months before the Colorado strike was given up by 
the miners. Although a solution to the Colorado problem
was apparently the foremost consideration in Rockefeller's
3 8mind at this meeting, the two reached general agreement 
that a much broader study of labor management problems, 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, would be a worth­
while task.
By July, King and Rockefeller had reached oral 
agreement that King would undertake a study of industrial 
relations under the auspices of the Foundation. King was 
emphatic in his desire to be employed by the Foundation and 
not by Standard Oil. He feared "that once associated in any 
way with the Rockefeller concern, my future in [Canadian]
q 7John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "Labor and Capital-- 
Partners," Atlantic Monthly, CXVII (January, 1916), 15.
^F. A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie 
King: 1911-1919 (Toronto: Macmillan of Toronto, 1962),
p . 97.
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q qpolitics would be jeopardized." In August of that year 
King was formally appointed by the Foundation to make a 
study of industrial relations.
Although King's appointment was for the purpose of 
studying industrial relations in general, he saw his first 
task as that of helping to solve the existing problems in 
Colorado. He resolved to study the situation in detail.
This did, of course, require a trip to the site of the 
trouble.
In March, 1915, he arrived in Colorado and began 
talks with the company's management. Investigating condi­
tions of work in the mines, he talked with the miners and 
their families. After much investigation and discussion he 
saw some progress in converting the management's previous 
hard-line view toward management-worker relations. He saw 
the need for many reforms in working conditions. He was 
further convinced that the company must initiate an "indus­
trial constitution, some form of representative government 
in which the company's twelve thousand employees would have 
a recognized standing when it came to decisions affecting 
working— and living--conditions. The plan of industrial 
representation was apparently taking form in his mind.
By September of that year the representation plan 
was complete, and King returned to Colorado, this time
^ Ibid . , p . 103 .
^McGregor, op.'cit., p. 16 0.
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accompanied by Rockefeller. The plan soon came to be known 
as the Rockefeller Plan, but its author was Mackenzie King.
Although Rockefeller's trip to Colorado was for the 
purpose of his explaining the new representation system to 
both management and workers, he fully realized his lack of 
knowledge of industrial relations and his dependence upon 
King. In later years he said:
I was merely King’s mouthpiece. I needed education. 
No other man did so much for m e . He had vast experience 
in industrial relations and I had none. He had an in­
tuitive sense of the right thing to do— whether it was 
a man who ought to be talked with or a situation that 
ought to be met.^l
This was King's first attempt at designing an 
employee representation plan, but evidence exists that it 
was well received by both sides. At a joint meeting of 
management and labor representatives Rockefeller, with King 
by his side, explained the workings of the plan. He in 
addition suggested a number of needed reforms in working 
conditions. The joint conference supported the plan. The 
workers were then allowed to vote for either acceptance or 
rejection, with the result that of the seventy-three per­
cent of the workers who voted, eighty-four percent cast their
4 2ballots for acceptance.
In addition to the formal creation of the plan, a 
position of Executive Assistant to the President was created
^Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: A
Portrait (New York: Harper, 1956) , p . 161.
noMcGregor, o p . cit., p. 184.
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to deal with problems and issues of industrial relations in 
the company. This position which was a forerunner of the 
company’s personnel department was initially held by 
Clarence J. Hicks. His primary duties lay in the adminis­
tration of the new representation system. He, in fact, 
succeeded so well that he was later called on to design 
plans for many of the Standard Oil Companies in which the 
Rockefeller family had stock interests.
Few had illusions as to Rockefeller's primary moti­
vation for the formation of the industrial representation 
system in the company. The battle between the firm and the 
United Mine Workers had been a bitter one, and the plan was 
an obvious attempt to satisfy the workers' desire for 
organization. It further acted as an upward channel of 
communication through which workers, through their elected 
representatives, could air their grievances with management. 
Coupled with the company's action in improving working con-
h 0ditions for the miners, it was well received. This plan 
continued to function for twenty years.
The leaders of organized labor were not, however, 
enthusiastic about the plan. Samuel Gompers, then President 
of the American Federation of Labor, was adamantly against 
such organizations. Gompers' position was essentially that 
no employee representatives were truly free to bargain with 
management unless their employee organization was completely
^Allan Nevins, John D. Rockefeller (New York: 
Scribner, 1941), II, pp. 673-674.
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independent of the employer.1+14 This issue was to become the 
chief argument for the outlawing of all such plans under the 
Wagner Act twenty years later.
Mackenzie King's success with the development of 
this early plan led to requests for similar help by a number 
of other large firms. During the period from 1915 through 
1918 he acted as consultant in labor relations to such firms 
as General Electric, Bethlehem Steel, and the International 
Harvester Company. In each of these companies an employee 
representation plan was put into effect as the result of 
his consultation.
His influence during this period was not limited, 
however, to the firms with which he had direct contact.
The representation systems he designed, particularly the 
Colorado Plan, were used as models by other firms with 
which he had no relationship.
Most of the companies directly and indirectly in­
fluenced by King's plans of employee representation sought 
to use them as a means to avoid unionism. The success of 
the Colorado Plan was an encouragement to managements who 
sought such means to keep unionism from engulfing their 
firms.
Mackenzie King did not, however, view employee 
representation as a means of subverting unionism. He saw
^Samuel Gompers, "Rockefeller Organizes and Recog­
nizes a 'Union'," American Federationist, XXII (November, 
1915), 976-977.
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the Colorado Plan as one step toward better worker- 
management relations and pictured union recognition as a 
possible later step by the company if conditions warranted. 
He insisted, in fact, that no discrimination be made against 
union members who were or wished to be employees of the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. His influence was so great 
upon Rockefeller that union organizers were allowed to 
actively seek members among the company’s employees upon 
the company’s property. Such a practice was never allowed 
before the representation plan was put into effect.
Although King returned to Canada in 1919 to re-enter 
politics, his mark upon industrial relations in this country 
was profound. He did much to contribute toward better 
management-worker relations, showing that by allowing the 
worker even a limited voice in the affairs of his work, a 
positive benefit could result to both sides. His influence 
upon John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s view of the proper relation 
between labor and capital was also great, especially in the 
decade to follow. Rockefeller's philosophy, strongly in­
fluenced by King, was to play a major role in the labor 
policies of Standard Oil of New Jersey for many years to 
come.
Summary of the pre-war period. The latter part of the nine­
teenth century and the early part of the twentieth witnessed 
a dramatic change in the size of many business firms and 
the relation of employees to these firms. Growth and
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increased mechanization brought an increase in job segmenta­
tion and repetitive tasks. The heavy influx of unskilled 
or semi-skilled immigrant workers was an added stimulus to 
the development of easily learned tasks, thus increasing 
the interchangeability of workers at minimum training cost. 
The techniques of scientific management, developed in the 
late 18 00’s, helped employers to design tasks in this seg­
mented manner.
Throughout this period most owners and managers held 
to the notion that the employers' authority was absolute, 
and the workers should either follow orders or take their 
labor elsewhere. Indeed, this was the basic tenet of nine­
teenth century private enterprise. But while the beliefs 
of employers remained for the most part unchanged, the 
organizational and economic relationship between capital and 
labor was changing dramatically.
As was indicated previously, the firm tended to grow 
much larger. No longer was there a chance for the personal 
relationships that might have occurred between the owner 
and his employees in a small shop. Cultural barriers and 
differences in language created a further gap between manage­
ment and the many immigrant employees of large firms.
Economically, the worker was in a position of in­
creasing dependence upon the firm. With little or no skill, 
the individual workman had no real bargaining power. And 
with an abundance of available workmen, the employer could
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pay low wages and be sure of having enough men to fill any 
vacant positions.
Supervisory style was commonly the driving type with 
foremen not known for their skill in human relations. 
Employees often retaliated with slowdowns or soldiering, 
attempts at unionization, and strikes. The period might be 
aptly described as one of labor unrest resulting in the 
growing power of unionism.
The fear of unionism and the wish to avoid strikes 
led a few employers to experiment, with techniques of employee 
representation. A second motive was the desire to improve 
efficiency and output and eliminate or reduce the soldiering 
found in many firms.
Although not commonly found in industry before World 
War I, employee representation gained a significant amount 
of publicity. Perhaps because it was appealing to the 
American public’s basic belief in democracy and fair play, 
it was apparently well received, at least in its theoretical 
aspects. Businessmen, however, were for the most part 
skeptical.
Of those who contributed most to employee represen­
tation in this era the names of John Leitch, W. L. Mackenzie 
King, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. stand out. While Letich 
and King were designers of plans, Rockefeller's influence 
lay primarily in placing his name and position in support 
of representation systems. He wrote and spoke out for 
giving the worker a greater voice in the work place. For a
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man of capital to make such statements in the early 1900’s 
was considered by many to be truly amazing, if not danger­
ously radical.^
Nevertheless, Rockefeller’s beliefs, strongly in­
fluenced by his association with Mackenzie King, did affect 
the growth of employee representation in this country, both 
within the firms controlled by the Rockefellers and those 
outside its sway.
Although many of Rockefeller's, contemporaries in 
big business did not accept the principle of representation 
for employees, Rockefeller along with Leitch, King, and 
others who were less well known, had forged a path for the 
concept of greater democracy in industry and more humane 
treatment of workers. The period to 1917 might properly be 
called employee representation's period of infancy. It 
would require America's entry into the War to give it its 
next stimulus for growth.
Influences Upon Employee Representation from 1917-1919
Shortly after World War I began in 1914, immigration 
to the United States was sharply curtailed. And even though 
this nation remained officially neutral until 1917, industry 
received a tremendous boost as a result of war orders from 
Allied nations.
^Judge Elbert Gary, President of U.S. Steel, 
remained unconvinced as to the wisdom of employee represen­
tation even though Rockefeller had personnaly tried to make 
him see otherwise.
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These two factors, increased demand for production 
and a decrease in the supply of labor from Europe, reduced 
the buyer's market for labor which employers in this country 
had enjoyed for some time. This situation was intensified 
with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917. 
Mobilization led to increased production demands upon in­
dustry while thousands of young men were being pulled out 
of the labor force for military service. Moreover, the 
avoidance of strikes and slowdowns in industries vital to 
the war effort became a national goal. The unrest and dis­
content of labor was not ameliorated, however, and actually 
grew. By the spring of 1918 the number of strikes in 
United States industry had risen alarmingly.
As a means of settling the conflicts in industries 
vital to war production, President Wilson created the 
National War Labor Board. The Board and its representatives 
were to act as impartial arbitrators in industrial disputes. 
Throughout its existence the Board recommended the estab­
lishment of collective bargaining between labor and manage­
ment. "Collective bargaining was involved in 22 6 cases on 
which it ruled, and the board directed that collective 
bargaining be followed either with regularly established 
unions or with shop committees that had heretofore not 
existed.
In essence, the Board gave a company the choice be­
tween recognizing a union or establishing a plan of employee
^Taft, op. cit. , p. 318.
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representation. As a result many firms who were formerly 
not interested in representation systems suddenly saw them 
as the lesser of two evils— the other being the firm's 
recognition of a trade union. As a consequence of the 
Board's work, about 125 representation plans were formed
h 7during the summer of 1918 and the early part of 1919.
Details of the plans were generally left to be worked
out by the employer and his employees. In fact some of the
plans constructed and installed by Mackenzie King in 1918
and 1919 were at the request of employers who had been
ordered to form such an arrangement. The plans he designed
for the Bethlehem Steel Company and for the General Electric
Company were of this nature.
Even though the Board allowed each company to work
out details of its own representation system it nevertheless
supervised the installation and administration. It also
established certain guidelines for the construction of a
plan. Secret elections among the employees were required by
the board with one representative chosen for each one
48hundred employees.
Not all of the plans installed during the war were 
at the request of the federal government, however. In 1918 
and 1919 the Standard Oil companies adopted industrial
^Henry Bruere and Grace Pugh, Profitable Personnel 
Practice (New York: Harper, 1929), p. 95.
^Carroll E. French, The Shop Committee in the 
United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 19 23), p. 2"7.
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representation plans similar to that of the Colorado system.
At Mackenzie King’s urging, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. actively
encouraged the formation of these plans. Happy with the
success of the Colorado experience and influenced by King's
thinking, Rockefeller seemed to feel that some sort of
formal system should be designed to allow the employees to
4 9air their grievances and to make requests to management.
Both King and Clarence J. Hicks, an administrator of the
Colorado Plan, were active in designing these representation 
50systems.
Of those representation systems designed and put
into effect at the insistence of the National War Labor
Board, many were discontinued after the war. A number of
works councils were established in plants which shut down
after the signing of the armistice. When the plants were
reopened to pursue private business and were free of National
War Labor Board supervision, employee representation was
51often abolished. However, most of the larger and better 
known firms which had established councils before or during 
the war maintained them after the fighting ceased. All of
n gInterview with William Reymond, retired Employee 
Relations Manager of the Baton Rouge Refinery, Standard of 
New Jersey, July 14, 1969.
k°Ibid. Hicks visited the Baton Rouge refinery, 
then a part of Standard Oil of Louisiana in 1919, to help 
with the installation of such a plan.
n Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee 
Representation or Works Councils (Washington, D.C.: Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 1927), p. 5.
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those companies mentioned previously in this presentation 
continued their plans.
Even though some of the wartime plans were abandoned, 
the concept of employee representation in American industry 
seemed to have gained not only in numbers, but also in 
prestige. In addition to the direct effect of introducing 
workers' councils in firms that had not previously had them, 
the National War Labor Board's activities resulted in a 
significant amount of publicity for the concept of represen­
tation. The federal government had for the first time 
given official sanction to this method of promoting labor- 
management harmony and had added its prestige to the legiti­
macy of the plans.
Employee representation was slowly becoming estab­
lished as a feature of some segments of American industry, 
although the decade of the 19 2 0's would be a period of much 
greater growth and strength.
The Decade of the 192Q's: a Dramatic Expansion of Employee
Representation
The end of the war signaled an economic downturn for 
industry in this country. As business activity declined 
and those in military service returned to the civilian labor 
force, the labor market situation again became favorable to 
the employer. Although prosperity characterized most of 
this period, unemployment was fairly high throughout. From
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1919 to 1926 the average percentage of unemployed was 9.7,
52and the average in the good years of 1923 to 1925 was 7.3.
With government controls lifted and an excess supply 
of workers, one might have predicted the abolishment of 
employee representation and other more humanitarian aspects 
of labor-management relations. And as previously indicated, 
some representation plans were, in fact, done away with' 
after the war. On the whole, however, the impetus for growth 
which occurred during the war was maintained afterward.
Reasons for growth. What reasons might explain the continued 
expansion of employee representation in the early 1920's?
One factor that cannot be ignored was the employers' con­
tinued fear of unionism. Throughout the war period the 
numerical strength of labor unions grew. In 192 0, union
membership stood at five million, or about twelve percent of
53that year's total labor force. Moreover, a wave of 
strikes swept the country in 1919. Some employers— fearful 
of having their own firm organized or in some cases desirous 
of eliminating an existing union in their companies--turned 
to employee representation as a solution. Writing in 19 20, 
a former official of the National War Labor Board stated 
that "A large group of employers are attempting to evade
^H. b . Butler, Unemployment Problems in the United 
States, (International Labour Office Studies and Reports, 
Series C, No. 17. Geneva: P. S. King, 1931), p. 47.
c  q U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Print­
ing Office, 19 60), p. 97.
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union recognition by the formation of shop committees and
the application of various local schemes of employee repre- 
54sentation." In the same year Tead and Metcalf expressed
the feelings of many employers:
. . . if I give my workers a voice in controlling 
conditions in the shop, there will be no place for out­
side organization. The idea is to anticipate the union 
organizer, to create an intraplant collective bargain, 
to deal only with my own men.^
Some employers, therefore, saw employee representa­
tion as a way of avoiding dealing with a labor union.
Whether they believed what they said or not, employers1 
associations, individual employers, and a significant number 
of the general population equated labor unions with the 
Bolshevism of Soviet Russia. The nation was shaken by the 
Russian revolution and feared that some labor unions of 
this country might be hoping for a similar experience here.
The country has been described in 1919 as in the grip of a
-> * 5 6real panic.
Although the American Federation of Labor was 
decidedly oriented toward business unionism and was the 
strongest labor confederation in the country in 1920, there 
were enough headlines made by more radical unionists, both
54W. Jett Lauck, "Labor and Production," Annals of 
the Academy of Political and Social Science, XC (July, 1920), 
91-92.
^Ordway Tead and Henry Metcalf, Personnel Admin­
istration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1920), p. 421.
^^See, for example, Preston William Slosson, The 
Great Crusade and After: 1914-192 8 (New York: Macmillan,
1931), Chapter 3.
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inside and outside the federation, to frighten many into
5 7equating trade unionism with revolution.
The problems of the time led one writer to compose 
the following poem critical of union activities in the coal 
mines:
SONNETS OF THE STRIKE58
by Charles Nicholls Webb 
I
The Manager is Interviewed
Conditions in our mines are excellent;
Considering, of course, the industry 
Is hazardous, at best, I think that we 
Lost fewer men by fatal accident 
Last season than one half of one per cent 
Of those employed; and I will willingly 
Go with you throughout any property;
Talk sanitation with you, wages, rent—
The clear, dry voice, the steady, steel-gray eyes,
Icy alike, alike unwavering,
In sudden change took me by swift surprise;
The eyes flashed and the voice took on a ring;
’This Union fights us with the basest lies;
And so, by Heaven, we will crush the thing!'
II
An Employee Takes Action
'Slave of efficiency!' In deep disdain 
The agitator sneared and walked away.
'You do not know your God has feet of clay!'
Haranguing loud and shrill like one insane,
He urged the men to strike with might and main.
'Suffer the masters not another day;
Breaking the clouds of serfdom, one small ray 
Predicts a sudden ending to their reign.'
5^Freidel, op. cit. , p. 223 .
58Charles Nicholls Webb, "Sonnets of the Strike," 
Atlantic Monthly, CXXIV (November, 1919), 664-665.
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Patient and still unmoving as a stone,
I listened to him lie and rant and brag 
And tell of hardships he had never known;
But when I saw him flaunt a crimson rag 
I struck him down--The alien, left alone,
Regretted that he’d cursed my country’s flag.
It thus does not seem surprising that some employers made
employee representation a part of their own shop’s American
Plan drive of the 1920’s. It did in a number of cases serve
as a way of avoiding unionism.
A second motivation for the post-war continuance of
representation systems was the wartime success of many of
them in overcoming slowdowns and low quality output. Under
emergency conditions calling for high levels of productivity,
employees in many firms responded more fully after the in-
5 9troduction of a representation plan. Of course some of 
the willingness of employees to produce during the war was 
no doubt due to appeals to patriotism; the extent to which 
this was a factor in increasing production cannot be 
isolated. The fact remains, however, that during the war 
the introduction of works councils in a number of firms 
resulted in decreased strife and increased productivity.
Thus a number of employers sought to maintain this better 
relationship after the war.
Employee representation may be seen, therefore, as 
one of the factors which influenced employers to modify the 
traditional driving form of worker motivation. The wartime
c q Ernest Richmond Burton, Employee Representation 
(Baltimore: Wilkins and Wilkins, 1926V, p . 231^
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experience had shown that employee participation in affairs
which concern them could result in greater interest and
productivity and a greater understanding of the actions
r ntaken by management.
A third important factor, closely related to the 
previous two, which influenced continued growth to the plans 
was the significant amount of publicity given works councils 
after the war. Books and articles on the subject in the
R1early 192 0's were numerous. Companies successfully using 
the plans seemed to be more than happy to tell the world of 
their experiences with them.
A final and perhaps more illusive impetus to the 
continued growth of representation was the public's in­
creasing concern for democracy in industry after World War I. 
The war had been fought to make the world safe for democracy, 
and it began to occur to many that democracy should exist 
not only in government bodies but also in some measure in 
industry. The comments of Sam A. Lewisohn, an industrial 
executive and Chairman of the Board of the American Manage­
ment Association during the 19 20's, reflect this sentiment:
One of the phenomena that is presented in industrial 
situations is an irritating sanctimoniousness and 
assumption of self-righteousness on the part of those 
in power. . . . the result of this notion was that the 
worker felt . . . that his dignity and self respect
were not accorded the consideration that they had been
^^This topic will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.
*^The appended bibliography is. believed to be a 
comprehensive listing of this literature.
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given in our political system. . . . Employee represen­
tation may be compared to limited representative govern­
ment . 6 2
Lewisohn went on to comment that industrial government in 
the form of employee representation could not be expected to 
reach the democracy of the political world without sacrific­
ing efficiency in industry. But he, along with others, did 
see representation as a means of giving the workers a 
degree of control over their working lives.
Although still covering only a small part of total 
United States industry, employee representation seemed to 
have an assured future by the early 1920fs. Its growth did 
indeed continue throughout most of the decade, reaching a
high point of over one and a half million workers in 4-32
fi qcompanies covered in 19 28.
The plans and unions. Despite the changes in managerial 
and social philosophy taking place during this period, it 
does appear that the primary factor influencing employee 
representation's adoption was the fear of unionization. 
Representation was often coupled with the paternalistic 
policies of the firm and with the employer’s crusade for the 
open shop or American Plan.
Most of the plans contained formal statements which 
recognized the acceptance of both union and non-union
®^Sam A. Lewisohn, The New Leadership in Industry 
(New York: Dutton, 1926), p. 125.
®^U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics, 
loc. cit.
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employees. For example, the by-laws of the Bethlehem Steel 
Company's works council contained the following statement:
Representation hereunder shall in no way discrimi­
nate against any employee because of race, sex, or creed, 
or abridge or conflict with his or her right to belong 
or not to belong to any lawful society, fraternity, 
union or other organization.^*4
Companies often publicized such clauses as proof of their 
tolerance of union members. Individual membership in a 
union was not, of course, a particularly effective weapon 
in securing concessions from management when the firm was 
operating as an open shop and did not bargain with the 
union. The clause may be more properly interpreted as allow­
ing, if not encouraging, employees not to belong to a union.
The employer could effectively argue that not only 
did his firm not discriminate against union members, but
that all of his employees, both union and non-union, had a
1
voice in the affairs of the firm through employee represen­
tation. Since in most firms, an individual was automati­
cally a member of the representation plan when he became an 
employee, he was automatically given a voice in the policies 
of the company. The open shop was thus encouraged through 
the administrative design of a representation system.
A second and closely related benefit of shop commit­
tees in keeping out unionism was its use as a vehicle for 
the paternalistic employer policies of the decade. These 
benefits which employers could afford to grant due to the
^Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Plan of Employee Rep- 
resentation at the Bethlehem Plant of Bethlehem Steel Com­
pany (Bethlehem, Pa.: Bethlehem Steel Company, 1935), p. 2.
52
general prosperity of the time were often cited as gains 
achieved through the shop committee. An example of such 
claims comes from a 1927 publication of Bethlehem Steel.
The company reported that conferences of workers and manage­
ment had resulted in gains for employees in such areas as 
employment and working conditions, wages, employees’ trans­
portation, health and sanitation, pensions and relief,
6 5employee housing, and athletics and recreation.
It is difficult to determine whether the gains 
mentioned by this and other companies were the result of 
employee or employer initiation. Although the company 
publications often implied that the workers’ representatives 
played a large part in obtaining the benefits which were 
granted, it must be noted that paternalism and the granting 
of various worker benefits was not limited to firms using 
employee representation.
Certainly, the benefits that were obtained through 
unilateral employer action were not by definition less help­
ful because they were not obtained through true collective 
bargaining. Many firms were quite generous with the benefits 
they bestowed upon their employees. The point is that many 
of the wage and fringe benefit increases granted to employees 
during this period were primarily the result of unilateral 
employer action. The councils were, however, the vehicle
6^Edward A. Lyman, Bethlehem Steel Plan Aids Company 
and Men in Bethlehem Steel Company (Bethlehem, Pa.: Bethle­
hem Steel Company, 1927), p. 8"T
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through which the benefits were granted with the firm citing 
the gains as accomplishments of the plan. Thus another
66wedge was entered between the employees and trade unions.
And union membership did decline during most of the
decade. Although employee representation could not properly
fi 7be regarded as the sole cause of this decline, it most 
certainly was a way of giving the workers a degree of collec­
tive participation in some firms.
Before concluding a discussion of this decade, it 
should be pointed out that despite the fact that the number 
of councils grew throughout most of this period and the 
number of employees covered increased, employee representa­
tion never included a majority of the labor force. The 
year of representation’s greatest strength was 1928 in which 
only about eleven percent of the work force were members of 
any sort of employee organization whether trade union or 
employee representation plan.
In summary, the period of the 1920’s was character­
ized by increasing growth of employee representation plans.
6^The above discussion is not meant to imply that 
there were no real contributions by employee representation 
to worker-management relations. Such contributions will be 
fully discussed in Chapters IV and V. Included in this 
discussion will be evidence that employees did in some com­
panies influence the overall benefit package.
6^Phelps sites the following factors as influencing 
the decline of unionism during the 192 0’s: stable wages,
improved personnel administration, drive for the open shop, 
tired labor leadership, and an unfavorable political climate. 
Orme W. Phelps, Introduction to Labor Economics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967^), pp. 151-153.
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Motivations for the increasing growth of the plans included
employer fear of unionization, a desire for increased morale
and productivity, the wide publicity given to existing plans,
and a general shift in society’s thinking concerning the
proper relationship between management and workers.
Employee representation was a convenient means
through which many employer-initiated benefits were given to
the workers. Since its formal design was of a democratic 
fi 8nature, it served as a further arguing point for employers 
against the need for unionization of their firms. It, 
moreover, was often used as a selling point for the open 
shop campaigns of the decade.
Employee representation in this and the succeeding 
decade achieved a number of sometimes unexpected benefits 
for the workers who worked under it and for many in industry 
who did not.
The 1930’s: Governmental Action, Union Growth, and Employee
Representation
After 1928, employee representation had begun to
decline slightly. The period from 19 2 8 through 19 32 saw a
membership decrease in representation plans from 1.5 million
fi Qto 1.2 million covered workers. Two factors accounted for 
this decline. In the pre-depression period, a number of
68This topic will be discussed in the following
chapter.
^National Industrial Conference Board, Collective 
Bargaining Through Employee Representation (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1933), p. 17.
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small firms (one hundred employees or less) discontinued 
their plans. The small employer’s motivations for plan dis­
continuance are not known, but it may be hypothesized that 
both his fear of unionization and his need for some method 
to improve contacts with employees were much less than that 
of the large employers. Skill in both the design and 
administration of the plans was no doubt often less preva­
lent in the smaller organization. As a result, the plans 
in smaller firms were sometimes less than satisfactory in 
practice.
The second factor accounting for declining member­
ship in representation plans was the general decline in 
employment with the onset of the depression. In addition, 
the great excess of applicants over jobs may have influenced 
the dropping of some plans.
The coming of the New Deal and the labor legislation 
of the early 193 0’s reversed this trend. From a 19 3 2 mem­
bership of approximately 1.2 million, employee representa-
70tion gained in membership by 1935 to 2.5 million workers. 
During the same period union membership rose from 3.1 to 
4.2 million workers.
The impetus for growth of both employee representa­
tion and unionism came from Section 7 (a) of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 193 3. The language of the Act
■^National Industrial Conference Board, Individual 
and Collective Bargaining Under the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (New York: National Industrial Conference Board,
1933), pp. 2 3-24.
56
was designed to encourage employee organization and collec-
71tive bargaining between management and workers. Many 
firms interpreted its wording to mean that an employee repre­
sentation plan would satisfy the requirements of employee 
organization and collective bargaining. An example of such 
an interpretation comes from the 19 33 annual report of the 
United States Steel Corporation
The Corporation’s subsidaries have whole-heartedly 
cooperated in carrying out the spirit and intent of the 
Code and the law in respect to ’’collective bargaining" 
by and with employees'. At practically all plants 
employees have organized under "Employees' Representa­
tion Plans," choosing their own representatives to deal 
with the employing company in all matters relating to 
wages and conditions of employment. These plans have 
proven eminently satisfactory in promoting harmony in 
industrial relations and are conducive to the best 
interests of the employees, the employers, and the 
general public."72
It should be noted that U.S. Steel had never been interested
in any form of employee representation prior to the passage
of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
The language of the act read in part . . . (1) 
that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coer­
cion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa­
tion of such representatives or in self organization or in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no 
employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as
a. condition of employment to join any company union or to 
refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor 
organization of his own choosing. . . . National Industrial
Recovery Act, sec. 7 (a), 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
7^United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report, 
1933 (New York: United States Steel Corporation, 1933), p.
4.
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While the National Labor Board (in existence from 
August, 1933 to July, 19 34) was established in part to deal 
with cases of employer interference in employee organization, 
its power was limited and its rulings on this matter were 
somewhat imprecise. The Board used two tests to determine 
the legitimacy of a plan: (1) whether there had been or was
interference, restraint, or coercion, and (2) whether there 
had been opportunity for the workers to accept or reject 
plans submitted.^
Thus the National Labor Board never held that every 
employee representation plan was necessarily dominated by 
the employer. Its interpretations of Section 7 (a) indi­
cated that the law did not make company unions illegal as 
such. If the Board found that the employees had a hand in 
designing the plan, in freely voting upon its provisions, 
and in the election of its representatives, and that the 
majority of the employees preferred this form of representa­
tion, the Board would certify it as the legitimate agent of 
the employees.
If there was a contest between a trade union and an 
employee representation plan, the Board would hold an elec­
tion to determine which plan the employees preferred. 
Certification was then granted by the Board to the winning 
organizations. The Board was limited in its effectiveness,
^3Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 19 50) , p. 845'.
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however. Employers could and often did refuse to attend 
Labor Board hearings since the Board had no power to sub­
poena witnesses or records. Its calls for representation
7 4elections were often challenged by employers in the courts. 
The experience of the first National Labor Relations Board 
(July, 1934-June, 19 35) was much the same. The result was 
the previously mentioned doubling of memJhe£ship in employee 
representation plans between 1932 and 1935. The passage of 
the National Labor Relations Act of 19 35 was to reverse this 
trend.
The National Labor Relations Act of 193 5 (the Wagner 
Act), like the National Industrial Recovery Act, did not 
outlaw independent or company unions. It did, through its
nrlisting of unfair labor practices, more clearly define 
what constituted employer domination of, interference with,
1 or coercion of employees in the formation and administration 
of employee organizations. The act also gave a newly 
created National Labor Relations Board broader and more 
specific powers to investigate and prosecute violators of 
the Act.
During its early investigative work the Board ruled 
on a number of representation plans and found them to be in 
violation of the Act. These rulings involved findings that
^ F o r  example, see U.S. v. Weirton Steel Company,
10 F.Supp. 55 US (1935).
"^National Labor Relations Act, sec. 8, 49 Stat.
452 (1935), 29 U.S.C., sec. 151 (1965).
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the representation plans were company dominated labor organ­
izations. Evidence of this domination was usually cited
7 6under one or more of the following headings:
1. A majority vote of both management and employee 
representatives was necessary for a resolution 
to be passed. Management could thus control the 
plan through its voting rights.
2. The plan could not be amended without management’s 
consent.
3. There was no actual contract for a specified 
period between the company and its employees.
Only a constitution of a very general nature 
existed.
4. Employees had no meaningful part in designing 
the plan.
5. Employee representatives could not impartially 
represent their constituents since they were 
paid by the employer and since the plan was 
financed entirely by the employer.
6. While employees might not have felt coerced under 
the plan, subtle coercion existed by definition 
under the National Labor Relations Act. When­
ever a plan, as defined by the Act, was financed 
by the company, coercion also existed.
Because the lawyers for many of the companies in­
volved in such disputes believed that the National Labor 
Relations. Act would have the same fate as the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act and be declared unconstitutional, they 
advised the companies to ignore the rulings of the Board and
allow the courts to settle the matter. In 1937, the Supreme
7 7Court upheld the constitutionality of the law.
7 fiFor example, see NLRB v. International Harvester, 
2 NLRB 310 (1936); NLRB v. Bethlehem Steel, CA DC (1941), 
120 F .2d. 641.
*^NLRB v. Jones S Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
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A decision by the Supreme Court in 193 8 specifically
outlawed employee representation plans. The Court ruled
that the National Labor Relations Board had the power not
only to order an employer to cease the domination of a labor
organization, but also to withdraw all recognition of that
organization and to post notices informing the employees of
7 8such withdrawal.
Despite the Court's ruling, National Labor Relations
Board findings concerning employer-dominated representation
7 9plans were contested by a few firms into the early 1940's.
In most cases the National Labor Relations Board's decisions 
were sustained by the courts, and employee representation 
declined and vanished from the scene by the time the United 
States entered World War II.
In summary, the decade of the 19 3 0's witnessed a 
decline, a sudden burst of growth, and then the demise of 
employee representation in the United States. The sudden 
interest of many employers in representation systems was 
stimulated by the labor legislation of the decade which 
sought to encourage unionism among American labor. Hoping 
to satisfy the requirements of the law, many employers 
designed employee representation plans as substitutes for 
trade and industrial unionism.
^®NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 30 3 U.S. 261
(1938).
7 QThe employee representation plan of Bethlehem 
Steel Company is a good example of continued, although un­
successful, resistance to the National Labor Relations Board.
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Representation systems were ruled illegal under the 
provisions of the Wagner Act, however, and existing plans 
were forced to discontinue their operation. In a few in­
stances , independent unions were formed by employees, but 
their numerical importance was not great.
Employee representation was thus effectively ended 
in this country by 1941. Its existence as an institution 
was put to an end by the Wagner Act and resultant National 
Labor Relations Board and court rulings. Although subject 
to many shortcomings, the plans filled a definite need in 
the evolving labor-management relationships in this country. 
As further chapters will demonstrate, employee representa­
tion is believed to have been a positive stimulus to the 
development of more employee-centered management, extending 
even beyond the companies who developed and used the repre­
sentation systems.
CHAPTER III
A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FORMAL DESIGN 
OF NINE PLANS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
With the adoption of an employee representation plan 
most firms composed a formal document to guide the manage­
ment and employee representatives in their dealings with 
each other. Often called industrial constitutions, these 
documents resembled union-management contracts in some ways 
but differed from them in important aspects. This chapter 
discusses the formal provisions of the plans of the nine 
companies surveyed.
Copies of the representation plan were usually dis­
tributed to all employees. It appears that the plan descrip 
tions were in some cases also intended for the consumption 
of other firms and the public in general.
The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
1. To find common characteristics among the plans.
2. To discover the areas in which non-management 
employees were allowed a voice in management’s 
decisions.
3. To determine how much authority was formally 
granted to them in the areas in which they were 
allowed a voice.
While such an analysis will not necessarily reveal 
how the plans functioned in actual operation, it should
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provide a greater understanding of the announced intentions 
of the managements which undertook employee representation. 
It should also, like the previous chapter, give the reader 
a better historical perspective with which to evaluate the 
true contributions of the plans. These contributions will 
be discussed in later chapters.
The analysis will be undertaken by discussing in 
turn the significant characteristics of the plan’s formal 
design followed by conclusions regarding the amount of for­
mal authority given to the employees through employee repre­
sentation.
Initiation and Adoption of the Plans
In every firm included in the survey the decision 
to institute a plan of employee representation was made by 
the employer.
In four of the nine firms.surveyed, the employees 
were given the opportunity to accept or reject the plan by 
secret ballot. They were not allowed to vote on specific 
provisions of the plan, however. The employees were 
required to approve it as it was designed, or reject it, 
and, by implication, the concept of employee representation 
as well. The firms surveyed reported an acceptance vote 
averaging 85 percent of the voting employees.1
1Three of the four firms which allowed a vote 
supplied data on the percentage of employees accepting the 
plan.
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The other firms surveyed did not allow a formal 
vote. They instead announced that the plan was in force and 
urged employees to elect representatives. Of course the 
employees could register their displeasure with the plan by 
refusing to elect anyone. There is no evidence that such 
action was taken in any of the companies surveyed.
The design of the plan was in most cases also in 
the hands of the employer alone. In a few instances repre­
sentatives of employees were asked to join with the company’s 
management to assist in the construction of the plan. In 
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, for example, the 
president of the firm announced in 1919 plans for the estab­
lishment of a representation system in the firm. Although 
the design of the plan was established largely on a uni­
lateral basis by the management, the employee representa­
tives were allowed to work with management representatives 
in the development of a legislative body. The president 
stated that the goal of the management and employee repre­
sentatives was to be the following:
. . . to formulate a plan to establish a legislative 
body somewhat along the lines of our national federal 
Congress, to give representation on matters of indus­
trial relations to all Goodyearites over 18 years of age, 
who are American citizens, understanding the English 
language, who have had six months continuous service or 
one year’s total service with the factory.3
^Seven of the nine plans allowed no formal employee 
participation in drafting the plan.
^Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Bulletin to 
Employees (Akron, Ohio: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,
1919), p. 26.
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Although no information is available which would 
determine how much real voice the employee representatives 
had in the development of this one aspect of the company's 
representation scheme, the management's strong hand in the 
design of the rest of the plan suggests firm guidance in 
this aspect also.
A second and somewhat more participative approach 
to employee involvement was taken by the Dennison Manufactur­
ing Company. The Dennison plan was launched in 1919 by 
posting a notice to all employees that an open-air meeting 
would be held to discuss the formation of a works council 
and the rules by which it would function. The employees 
were reported to have discussed the matter extensively with 
the result that a constitution committee was formed from 
among non-management employees, and a plan was developed by 
these individuals.14 Management representatives then dis­
cussed the provisions with the committee and gave their 
approval. The entire body of employees then voted their 
acceptance. The plan, however, was amended in several ways 
about six months later at the suggestion of the management 
representatives.®
^Franklin J. Meine, "The Introduction and Develop­
ment of the Works Committee in the Dennison Manufacturing 
Company," Journal of Personnel Research, III (August, 1924), 
133. Mr. Dennison did-supply the committee members with 
publications on employee representation to guide them in 
their construction of a plan.
5Ibid., p. 13 5.
^Ernest Richmond Burton, Employee Representation 
(Baltimore: Wilkins and Wilkins, 1926), p. 85.
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Thus the Dennison approach appears to have allowed 
the employees more latitude in forming the kind of plan they 
desired than any of the other firms surveyed. But to say 
that the employees had complete control over the plan's 
design is, of course, an overstatement. As noted, the 
plan's make-up was subject to the approval of management 
and was at least indirectly guided in its formation by Henry 
Dennison through his supplying the constitutional delegates 
with approved reading material in employee representation. 
The approach nevertheless involved far more participation 
by employees than that taken by any of the other firms 
surveyed and may be properly regarded as an unusual means 
of designing a plan.
Method of Obtaining Membership in the Plans
With the exception of American Telephone and Tele­
graph, an individual automatically became a member of the 
representation plan when he became an employee of the firm, 
provided he did not hold a managerial or supervisory posi-
i
tion. He typically obtained voting rights under the plan
7after a brief probationary period of thirty to sixty days.
In the case of American Telephone and Telegraph, 
employees were allowed to decide if they wished to be 
members and were required to take the initiative in joining. 
The Constitution of the Association of Employees stated
7 •The Goodyear plan required a waiting period of six
months of continuous service or one year's total service 
with the company.
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that "an eligible employee who wishes to become a member of 
the Association shall affiliate with the Branch formed among 
employees of' his Department and subdivision thereof as 
determined by the employee's work and place in the Company's 
organization . . .
It is interesting to observe that employers who 
utilized these plans argued against compulsory unionism and 
for the open shop. Their own firms, with the exception of 
A. T. and T., were operating under a form of union shop in 
that all employees were also members of the representation 
plan whether or not they wished to be.
Qualifications of Employee Representatives
The firms' industrial representation plans were 
designed in every case to spell out the qualifications for 
an employee to represent his co-workers in meetings with 
management. The qualifications in the Bethlehem Steel Com­
pany's plan were typical of those of most firms:
Each employee who has been on the pay rolls of the 
Company for a period of at least one year immediately 
prior to the first day on which nominations shall be 
held, who on that day is twenty-one years of age or 
over and who is an American citizen shall be qualified 
for nomination and election as an Employees' Represen­
tative .
8American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Constitu- 
of Association of Employees (New York: American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Division, August 3, 1934),
p . 6.
Bethlehem Steel Company, Plan of Employee Represen­
tation at the Bethlehem Plant of Bethlehem Steel Company 
(Bethlehem, Pa.: Bethlehem Steel Company, 1935), p. 4.
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The employer appeared in every case to be concerned 
primarily with two qualifications: that the representatives
were his own employees and that they had been on his payroll 
for a minimum period of six months to a year.
The requirement that all representatives be employees 
of the firm reflected the desire of the employer to avoid 
dealing with outside organizations, i.e., labor unions. The 
waiting period was apparently designed to more nearly insure 
that employees elected to these posts were relatively stable 
individuals who had some knowledge of the company and the 
department in which they worked. It also appeared to have 
been an attempt to discourage outside agitators from joining 
the firm for the sole purpose of being elected a represen­
tative .
Representation Ratios and Method of Election
In every plan surveyed the employees were guaran­
teed the right to freely elect their representatives by 
secret ballot, usually once a year. Perhaps because of the 
management's fear that the plan might be subject to charges 
of company domination, a clause was included which empha­
sized the company's lack of involvement in nominations and 
elections. Typical of these clauses was the following 
statement of the International Harvester plan:
•^This conclusion is based on personal interviews 
with individuals who worked under and administered the 
representation plans. Reference to these.interviews will 
be more fully made in the following two chapters.
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Nomination and election of Employee Representatives 
shall be by secret ballot. . . . Employees will deposit 
their ballots in a locked box carried by a teller 
representing the employees, who shall be accompanied by 
a timekeeper. . . . When all who desire have voted, the 
timekeeper and two employee watchers shall open the 
ballot box and count and record the votes, in the pre­
sence of the Works Auditor, or person designated by 
him.
The number of representatives which the employees 
were allowed to elect varied from firm to firm, but was 
typically one representative for each one hundred to two 
hundred employees. Some companies used departmental divi­
sions and allowed the election of at least one council 
member for each department, regardless of its size. If the 
department contained enough employees to merit additional 
representatives, they were, of course, permitted.
Management representatives were appointed by the 
president or some other top official or officials. If the
firm had a personnel director, he was usually a member of
1 2the management committee or a neutral observer. The 
representation systems surveyed were careful to note that 
the number of management representatives could never exceed 
the number of employee representatives. In most instances 
the plans stipulated that the management and employee 
representatives must be of equal number. In a few cases 
the management committee was permitted to be smaller in 
number than the workers' committee.
•^Neil M. Clark, Common Sense in Labor Management, 
(New York: Harper, 1919), pp. 19M--195.
-^This point will be discussed more thoroughly in 
later chapters.
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Again the reason for stipulating that at no time
could the number of management members on the works council
exceed the number of employee delegates appeared to be the
fear of charges of company domination. At the same time,
the requirement in most plans that an equal number of
management and employee representatives were to be present
also presented a measure of security to the firm. Since in
every company a majority of the council was required to
vote favorably on an issue before it could be passed, the
employee representatives were unable at least initially to
13obtain a concession without management's agreement. In 
some organizations a two-thirds majority was necessary to 
pass a proposal.
Independence of Representatives
Like the issue of employee freedom in electing 
delegates, the independence of representatives seems to have 
been a sensitive area for employers using representation 
plans. In every plan surveyed, an explicit statement was 
made concerning the complete freedom of representatives to 
raise issues and speak frankly without fear of employer 
retaliation. The American Telephone and Telegraph agree­
ment, for example, stated that "The Company agrees that a 
member of the Association shall not be accountable to the 
Company for any speech, debate, or performance of duty in
1 3This topic will be explored more fully in a later 
section of this chapter.
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connection with the constitutional functioning of the Asso­
ciation . The extent to which such a promise was carried
out is, of course, another matter. It should be noted 
that a review of the literature of the time revealed no 
obvious violations of the companies' pledge. Union publi­
cations stressed repeatedly the point that no representatives 
could be truly free to speak without fear of company repri­
sal, but no specific instances were cited in which the 
companies actually took action against representatives. 
Although it may be argued that reprisal was much too subtle 
to be easily discovered or that fear or reprisal kept most
employee representatives from ever raising questions which
15were controversial, it does appear that visible violations 
of this type of pledge were virtually nonexistent.
Matters Considered by the Councils
The topics to be discussed by the works councils 
were usually described in broad terms. The Standard Oil of 
Indiana Joint Committee was to have "jurisdiction over 
wages, hours, employment, working conditions, safety and 
accidents, sanitation and health, recreation and any other 
matters brought before them by representatives of either
^American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Agree­
ment Between Long Lines Department, American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and the Association of Employees (New 
York: American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines
Department, August 3, 1934), p. 1.
1 RThe National Labor Relations Board raised this 
issue in its decisions against the plans in the 193 0’s.
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management op employees.”-1-̂  Most firms did not publish a 
record of the frequency with which various subjects were 
considered. Many did post the minutes of the periodic 
meetings on company bulletin boards and in company publica­
tions .
Bethlehem Steel Corporation did periodically print 
in their company newspaper a tally of the frequency with 
which issues were raised. Table I presents the classifica­
tion of cases dealt with through employee representation in 
1934.
Although wages, hours, and working conditions were 
legitimate topics for debate, in every firm surveyed the 
method by which these subjects were raised frequently 
differed from the approach taken by a labor union. Adjust­
ments were often made on the basis of individual employee 
requests through their elected representatives. Individual 
rather than collective requests were quite common under 
employee representation.
In arguing for the abolishment of the Bethlehem 
plan, the National Labor Relations Board emphasized this 
lack of real collective bargaining:
The Plans never bargained collectively— they never 
negotiated for such a contract. They acted only on 
such matters as the adjustment of grievances. You will 
find in the record some two hundred types of grievances 
dealing with such matters as John Jones said there is 
too much sunshine in the window, or John Jones said
1 RStandard Oil Company (Indiana), Industrial Rela- 
tions Plan (Chicago: Standard Oil Company of Indiana,
1923) , p7 4.
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TABLE I
TOPICS DEALT WITH THROUGH EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
IN BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, 1934
Topic Percent
Safety and prevention of accidents 26.4
Hours and working conditions 14.5
Pensions and relief 12.4
Wages, piece work, bonus, and tonnage 
schedules 9.0
Health and works sanitation 8.9
Rules, ways and means 7.0
Practice, methods and economy 5.8
Miscellaneous 5.7
Employees Transportation 4.9
Housing, domestic economics, and living 
conditions 2.9
Athletics and recreation 1.5
Education and publication 1.0




there is too much of a screen in front of him. . . . 
There have been few attempts to deal with wages on a 
general basis or with the eight-hour problem . . . •*•?
Some issues which affected the entire working body 
were, however, raised by employee representatives and 
resolved to their satisfaction. Early writings indicate 
such results.'*'® Nevertheless, it does appear that much of 
what was initiated by employees could be classified as 
grievance handling rather than collective bargaining.
Source of Financing for the Plans
The expenses attendant with the formation and admin­
istration of every plan surveyed were borne by the company.
A statement of the employer's intention to back the plan 
financially was commonly found in the formal charter or 
agreement between the company and the employees. Such 
expenses included paying the regular wages or salaries of 
all employee representatives while performing representation 
duties and those of any other employee when appearing before 
the works council.
In accordance with the bearing of all expenses by 
the employer, no membership dues were charged the members. 
While this practice eliminated any possibility of financial 
burden to the employees, it also meant that the employees 
had no treasury from which they might finance any activities
^ Bethlehem Steel Company v. NLRB, CA DC (1941),
120 F.2d. 641.
1 RJoanna Farrell Sturdivant, "Employee Representa­
tion Plan of the Durham Hosiery Mills," Social Forces, IV 
(March, 1926), 627.
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not wholly approved by the employer. For example, the right 
to strike was never explicitly denied the employees under 
these representation systems (although it was never explic­
itly granted), but its likelihood was decreased due to a 
lack of funds maintained exclusively by the members. 
Admittedly, many strikes of this time were strikes for 
employer recognition of a union and were not backed by any 
strike fund created by the company’s employees. Neverthe­
less, if a union did exist within a firm, it enjoyed a 
financial independence that an employee representation plan 
could not claim.
Thus while exclusive employer funding relieved the 
employees of any financial obligation, it did at the same 
time decrease the employees' power over their representa­
tion plan. This characteristic was later attacked by the 
National Labor Relations Board as evidence of company domi­
nation. Some firms (including Bethlehem Steel, for example) 
as a result dropped their financial support hoping that 
this would satisfy the Board's criterion for an independent 
employee organization. However this was not in the judge­
ment of the Board sufficient evidence that the plans were 
free of company control.
Procedure for Raising Issues and Resolving Them
The way in which issues could legitimately be 
raised by the employee or management representatives was in 
part dependent upon the design o_f the representation bodies.
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The plans surveyed were not identical in their design, but 
seven of them can be classified into one of two groups:
the Joint Committee structure and the Industrial Democracy
•f 19 form.
The Industrial Democracy form was so named because 
it was patterned after the three branches of the United 
States Government. The House of Representatives was com­
posed of employee spokesmen. A Senate was composed of 
appointed members of first line and middle management. A 
Cabinet consisted of executive officers of the company with 
the president of the firm serving as the chairman or head 
of the cabinet.
Bills or proposals were allowed to originate in 
either the House or Senate and were required to pass both 
houses before they could be submitted to the Cabinet. The 
Cabinet served as an executive body, approving or disapprov­
ing proposed legislation and possessing veto power over 
submitted bills. It could also suggest legislation for 
origination by either branch of the legislature. A diagram 
of this type of plan is shown in Figure 1 on the next page. 
This sort of plan, while perhaps more artistic in its design 
than the Committee form, was by far the less popular of the 
two approaches.
19The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was the only 
firm surveyed using the Industrial Democracy format. Six 
firms could be classified under the Joint Committee format. 
The Armco and Westinghouse arrangements were such that 
their employees had' no legislative power.
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FIGURE 1
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION STRUCTURE
MANAGEMENT OF CABINET COMPANY EMPLOYEES OF









^ H O U S E  OF REPRESENTATIVES
a
**
*  ^Bill may originate ̂  ̂ n-BiII may originate
Subcommittees Subcommittees
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A survey of twenty companies conducted in 19 26 
found that 6 percent of the works councils in operation 
were of this Democratic form while 94 percent were some
O Qsort of Committee arrangement.
The committee form, as the name implies, consisted 
of joint committees, usually made up of an equal number of 
workers and representatives of management. The major 
difference in formal operation of this approach from the 
Industrial Democracy format was that both sides discussed 
an issue together before voting on it. The industrial 
Democracy approach began with the introduction of a bill by 
one house or the other and a commitment to that bill by 
the introducing house.
In some of the Committee arrangements a two^-thirds
majority of the management and employee representatives was
adequate to pass a resolution. In other instances both a
majority of the joint committee and top management were
21required to approve every proposal submitted. A diagram 
of the committee form is shown in Figure 2 on the next 
page.
9 nChamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee 
Representation or Works Councils (Washington, D.C.: Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 19 27), p. 5.
21Of the companies surveyed which used the Joint 
Committee system, one required a two-thirds majority of the 
management and employee representatives to put a proposal 
into effect. Five firms required both a simple committee 
majority and top management approval.
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Although the design of this approach was somewhat 
different from that of the Democratic approach, its sub­
stance was substantially the same. In both cases, represen­
tatives of each side raised issues, considered them, voted 
on them, and generally, passed them to a higher level of 
management (usually the plant manager or the president) for 
approval.
In some firms the decision of the top management
official could be appealed. Of the companies surveyed,
three had some form of arbitration clause in which appeal to
an impartial individual outside the company was allowed.
The clauses in two of these three limited the strength of
appeal, however. In these firms no case could go to arbi-
2 2tration without the president's approval. Of the other 
firms included in the survey, none allowed an appeal to 
persons outside the firm. The decision of the president or 
board of directors was final.
In those plans which permitted outside arbitration, 
the employees and their representatives were given a mea­
sure of added protection and independence. However, one 
survey made during the period of employee representation 
indicated that the right was seldom if ever used. The 
study reported that "in the practical working of these plans, 
final settlement by arbitration . . . occurs only in
^^These firms were Bethlehem Steel and International 
Harvester.
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2 3exceptional and very infrequent cases.” The firms sur­
veyed in this study which allowed arbitration apparently 
made little use of the provision.
Only in the Armco and Westinghouse plans were there 
no formal legislative or administrative powers given to 
employee representatives. The committees were designed to 
perform only in an advisory capacity to management. While 
issues relating to the employment relationship could be 
raised by employee representatives, no formal votes were 
taken. Management retained the entire function of decision 
making.
Procedure for Amending the Plan
The fact that representation plans did not have a 
specific expiration date meant that there was no stated 
time at which the .terms of the authority relationships be­
tween management and the employees could be reconsidered.
In order to alter these relationships, the plan itself 
required amendment.
In all but two of the firms which were investigated 
a formal procedure for changing the plan was included in
onits design. By analyzing these amendment procedures a 
greater insight into the employees’ right to influence 
their plans may be gained.
^^Earl J. Miller, ’’Workmen’s Representation in In­
dustrial Government,” University of Illinois Studies in 
the Social Sciences, X (September-December, 1922), 100-101.
2^The firms which had no provision for amendment of 
their plans were Armco Steel and Westinghouse.
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A survey of the amendment procedures of these firms 
indicated that all required either a simple majority of 
both management and employee representatives to approve a 
change or a two-thirds majority of both sides. These pro­
visions meant, of course, that the employees could make no 
alteration in their plans without the agreement of manage­
ment .
Although such joint approval was similar to a 
union-management bargaining relationship, the employees 
working under employee representation did not possess the 
economic power that was and is often characteristic of a 
labor union. Although the employees theoretically had the 
right to strike under a representation plan, strike funds 
were lacking along with help that employees in other firms 
and other employees in the same firm might have given them 
under unionized conditions. Thus the employees had little 
real power to obtain any alteration of the representation 
system set up by management. Their only means of obtain­
ing amendments was to request that management allow the 
changes. Although data on the frequency and initiation of 
amendments is incomplete, it appears that as in the initia­
tion and design of the plans the employees played little 
active part.
Summary of the Outstanding Features of Plan Design
Employee representation plans in the firms surveyed 
were in most instances the creatures of the managements of
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the firms which used them. In the design stage of the 
plans employees were not active participants. When given 
the opportunity to vote at all, the employees were asked 
to approve a plan in full or to reject it in its entirety.
An employee became a member of the representation 
system in most firms by simply being hired; there was no 
way he could elect not to be a member. He was, however, 
prevented from holding office as an employee representative 
until he met both an age and a service requirement. Such 
a provision was apparently motivated by the desire to deal 
only with employees who had some grasp of the company’s 
operations and its problems.
Companies utilizing employee representation guaran­
teed the right of secret ballot in representation elections. 
No record of violations of this promise by any firm was 
uncovered. Similarly, the independence of representatives 
from company retaliation was guaranteed. No overt viola­
tions were found in the literature of the period.
The representation councils considered a number of 
topics including health and safety, hours and working con­
ditions, wages, and pensions and relief. On the subjects 
of wages and hours, the discussions tended to center on 
individual adjustments rather than on company-wide changes.
The plans were wholly financed by the companies 
resulting in no membership dues, but also in no employee 
fund independent of the company. Organized employee
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activities which required financial backing also required 
company approval.
Issues could be raised by either management or 
employee representatives at the council meetings. A 
majority vote of both sides was generally required with the 
final decision made by top management. In a few instances 
employees were allowed to appeal to an outside arbitrator 
if they felt that management's decisions were unfair. 
Arbitration was, however, rarely used.
Amendment of the plan was in most instances allowed 
if the majority of both management and employee representa- • 
tives agreed to the change. Although union-management 
agreements had essentially the same requirement, the 
bargaining power of the employee representatives was usually 
much less than the representatives of a union. When 
employees wished changes in the plan, they were in essence 
petitioning management and were dependent upon their deci­
sion .
Conclusions Concerning the Formal Design of the Plans
Employee representation plans were without question 
largely the product of company managements and management 
consultants. And as a result, their design reflected 
management’s views of the extent to which their employees 
should have a voice in the affairs of the company.
The representation systems were designed to allow 
some employee participation in determining solutions to
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labor-management questions, but as the preceding analysis 
indicates, management built safeguards into the plans to 
protect their own freedom to act as they saw fit. The 
plans were primarily a combination appeal and suggestion 
system to management. The effectiveness of these two func­
tions was largely a question of management good faith and 
to a lesser extent, employee interest. Only an analysis of 
plans in operation could reveal such information.
This explanation of the limitations upon employee 
authority under the plan is not intended to imply that 
representation systems were of little value. As the follow­
ing chapters will demonstrate, employee representation was 
a positive force in the development of personnel administra­
tion in this country. The analysis of the formal design 
of the plans, nevertheless, has revealed the role which 
managements apparently saw for their employees under '
employee representation.
CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AND THE STANDARD OIL 
COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY
In order to fully understand the employee represen 
tation plan of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, it will 
be necessary to look briefly at the company's personnel 
policies prior to the installation of the plan. In so 
doing a brief history of the formation of the company from 
its parent organization, the Standard Oil Trust, will be 
included, with a discussion of the parent's influence on 
personnel relationships.
The Standard Oil Trust was formed in 18 8 2 by an 
association of forty-one companies, most of which were 
either wholly owned or principally owned by the investors 
who contributed their stocks to the Trust. The guiding 
hand of its operation was John D. Rockefeller. The Trust, 
which was later reorganized as a holding company operation 
was a vertically integrated and sprawling operation which 
by the time it was ordered dissolved by the Supreme Court 
was operating in all states and a number of foreign coun­
tries. Its eventual goal was to incorporate a separate
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Standard Oil Company in each of the states with control 
vested in the parent organization.'*'
In 1911, however, the holding company was ruled a 
monopoly by the Supreme Court and was ordered broken up in- 
to a number of completely separate operating companies.
A number of these companies retained the Standard Oil 
designation. Included among these was the Standard Oil
3Company of New Jersey.
Early Personnel Policies of Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(1911-1915)
The attitudes of the company toward its employees 
did not emerge newly formed with its creation in 1911.
They were in large measure a carry-over from the preceding 
years of the Trust’s operation. The Trust’s early policies 
toward both management and non-management employees are 
thus believed to be valuable indications of the New Jersey 
company’s personnel approach.
Although data concerning the Trust's treatment of 
employees is fragmentary in these early years, John D.
•^For a thorough discussion of the operations of the 
Trust and of John D. Rockefeller, see Allan Nevins, John D . 
Rockefeller (New York: Scribner, 1959); and Ida M. Tarbell,
The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York:
Macmillan, 190*41.
^Standard Oil Company (New Jersey): A Brief
History (New York: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
1960), p. 12.
qOther companies retaining the name included 
Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of Indiana,
Standard Oil of Kentucky, and Standard Oil of Ohio.
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Rockefeller in 19 01 stated that the company "has sought for 
the best superintendents and workmen and paid the best 
wages.,,1+ He further said that the company’s policy was one 
of permanent work and good wages for those employed by the 
company.^
Public pronouncements were apparently often backed
up by action. Researchers who investigated the pay scales
for Standard refinery workers in 18 89 concluded that wages
were as high or higher than those in any other company in
fithe oil business during those early years. Cost of living 
increases were also granted periodically in the years from 
1890 to 1911.7
Other early employee benefits included stabilization 
of employment, reluctance to employ child labor, pensions 
for long^-service employees , and payment of medical expenses 
for some workers injured on the job. While such actions 
seem only routine today, they were truly extraordinary at 
the turn of the century. Management was, of course, free 
to grant or withhold benefits as it saw fit. The concept
^John D. Rockefeller, "Policy, Methods,' and Aims of 
the Standard Oil Company," The Engineering Magazine,
January, 1901, p. 75 2.
5Ibid., p. 763.
^Ralph W. and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big 
Business (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 5 91.
7Ibid., p. 593.
O George Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, The Resurgent 
Years (.New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 138-139 .
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of an employee voice in the determination of wages, hours, 
and working conditions was no more acceptable to Standard's 
leadership than to most.
The tradition that the New Jersey company had in­
herited thus might be best described as one of benevolent 
autocracy toward its employees. While progressive in many 
aspects in its labor relations, the company held in those 
early years to its policy of unilateral determination of 
wages, benefits, and working conditions in the refineries, 
pipeline operations, and marketing divisions.
Despite the company's generally benevolent attitude 
toward its labor force, working conditions in the refineries 
were considered by many employees to be unsatisfactory 
during those early years. By 1915 the dissatisfaction was 
shown by a strike of the workers in the Bayonne refinery.
The major issue centered around the workers' unhappiness 
with their rates of pay, the hours they were required to 
work, their physical surroundings, and treatment by super­
visory personnel.
With regard to hours, one observer who talked to 
the strikers wrote that a refinery employee would often 
work 168 hours in two weeks, with one twenty-four hour
gshift when the night shift was changed to the day shift.
An employee of the Bayonne refinery during those times later 
described his own situation in the following way:
^Amos Pinchot, "Why Violence in Bayonne?" Harper's 
Weekly, LXI (August 7, 1915), 126.
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I worked a good many years the whole twenty-four 
hours and I remember working every Sunday. . . .  I 
remember working up to five o'clock in the evening, 
from seven, and at five I unhitched the horse and took 
him out and put a fresh horse in, and then I would con­
tinue working on until seven in the morning. They 
never thought of working a poor horse twenty-four hours, 
but they never considered the human being.^
Working conditions, while beginning to improve by 
the turn of the century, were often poor in the refineries. 
Safety equipment was infrequently found although goggles 
for workmen and electric lights were provided by about 1900. 
Washrooms were rarely found in the refineries. Refinery 
workmen were accustomed to drawing their wash-up water from 
a condenser into a bucket, carrying the bucket to the 
boilerhouse, and warming the water with steam before wash­
ing. In a letter to the New York Times, a striking 
worker insisted that the heat in many departments was often 
intolerable. He further maintained that the workers in
these departments were often forced to drink warm water if
12they drank any at all.
Supervision in the refineries was described by some 
as not only frequently inept, but often vicious. One of 
the workers' demands during the strike stated, "We request 
humane treatment at the hands of the foremen and superiors
•-^Burton Kline, "Speeches at a Standard Oil Meeting 
of Employees' and Company's Representatives," Industrial 
Management, LX (July, 1920), 4.
•^The Lamp: 7 5th Anniversary of Jersey Standard
(New York: Standard Oil Company,' New Jersey, 1957), p. 18.
12"prom a Bayonne Striker," New York Times, July 26, 
1915, p. 8.
91
in place of the brutal kicking and punching we now receive
13without provocation.” Whether or not this charge was 
representative of foreman-worker relations, it did demon­
strate that many workers felt strong antagonism toward 
first-line supervision. An interview with one former 
employee who was a wage earner in the Bayonne refinery 
during this time confirmed that relations between supervi­
sors and rank-and-file employees were generally poor.'*'1*
Wages were another major grievance of the striking 
workers. Although Standard’s policy was to pay prevailing 
wages or better to its employees, one observer stated that 
the workers were underpaid and lived in greater poverty and 
squalor than even the workers of the fertilizer companies 
of the area.^ Wage rates, as noted previously, had been 
comparable with other companies in the industry. A com-' 
parison with average wage rates in manufacturing is diffi­
cult because of fragmentary data available from Standard 
Oil of New Jersey. However a partial comparison follows:
-*-3Stuart Chase, A Generation of Industrial Peace 
(New York:. Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, 1946), p. 4.
•^Confidential communication with a retired employee 
of Standard Oil of New Jersey who worked in both non­
management and management positions during his career with 
the company. December 10, 1969.
] C ,^Pinchot, loc. cit.
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It thus appears that the workers did enjoy a substantial 
pay advantage, at least in terms of averages, over workers 
in other areas of manufacturing. Nevertheless, the Bayonne 
employees demanded higher wages as a condition for return­
ing to work.
The strike was a bloody one; both sides incurred
casualties. The company had hired armed guards to protect
its property from the strikers, but newspaper reports stated
that the guards roamed the streets and shot into the houses 
18of strikers. Much gunfire was exchanged between the 
antagonists despite the efforts of law-enforcement officers. 
The strike was ended twelve days after it began with no 
concessions made by the company. Throughout the strike the 
company maintained that it would consider the requests of 
the workers only when they had returned to work and peace 
was restored.
^^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 91.
^Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee 
Relations File, 1925,
Standard Spurns Strike Mediation," New York 
Times, July 25, 1915, p. 10.
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The company did grant some concessions to the work­
ers after the strike was over. Wages were increased by 10 
percent in the refineries. Later that year the eight hour 
day was also instituted so that a normal work week consisted 
of a forty-eight hour, six day week. A three-shift system 
replaced the two-shift scheme that had previously been used. 
These changes affected 7 500 refinery employees. -1-9
Despite the company’s response to some of the 
wishes of its employees or perhaps because of its respon­
siveness, another strike occurred at the Bayonne refinery 
in the following year. Again the clamor was for improve­
ments in wages and working conditions, and again the strike 
was ended with no definite promises made by the company.
In spite of the company’s action to improve wage 
rates again, there was evidence that the directors and top 
management of Standard Oil of New Jersey were questioning 
their own relationships and policies with regard to the 
rank-and-file-worker. The company had grown large with a 
resultant administrative distance between the policy-making 
groups and the level at which the policies were executed. 
There was almost no contact between the top and bottom 
levels of the organization’s hierarchy. In 1916 John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. wrote that the growth of the organization 
of industry had proceeded faster than the adjustment of the
■^Standard Oil and the Eight-Hour Day,” Outlook,
III (September 15, 1915), 109-110.
o ninterrelations of men engaged in industry. Rockefeller 
was reported by this time to have been concerned with the 
need for management to set up some machinery for allowing
the workers to air their grievances and to have a voice in
21the affairs of the company.
The adverse experiences Rockefeller had had with
the labor problems of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company
and their apparent solution through the installation of a
plan of employee representation led him to believe that a
similar solution to Standard Oil of New Jersey's labor
troubles might be found. Rockefeller thus suggested to
A. C. Bedford, then chairman of the Board of Standard Oil,
that a plan similar to the one in Colorado be considered as
a solution of the labor problems being experienced in
2 2Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
As a result Clarence J. Hicks, an assistant to 
W. L. Mackenzie King in the installation of the Colorado 
plan and its administrator once it had been installed, was 
invited by Bedford to come to New Jersey and survey labor 
relations in the Standard refineries. This he did, and in 
1917 he recommended the installation of an employee
John D. Rockefeller, "Labor and Capital--Partners, 
Atlantic Monthly, CXVII (January, 1916), 14.
^Interview with William Reymond, retired Employee 
Relations Manager of the Baton Rouge refinery, Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, July 14, 1969.
22ciarence J. Hicks, My Life in Industrial Rela­
tions (New York: Harper, 1941)", p. 46".
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representation plan similar in design to the one which was
9 Qbeing used m  Colorado.
The plan was accepted by the company’s board of 
directors, and Hicks was given the position of Executive 
Assistant to the Chairman of the Board. It was his task to 
explain the. plan to the Employees and to install and admin­
ister it.21+
Hicks traveled to each of the refineries of Standard
Oil and explained the plan to the employees. In each of
the refineries the plan was accepted by a large majority of
those voting.2  ̂ In Baton Rouge the boilermakers had gone
out on strike shortly before Hicks' visit. Upon his
arrival at the refinery, he asked to speak to the striking
workers. His presentation resulted in their acceptance of
the plan and the withdrawal of their support from the
9 fistrike leaders.
Although the design of the plan follows the outline 
of the plans discussed in the previous chapter, a brief 
discussion of its formal construction will follow. Employee 
representatives were elected from each department with one 
representative for each one hundred employees and a minimum 
of one representative per department. Representatives'
2^Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 166-167.




terms of office lasted one year, and there were no restric­
tions on the number of terms they could serve. Management’s 
representatives were selected by top management. There 
were to be an equal number of management and employee 
representatives at each meeting.
Meetings were held a minimum of once each two 
months. These were called works conference or joint con­
ference meetings. Special meetings could be called by 
either side at any time. In addition, annual meetings, 
called general conferences, were held with representatives 
from the refineries and top management personnel and mem­
bers of the board of directors in attendance. These 
general conferences were apparently designed not for the 
discussion of grievances or the raising of issues, but 
primarily for the purpose of increasing the contact be­
tween personnel at the top and bottom levels of the organiza­
tion.
At works conferences, a representative from the 
personnel department usually acted as chairman and was 
officially neutral. Although he was designated by manage­
ment as a conciliator between the two sides, one personnel
representative was told by his superior to take the side
27of the employees in any dispute with management. The 
personnel department was formed in each of the company’s
27Ibid.
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plants in 1919 at the time of the representation plan's 
beginning.
Issues were to be settled by a majority vote of
employee and management representatives. This procedure
was often ignored due to the informality of many of the
meetings held at the refinery level. The representatives
2 8would often agree without any formal vote being taken.
Issues were raised by the employee representatives 
as the result of suggestions and complaints made by workmen 
in the departments they represented. Employee representa­
tives were free to raise any issue relating to wages, hours, 
working conditions, and any other matter affecting employ­
ees. Management stressed the point that workers need fear 
no displeasure or retaliation as the result of any state­
ment or request made through the plan. Interviews indicate 
no recollection of any case in which management violated 
this pledge.
If an employee became involved in a dispute with 
his supervisor, he was first required to attempt to settle 
it with the supervisor, either personally or with the help 
of his departmental employee representative. If this 
attempt was unsuccessful, the matter could be appealed to 
higher management and then be brought before the works 
conference for settlement. Employee grievances which were 
not settled by the conference could, like any other 
unresolved matter, then be appealed to the refinery's top
2®Confidential communication, op. cit.
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management. Decisions at this level could in turn be 
appealed to the company's board of directors whose judge­
ments were final and binding on all matters. No opportunity 
was given for appeal to an outside arbitrator. Those inter­
viewed could recall only a few instances of appeal to the 
refinery’s top management or to the company's board of 
directors. Nearly all matters were settled at the works 
conference level.
In addition to joint meetings between management 
and employee representatives, informal meetings among 
employee representatives were occasionally held. Although 
Standard Oil did not permit such meetings to be held on 
company time, it did not discourage representatives from 
discussing issues among themselves on their own time.
The plan's operation was financed entirely by the 
employer. Employees automatically became members after a 
waiting period of six months. No dues were charged the 
membership, and meetings were held at company expense. 
Elections were also held on company time with both a 
management and employee representative present at both the 
balloting and the counting of votes.
Although the plan contained no formal provision 
allowing the employees to strike, there was no specific 
statement forbidding this action. In fact, no strike did 
occur during the life of the plan. It might be noted, how­
ever, that the employees had no strike fund available since
99
they paid no dues, and there was no independent employee 
29treasury.
The plan provided for its amendment through joint 
agreement between management and workers’ representatives. 
It was never amended as far as the eight retired employees 
who were interviewed could recall. One individual sug­
gested that this lack of change resulted from the relative
informality of the plan and the flexibility of both sides
3 0in dealing with one another.
The plan functioned continuously from its inception 
in 1918 until 19 37 when the National Labor Relations Act 
was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court. At this 
time the company's lawyers advised top management that the 
representation plan fell under the Act’s definition of a 
company dominated labor organization. The company withdrew 
its support from the plan and advised its employees to form 
new labor organizations which met the requirements of the 
Act.
The company’s employees were said to be generally 
upset and frustrated when the law required the abandonment
q  iof the plan. Although generalizations such as these are 
difficult to verify, in each refinery independent unions
9 QThis topic was discussed in more detail in the 
previous chapter.




were established. Resembling the representation system in 
many ways, the unions in most instances elected former 
employee representatives as their first officers.
The eight retired employees who were interviewed 
were unanimous in the belief that the plan was an important 
contributor to labor peace both during its existence and 
in the period of independent unionism which has followed.
One individual stated that the plan contributed to an 
effective working relationship between management and labor 
so that both could feel that they were a part of an inte­
grated team. He felt that these were the types of relation­
ships that actually existed in most departments of the
~. . 32refineries.
The analysis of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s repre­
sentation plan has until this point been primarily descrip­
tive in nature. The discussion has centered upon personnel 
policies of the firm prior to the plan's introduction, 
their influence upon the installation and design of the 
plan, and finally, the plan's actual installation and 
operation.
The effects of the plan upon the organization will 
next be investigated. It has been assumed, as was pointed 
out in the first chapter, that employee representation made 
a number of positive contributions to worker-management
^2Interview with M, C. Hagen, former Employee Rela­
tions Manager of the Bayonne, New Jersey refinery and now 
with Industrial Relations Counselors of New York, December 
30, 1969.
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relationships. It is the purpose of this section to deter­
mine the extent of these contributions to Standard Oil of 
New Jersey.
The Representation Plan and Channels of Communication
Adequate communication with subordinates is, of
course, a necessity for management if it is to convince the
workers of the wisdom of its actions. As Barnard has stated,
"The first executive function is to develop and maintain a
3 3system of communication." That the top management of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey had become aware of their lack 
of real success in achieving adequate communication with 
rank-and-file employees was cited in an earlier part of 
this chapter. M. C. Hagen pointed out with reference to 
this problem that management felt that it was treating the 
work force fairly; however, decisions for wage increases, 
improvements in working conditions, and benefit liberaliza­
tions were unilateral. He stated that no one bothered to
q jiask the workers what they wanted. The strikes of 1915 
and 1916 indicated that workers did have wants that manage­
ment had ignored.
One of the primary reasons for instituting the 
employee representation system was, according to management 
representatives, the desire to establish the contact which 
was lacking between the work force and management.
33Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 
(.Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 1938),-p. 226.
^Hagen, op. cit.
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As mentioned previously, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
was concerned enough about this problem to suggest to the 
company’s management that a form of closer contact between 
management and the labor force be attempted. Employee 
representation was the means by which this contact would be 
achieved. Clarence J; Hicks stated at the first meeting of 
management and employee representatives, "The Representation 
Plan inaugurated at the election last Wednesday provides a 
method of preserving direct contact between the management 
and their employees."^
While the existence of available communication 
channels is not, of course, proof that understanding among 
organizational levels must result, their establishment 
nevertheless may be regarded as a prerequisite for this 
understanding. "Communication is the bottleneck through 
which effective management ideas must pass, so it often is
q  ca key managerial problem." The effectiveness of the 
communication which was transmitted through these channels 
will be evaluated in later sections of this chapter.
The question remains as to whether the plan did in 
fact increase to any significant extent the volume and 
clarity of communication from policy-making levels of
^Clarence J. Hicks, Address at Standard Oil of New 
Jersey's first representation meeting, New York City, April 
1, 1918. Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee 
Relations File, 1918.
^Keith Davis, "Success of Chain-of-Command Oral 
Communication In a Manufacturing Management Group," Academy 
of Management Journal, XI (December, 1968), 380.
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management to the rank-and-file worker. A partial answer 
to this question can be obtained by looking at the plan’s 
effect upon the number of downward channels of communication 
in the organization.
Prior to the installation of the representation 
system, the supervisor was used almost exclusively to pass
37information from higher management to operating employees. 
This method of communicating with workers is the usual 
technique in any large bureaucratic organization. It is 
still today one of the foremost techniques of passing infor­
mation to operating employees.
In terms of keeping the employees informed of the 
actions of management, however, this approach was not par­
ticularly successful in the early years of the company's 
operation. First of all, supervisory personnel were not 
used to any significant extent to transmit information to 
operating employees. This was due in part to the lack of
any clearly defined policy of sharing information with
3 8lower level personnel. While orders concerning expected 
performance goals were passed through the hierarchy and 
while announcements of pay increases and other benefits 
were also transmitted downward, attempts to explain the 
reasoning behind management actions were largely missing. 
Thus the supervisor himself was often without knowledge of
3^Interview with Richard Lackey, retired Employee 
Relations Director, Bayway, New Jersey refinery, January 7, 
1970. H
38Confidential communicatidn, op. cit.
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why the company did what it did, and he was unable to 
explain such actions to his subordinates even if he wished 
to do so.
Secondly, the company maintained almost no controls 
over the supervisory staff in terms of labor relations 
policy. One retired employee stated that before the plan, 
each yard supervisor hired and fired employees, so that a 
worker could be fired in one department today and work in 
another tomorrow. Each foreman could fire an employee at
q gthe slightest provocation. In such a situation he was 
not likely to press his superiors for greater guidance in 
labor relations.
The weaknesses of the chain of command as a channel 
of communication were, therefore, twofold: the management
failed to pass any significant amount of explanatory infor­
mation to operating employees, and it applied little if 
any control on its supervisory personnel to determine the 
way they represented the company to the workers.
It is interesting to note that these weaknesses 
could have been corrected largely through strengthening 
the existing channel. This in fact was done in later years. 
It must, however, be remembered that this was 1918. Com­
paratively little understanding of effective organizational 
communication techniques existed, and attempts to improve
39Interview with Harry D. Field, refinery worker in 
the Bayonne refinery during the years of the plan's opera­
tion, January 14, 1970.
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labor-management relations were largely experimental. The 
management of Standard Oil was looking for a means to 
improve its relationship with its employees, and when 
employee representation appeared, it was quickly adopted as 
the possible way to achieve this improvement. The result 
was to largely bypass supervisory personnel and obtain a 
direct link between management and operating employees.
The creation of downward channels. More specifically, what
new channels of communication were added to the existing
ones as a result of employee representation? The first and
most obvious were the employee representatives themselves.
The representatives provided a point of connection between
company management and the individual worker. They in
effect bypassed the supervisor as an information channel, .
reporting directly to their constituents what took place in
the representation meetings.
In addition to the meetings between employee and
management representatives at the refinery level, yearly
meetings were held at which representatives met with
corporate top management to exchange ideas and information.
In these meetings corporate officials sought to explain to
the employee representatives the reasoning behind many of
4-0the policy decisions of the company.
The refinery and corporate levels of management 
had, therefore, established a means of getting the company
^Interview with Clement A. Hurley, retired refin­
ery worker and later supervisor in the Bayonne plant,
January 20, 1970.
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point of view across to the average workers. The employee 
representative was the means by which the message was to be 
communicated.
While direct contact between management and employee 
representatives resulted in an added communication channel 
in the organization, it was not the only one created by the 
representation plan. Although somewhat of a duplication of 
the previous channel, the printing and distribution of the 
minutes of the representation meetings to employees can be 
properly regarded as another method of communication 
created by the plan.
The minutes were printed at company expense and 
were distributed to every employee in the refinery who was 
a part of the representation plan. Plant management also 
received copies of the proceedings of these meetings.^
Although the events which occured in the meetings 
were to be explained to workers by their employee represen­
tatives, the formal minutes provided a second means by 
which management could attempt to explain its thoughts and 
actions to those at the operating level. In this way a 
form of insurance was provided against the possible in­
ability or unwillingness of an employee representative to 
adequately explain the rationale behind management’s
^Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee 
Relations File, 1922.
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decisions. The employees could read the minutes of the
U 9meetings and find out what was said and by whom. .
Employees were also exposed to another printed form 
of communication as a result of the same motivations which 
initiated the representation plan. This publication started 
in 1918 was entitled The Lamp. It was and is today the 
company’s official magazine distributed to employees and 
stockholders.
The Lamp cannot be said to have been created as .a 
result of the representation system since it could have 
been initiated without a representation plan. It was, how­
ever, the result of the management's desire to obtain 
closer contact with the work force and to explain its 
decisions to them. In 1918 W. C. Teagle, then president of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, explained to the first assembled 
group of employee representatives that the purposes of 
the new publication were to help each individual and 
department keep in touch with the rest of the company and 
to establish a unity of purpose among all employees of the 
firm.
With essentially the same general objective as the 
representation plan, it is not surprising that the magazine 
functioned in a manner complementary to it. The journal
^Interview with Willard G. McAndrew, refinery 
worker, employee representative and later supervisor in the 
Baton Rouge refinery, now retired, January 28, 1970.
11 ̂ W. C. Teagle, Address at Standard Oil of New 
Jersey’s first representation meeting, New York City, April 
1, 1918. Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee 
Relations File, 1918.
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frequently contained articles concerning the progress of 
the company, its generosity to employees in terms of wages, 
hours, and benefits, and the reasons behind management
ii i± .decisions. Excerpts from representation meetings were
also published when believed by management to be especially 
45important.
Three new channels of downward communication were 
thus a direct or indirect result of the representation plan. 
The employee representatives were a means by which plant 
and corporate management could reach production employees. 
Distribution of the minutes of representation meetings was 
a second method of delivering this information to employees. 
Finally, The Lamp, initiated by management at the time of 
the plan’s beginning, worked together with the representa­
tion system to give management's point of view to the 
workers.
In retrospect, these added methods of communicating 
with workers do not appear particularly revolutionary. It 
must be remembered, however, that in 1918 they were signif­
icant additions to the recoupling of top and bottom organ­
izational levels.
^See, for example, Clarence J. Hicks, "Confidence 
Between Management and Men," The Lamp, IX (April, 19 27), 
23-26; George H. Jones, "Loyalty a Priceless Asset," The 
Lamp, IX (April, 1927), 30-32; "The Company and Its 
Workers," The Lamp, XIX (April, 19 37), 2-4. Current issues 
reflect a. similar content.
^Hagen, op. cit.
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The creation of the new communication channels did 
not in itself assure that they would be used by management 
and, if used, that they would be effective. Did management 
utilize the representation meetings as sounding boards for 
its points of view and did it encourage employee represen­
tatives to explain these points of view to their constit­
uents? Evidence indicates that the answer to both questions 
is yes.
Managements usage of the channels. From the first repre­
sentation meeting in 1918 management representatives 
appeared to be anxious to convince employees that the 
company was both wise and generous. At the second meeting 
of employee and management representatives in 1918, Clarence 
J. Hicks drove home the point of company generosity to 
those representing the New Jersey refineries:
The wage increase has been considered and adopted, 
and it seems to me it is your great privilege and your 
great responsibility to go back to those employees and 
speedily get the word to them that we have a wage scale 
that we are proud of, and it is time we settled down 
to business . . . you employee representatives can do 
very much to allay any unfounded discontent or rest­
lessness that may exist on the part of the employees, 
and I think you will agree with me that your message 
as you go back tomorrow morning is "Boys, the Company 
has done its part and now it is time for us to do 
ours."46
At the plant level, an analysis of the minutes of 
the representation meetings through the years reveals
^Clarence J. Hicks, Address at Standard Oil of 
New Jersey's second representation meeting, August 9, 1918. 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee Relations 
File, 1918.
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similar statements by management members. One example is 
given from a meeting in the Baton Rouge refinery. The 
following comments were made by Mr. Callaghan, a long-time 
management representative at the refinery, speaking to the 
employee representatives:
The Company promises and gives you a safe place to
work in. That is one of the things that the Company
gives you that you cannot buy, and still you hear very 
little about it. . . . Here every man has the right to 
know why he was discharged, and if he was unjustly 
treated, the matter will be straightened out in a con­
ference. . . .  In return for all these things that the
company gives you, they expect loyalty— loyalty not 
for eight hours— not while you are going to and from 
work--but in every minute of the twenty-four hours; 
and they expect this from every one of the employees. '
In terms of volume of communication, the minutes of 
the meetings through the years indicated that management 
representatives utilized these meetings as regular sounding 
boards for company viewpoints. A study of the records of 
meetings at the Baton Rouge refinery for the years 192 9 to 
1937 shows an average frequency of one meeting every two 
months. Length of meetings averaged two and one-half hours
U Oeach. Thus management had the opportunity to dispense 
company points of view on various subjects and apparently 
did so quite frequently. How effectively employee repre­
sentatives explained management's position to the employees 
should next be explored.
^"Minutes of Joint Conference, July 16, 192 9," 
Baton Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
1929.
^ " M i n u t e s  of Joint Conferences, 1929-1937," Baton 
Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
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Of the eight ex-employees interviewed on this sub­
ject, both management and non-management employees felt 
that the representatives did a generally satisfactory job 
of explaining to their constituents those matters which were 
discussed in representation meetings. Although the repre­
sentatives were not said to have taken management's point 
of view in all cases, they were believed by the eight men 
interviewed to have been fair and to have explained to the 
men why management took a certain position.
The distribution of the minutes themselves acted as
a second means of reaching the individual worker. How
widely read these minutes were is of chief concern in an
analysis of their effectiveness as a downward communication
channel. Again, the eight individuals who were interviewed
believed that worker interest in these meetings was usually
fairly high and the minutes were widely read. One example
of the importance of the minutes to employees was given by
the former Employee Relations Director of the Bayonne, New
Jersey refinery. He stated that employee representatives
would make a special effort to speak out on an issue so
that those employees they represented would see that they
had been active in the meetings. He also pointed out that
often a representative would speak up when the issue he
was discussing had already been settled because of the in-
u qterest in the subject of those he represented. One
^Hagen, op. cit.
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non-management employee interviewed did indicate that
employees were more likely to read the minutes of those
meetings which dealt with issues of immediate interest to
5 0them and their department.
Thus both the creation and use of new downward 
channels of communication were the result of the represen­
tation plan. Of equal if not greater importance was the 
creation of upward channels through which workers could 
reach higher levels of management with suggestions, appeals, 
and requests.
The creation of upward channels. As in the transmission of 
information from top to bottom of the organization, commun­
ication upward was allowed to follow only one channel 
prior to the installation of the employee representation 
plan. If the employee wished to appeal a decision or make 
a request, he was forced to do this through his departmental 
supervisor.
Interestingly enough, Standard Oil of New Jersey 
had had for some time a tradition of the right of appeal of 
any decision to higher authorities in the company. It 
prided itself in this approach to the exercise of author­
ity.^ It was, however, a fact of organizational life that 
the effectiveness of the appeal process was dependent upon
5^Interview with L. M. McGraw, retired refinery 
worker and employee representative in the Baton Rouge 
refinery, January 20, 197 0.
-̂*-Gibb and Knowlton, op. cit. , p. 570 .
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the individual superior. An unsympathetic supervisor would
often dismiss an employee before his appeal could ever
c oreach plant management.
Since the supervisor had the right to hire and fire 
and since the company exercised almost no restraint upon 
the supervisor’s authority in these areas, the employee had 
in reality no effective right of appeal. Regardless of 
higher-level management’s intent to consider the wishes of 
its workers when making decisions (which by 1915 it claimed 
that it wished to do),^ it could not effectively know 
what problems the workers were facing or felt they were 
facing in their jobs except through the supervisor. Again, 
there is no evidence to suggest that management attempted 
in any serious way to determine the feelings of employees 
through their supervisors or to encourage supervisory 
personnel to lend an understanding ear to the problems of 
their subordinates. While the upward channel of communica­
tion existed, it was apparently infrequently used in any 
effective sense.
The Bayonne strikes of 1915 and 1916 were, as in­
dicated previously, caused by the workers’ feelings of 
frustration concerning unsatisfied needs coupled with no 
way to get management's attention in order to explain these
52Ibid., p. 571.
^"Sheriff Arrests 30 Strike Guards," New York 
Times, July 26, 1915, p. 1.
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needs. The strikes were thus the workers' only way to 
obtain this attention.
That top management was beginning to recognize the 
need for closer contact with workers after two violent 
strikes has been pointed out previously. The employee 
representation plan was designed to provide employees with 
a non-destructive method of obtaining management's atten- 
tion in the area of requests and grievances.
A formal appeal procedure for employee grievances 
was constructed with the creation of the representation 
plan. The appeal procedure first required that the 
aggrieved employee consult with his supervisor. If no 
satisfactory result was obtained, he could appeal to the 
superintendent of his department. The next step in the 
procedure was to bring the matter before the representation 
council, at which time the management and employee repre­
sentatives would consider the matter and vote to either 
affirm or deny the grievance. A unanimous decision would 
end the appeal procedure, but if the decision was not 
unanimous and the employee was still unsatisfied, the
grievance could be brought before the president with his
54decision as final.
Although it should be noted that the appeal system 
included as its first step the requirement that the
^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey;, April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919 
(New York: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 1919),
p . 15.
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aggrieved employee attempt to settle the issue with his 
supervisor, it should also be observed that there were 
several checks on the supervisor's power. First of all, 
the employee was allowed to have his departmental represen­
tative on hand when confronting the supervisor. Or, as an 
alternative, he could ask his representative to talk with 
the supervisor about the matter without the necessity of 
the aggrieved employee being present. The representative 
could adopt a persuasive role to encourage the supervisor 
to relent if he felt that the employee had a legitimate 
grievance.
Secondly, an employee could appeal the supervisor’s 
ruling to higher levels of management and then if still un­
satisfied, to the conference of management and employee 
representatives in the plant. Finally, a dissatisfied 
worker could appeal to the company's president a decision 
at the conference level which was not unanimous.
Perhaps the greatest safeguard in this formalized 
appeal procedure was the great reduction in the supervisor's 
power of dismissal. The plan published a list of offenses 
for which an employee could be dismissed upon first viola­
tion. In no other instance could a worker be removed 
without the concurrence of the newly formed Employment 
Department (later renamed the Employee Relations Department). 
And even if the Employment Department agreed that the 
employee should be dismissed, he nevertheless had the right
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to carry his grievance through the designated appeal pro­
cedures .
In an analysis of appeal systems, Scott has observed 
that they are a systematic violation of the scalar principle 
of classical organization theory.^ Scott, however, justi­
fies this violation of classical theory in terms of the 
improvement in overall coordination within the firm which 
results from the use of an appeal system. He states that 
the principles of uniform treatment and individual treat­
ment take precedence over unity of command and exclusive
C Creliance upon the scalar chain in large organizations.
Perhaps intuitively, the management of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey sensed in 1918 that overall coordination 
could be improved by allowing workers a chance to appeal 
decisions of their superiors to higher levels in the organ­
ization. And as a result of the representation plan, the 
employees of Standard Oil of New Jersey had a guaranteed 
means of reaching higher levels of management with their 
grievances. Although no arbitration procedures were estab-
c nlished in the company’s plan, the operating employee was 
given much more protection than he had prior to the plan’s 
installation. One retired employee felt that before the
^^William G. Scott, The Management of Conflict 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 196 5) , p . 101.
56Ibid., p. 105.
5^As indicated in Chapter III, some companies’
plans did have them.
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plan’s institution in 1918, the employees were subject to 
the whims of each supervisor who were regarded as lords of 
each area involved."
In addition to the right to air grievances, the 
workers were given machinery for the making of requests 
and suggestions to management. This procedure, of course, 
involved the elected employee representatives, meeting in 
regular and special sessions. The plan made provision for 
these meetings by stating that elected employee representa­
tives would meet regularly with representatives of manage­
ment to discuss and decide upon all matters of joint 
interest, such as wages, hours, and working conditions.99 
The employees could raise almost any question with their
representative and have it brought to management’s atten- 
r ntion. One employee representative stated the relationship 
in the following manner: ’’You don’t have to be dubious
about going down [to your employee representative] and ask­
ing for your rights. You have the channel through which 
you can do it.”9'*'
"Field, pp. cit.
5^Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919, 
op. cit., p. 14.
r nuHurley, op. cit.
^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey) in its Refineries (New York: 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, June, 1921), p. 15.
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Employee usage of the channels. Two somewhat overlapping 
channels of upward communication were thus opened by the 
employee representation plan. These were the grievance 
procedure and the right to make requests and suggestions 
through the elected representatives. As with the downward 
channels, their frequency of usage must also be analyzed. 
Ideally, it would be desirable to compare the flow of 
grievances before and after the plan's installation and to 
observe the amount of grievances submitted. Unfortunately, 
no company records could be found which indicate how many 
grievances were received by management prior to the plan's 
operation.
One confidential report submitted to top management 
in 19 2 8 by a special management committee investigating the 
company's plan did, however, briefly deal with this subject. 
The report outlined the frequency of usage of the appeals 
procedure in the following manner:
Conditions during the period of the war had culmi­
nated in the Bayonne strikes of 1915 and 1916, and 
relations between employees and some supervisory 
officials were still characterized by suspicion and 
ill will. It was natural, therefore, that in the early 
days of the representation plan a steady stream of 
grievances and complaints was poured into the confer­
ences. From this condition there has been a gradual 
evolution until in most of the refineries in 1928 the 
bulk of the grievance cases were being settled between 
representatives and foremen.62
fi 9 "Industrial Representation Plan of Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey): Report of an Inquiry Conducted Under
the Direction of the Special Conference Committee," History 
of Employee Relations File, October 9, 1928, pp. 17-18.
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The report went on the state that grievances and requests
had throughout the history of the plan been carried upon
fi 3occasion to the higher officials of the company.
With reference to the flow of grievances upward 
before the plan's inception, it has earlier been stated 
that few if any such communications ever reached higher 
levels of management. Those interviewed confirmed this 
observation. All eight indicated that the number of griev­
ances and requests by employees were substantial after the 
plan's initiation and that the channels of upward communi­
cation continued to be used frequently throughout the life 
of the plan.
An analysis of the minutes of the representation
meetings provides further evidence of the willingness of
workers to register their grievances with management.
Throughout the history of the plan, employee grievances
and requests were brought before management representa^- 
fi utives. The effectiveness with which employees influenced 
management through the processing of grievances will be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.
Thus as with downward communication, upward commun­
ication in the company's refineries was stimulated by the
63Ibid., p. 19.
^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919, 
op. cit.; Eleventh Annual Joint Conference of Industrial 
Representation Plan (New York; Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
May 3 , 1928); Minutes of Joint Conferences, 1929-30, Baton 
Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
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employee representation plan. The flow of communications 
in both directions was not in itself proof that either side 
understood the other any better. Such an interpretation 
can only come from investigating changes in attitudes 
resulting from this closer contact. Accordingly, the real 
impact of the new communication channels will be explored 
in the section which discusses economic benefits and griev­
ance processing and in the discussion concerning organiza­
tion climate. A discussion of the impact of the plan upon 
economic benefits obtained and upon the effectiveness of 
grievance processing follows next.
The Effect of the Plan Upon Economic Benefits and Grievance 
Processing
Perhaps the aspect of employee representation which 
obtained the most publicity was the improvement in economic
i
conditions attributed to the plan's operation. The actual 
impact of the plan upon economic gains should therefore be 
analyzed.
Throughout the history of the employee representa­
tion plan, the employees of Standard Oil of New Jersey 
experienced improvements in their economic status and work­
ing conditions. The task here is to determine how signifi­
cant a part the plan played in the granting of these 
benefits to the workers.
It is tempting to quickly conclude that the plan 
had no real role in the determination of benefits and that
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it was simply a vehicle through which they were granted 
after being unilaterally determined by management.
Some evidence suggests the truth of this statement. 
In 1915, three years before the plan was introduced, the 
company decided that its refinery workers should work an 
eight hour rather than a nine hour day. No loss of earn­
ings to the workers resulted from the reduction of working
hours. In that same year wages of refinery workers were
R firaised significantly.
We should, however, remember that 1915 was the year 
of the first major strike at the Bayonne refinery. These 
concessions, while not being granted at the time of the 
strike, came shortly after the workers returned to their 
jobs. In any case the benefits were unilaterally granted 
by management.
It can also be noted that at the time the represen­
tation plan was established, wage increases were given 
along with the institution of a number of fringe benefits 
mentioned previously. One journal article describing a 
portion of the benefits obtained by Standard Oil of New
Jersey’s employees emphasized that they were granted by
R fithe company’s directors. The benefits were obviously 
unilaterally determined, having no direct relationship to 
the representation plan.
"Eight Hour Day for 10,000 Standard Oil Workmen," 
Survey, XXXV (October 16, 1915), 59.
66tiThose Who Can Afford Welfare Work," World’s Work, 
XXXVI (June, 1918), 131-132.
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Six of the eight individuals interviewed expressed 
the belief that many economic concessions made during the 
plan’s existence would have eventually been granted by the 
company even without the representation p l a n . Statements 
of the six stressed that the company’s policy was always to 
keep its wage rates at or above the levels of other firms 
even if there had been no plan. They did, however, indi­
cate that without the representation plan, the benefits 
might not have been granted as soon as they were or in the 
amounts in which they were g i v e n . 66
The major wage and benefit increases, while largely 
decided upon by management, nevertheless appear to have 
been influenced in many cases by worker requests. While 
some of these requests were denied, they apparently made
management aware that some compensation adjustments should
fi qbe made.
An example of this influence can be cited from the 
minutes of the Baton Rouge representation meetings. During 
two successive conferences in 19 36, the employee represen­
tatives pressed for a 5 percent increase in regular wage 
rates. Management resisted, using numerous arguments. In
^Reymond, op. cit. Confidential communication, 
op. cit.; Hagen, op. ext.; Lackey, op. cit.; McAndrew, op. 
cit.; McGraw, op. cit.
68Ibid.
69lndustrial Representation Plan of Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey): Report of an Inquiry Conducted Under
the Direction of the Special Conference Committee, op. cit.,
p . 10.
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the following conference, management representatives 
announced at the beginning of the meeting that the company 
had reevaluated its position and would grant the increase. 
Management representatives also agreed to make adjustments 
in a number of individual job rates which employee repre­
sentatives believed to be out of l i n e . 70 Interviews largely 
confirm the conclusion that employee representatives influ­
enced both the timing of the granting of wages and benefits 
and the design of the compensation package even though 
their influence upon the long-term level of compensation 
was not great.
The plan had a much more direct influence upon the 
granting of comparatively minor concessions by management 
to individuals and departments who usually wished some 
adjustment in working conditions such as a change in light­
ing, heating, or the arrangement of work flow, or the 
correction of the actions of a superior. Transcripts of 
the meetings are filled with such requests. Although no 
tabulation of decisions was made concerning these requests, 
it does appear that many of them were decided in favor of 
the worker or workers making them. Table II on page 124 
is given as an example of the kind of concessions asked 
for. It comprises approximately 14 percent of the griev­
ances and requests processed during the year. When
7 0"Minutes Joint Conference, June 18, 1936;”
"Minutes of Joint Conference, August 17, 1936;" "Minutes of 
Joint Conference, October 26, 1936," Baton Rouge refinery, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 19 36.
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TABLE II
SAMPLE OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES AND REQUESTS DISCUSSED IN 
REPRESENTATION MEETINGS OF THE BATON ROUGE REFINERY, 
JULY 25, 1929 TO JULY 16, 1930
Request or Grievance Action Taken
Dangerous steam pipe in a 
departmental restroom.
Agreement by management to 
have it covered.
Unjust dismissal of a 
laborer.
Grievance denied by manage­
ment. Explanation 
provided.
Delay in company transpor­
tation to town for 
employees working over­
time .
Grievance denied by manage­
ment. Explanation 
provided.
Request for rearrangement 
of pay periods to allow 
employees a payday imme­
diately before Christmas.
Granted by management.
Poor food served by company 
lunch wagons.
Improvements promised.
Poor fixtures in one 
department’s restroom.
Improvements promised.
Request for hats and coats 
provided at company 
expense for employees who 
had to work outside in 
bad weather.




Request or Grievance Action Taken
Lack of employee training 
in how to use gas masks 
provided for emergencies.
Request for flags to be 
given to those depart­
ments which had accident- 
free months.
Request that pay office be 
moved to prevent employees 
from waiting outside in 
bad weather for paychecks.
Request that the plant
operate on daylight saving 
time in order to give 
employees more daylight 
hours after work.




Decision postponed by 
management for further 
study.
Source: Minutes of representation meetings (Files 
of the Baton Rouge Refinery, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
1929-1930).
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grievances and requests were denied, management spokesmen
went to great lengths to explain their reasoning and often
succeeded in persuading employee representatives to vote
with them in denying the adjustment.
It should be noted that by 19 29 the majority of
individual grievances were said to have been resolved among
the supervisor, the employee representative, and the
71aggrieved employee. The grievances and requests presented 
in Table II were primarily those questions involving large 
numbers of employees which could not be settled without the 
approval of the plant’s management.
While the willingness of management to adjust many 
grievances and requests in favor of the workers is not a 
perfect measure of improvement in their ability to under­
stand workers’ needs and desires, it does provide strong 
indications that this was the case. Certainly the fear of 
unionism and labor unrest was no doubt at least in part a 
motivator of company representatives’ willingness to settle 
grievances and requests in the workers' favor, but the very 
fact that management now had a feedback mechanism from the 
level of the work force undoubtedly influenced their 
thinking about workers and their problems.
It therefore seems correct to conclude that 
although the plan was given more credit by official company 
statements than it deserved for its influence upon
"^Hagen, op. cit. ; McAndrew, op. cit.; Field, op.
cit.
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increases in wages and benefits, it nevertheless did have 
some effect upon them. To the extent that the representa­
tion system made management aware of the specific benefits 
that workers were most interested in, it did influence 
when major concessions were granted and in what configu­
ration. In addition, relatively minor adjustments in 
working conditions and the correction of grievances were 
directly affected by the plan throughout its existence.
The plan at the same time encouraged a standardiza­
tion of labor policies and a recentralization of personnel 
administration into the hands of higher levels of management 
and away from the supervisory work force.
Impact of the Plan Upon the Formation and Growth of the 
Personnel Department
Prior to the institution of Standard of New Jersey’s»
employee representation plan, the company had no centralized 
personnel department in any of its refineries. As was in­
dicated previously, employment was largely in the hands of 
the supervisor as was transfer, discipline, and discharge.
As formerly mentioned, the Joint Agreement which 
established the plan also created a central Employment 
Department in each refinery. The head of this department 
was directly subordinate to the general manager of the
refinery and functioned with relatively little supervision
7 9from corporate headquarters. In an informal way, however,
72Hagen, op. cit.
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Clarence J. Hicks, Assistant to the President, and the 
counterpart of today's corporate personnel director, exer­
cised control over the employment managers in the New 
Jersey refineries through monthly meetings in which problems 
were discussed and suggestions for their solution were 
made.73
Even, though there is evidence that they encountered 
some resistance from top levels of plant management and 
from the supervisory group,71+ these employment managers 
apparently did exert influence upon labor policies and 
practices in the refineries. As one former Employee Rela­
tions Director (the department's title was later changed 
to Employee Relations) put it, the department had a marked 
effect upon the relations between employees and manage­
ment.^^ A refinery worker also observed that the department
• 7 fi • •stabilized employment and employee relations. Specifi­
cally, the duties of this new department as described in
the Joint Agreement were in the areas of selection, trans-
7 7fer, counseling, discipline, and discharge.
In each of these areas the supervisor's powers 





77Industrial Representation Experience of Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919, 
o p . cit., pp. 15-16.
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were in the areas of discipline and discharge. Whenever a
foreman formally warned an employee that he had committed
an offense for which a repetition could result in suspension
or dismissal, the foreman was required to forward a copy of
7 8that notification to the Employment Department.
With regard to the commission of an offense in­
cluded in the list of those for which an employee could be 
dismissed or suspended without a previous warning, foremen 
were required to report the case fully to the Employment 
Department. The Joint Agreement stated that the department, 
after investigation, could approve the proposed discharge 
or suspension, or arrange to transfer the employee, or, if
the facts warranted, discharge him after securing the
7 9approval of the Superintendent of the Works. Thus the 
process of suspension or discharge became more involved 
and more carefully deliberated before action was taken. 
Additionally, the affected employee could appeal the 
decision through the grievance procedure which had been r. 
established in conjunction with the representation plan.
The Employment Department was soon given additional 
duties to perform. Training in the refineries had in pre­
plan days been left in the hands of the foremen and through 
them to the more experienced workers in the departments. 




plan, the department was given the responsibility for
directing training which was described as an unsystematic
8 0affair up to this time. Although on-the-job instruction 
remained as the primary technique of training, the Employ­
ment Department was charged with determining who would do 
the training, how training would be done, and seeing that
81the trainers had time to train and took the time to train.
Fringe benefits were greatly expanded at the time 
the plan was begun. The company granted retirement annui­
ties to long service employees and accident and sickness 
benefits. Although the accounting department was first 
given the task of administering the benefits, this activity
was also transferred to the Employment Department shortly
8 9after the plan began.
Another department which lost one of its functions
to the newly created Employment Department was Engineering.
Prior to the plan’s existence and the Department’s creation,
safety in the plants was administered by one or more persons
who reported to the Director of Engineering. This function
was also transferred shortly after the department was
established. This was a function thought to belong most
properly with those who were most concerned with the person-
8 8nel of the organization.





In analyzing the duties and powers of the newly 
created Employment Department, it is apparent that it 
derived many of its functions from what were formerly those 
of the foreman. It was given the authority to select, to 
supervise training, to transfer, to suspend, and with top 
management approval, to discharge. Thus much of what the 
Employment Department had gained had been lost by the fore­
man .
In addition, the Department had obtained tasks 
formerly assigned to Engineering and Accounting. Both had 
given up some of their personnel functions to Employment.
What were management’s purposes in the creation of 
such a department, and how did they relate to employee 
representation? It must first be noted that during the 
early 1900’s personnel departments were being established 
in a few companies in this country. Eilbirt has traced 
their beginning to two divergent forces: the introduction
of Scientific Management and the existence of welfare work 
in many large organizations.
Could it be assumed, therefore, that the company 
would have created a personnel department even if it had 
not established an employee representation plan? An answer 
to this question is speculative, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that one might have been created during those early 
years without the influence of employee representation.
8l*Henry Eilbirt, ’’The Development of Personnel 
Management in the United States," Business History Review, 
XXXIII (Autumn, 1959), 363.
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How then was the creation of the department related
to employee representation at Standard Oil of New Jersey?
It was earlier pointed out that the establishment of the
department was a part of the same Joint Agreement which
created the employee representation plan. The department
was utilized as part of the appeal procedure for employees,
and the Employment Manager also served as a neutral third
party at the representation meetings. He acted as a source
8 5of information and advice for both sides. These func­
tions do not, however, explain any direct influence of 
employee representation upon the creation of a personnel 
department. There is no evidence to indicate that the plan 
could not have functioned without a personnel department.
Although the department's formation cannot be said 
to have been caused by employee representation, it can be 
said that its formation was definitely related to the plan. 
The desire of the company to implement its policy of fair 
and consistent treatment for all employees which was set 
forth in the Joint Agreement appears to have motivated the 
creation of an Employment Department. This department was 
designed to insure that employees were treated impartially
and in accordance with the promises made under the represen-
8 6tation plan and other areas of the Joint Agreement.
^Hagen, op. cit.
fi fi •Lackey, op. cit.; Confidential communication,
op. cit.; Field, op. cit.
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The management had created a means whereby the 
employees could register their complaints through their 
representatives when unfair conditions arose. It created 
the personnel department to see that conditions leading to 
grievances were infrequent. The plan itself had led to the 
need for some sort of organizational policeman to amelio­
rate conditions which might lead to a flooding of the up­
ward channels of communication with complaints. Thus not 
only did the personnel department administer many of the 
benefits developed under the plan, it also gained sub­
stantial control of hiring practices, transfers, training, 
discipline, dismissal, and safety practices.
Management had placed restraints upon itself through 
the institution of the representation plan. The personnel 
department was the administrator of these restraints. In 
an analysis of such self-imposed limitations, Vollmer has 
pointed out that they are a "result of organization needs
87for coordination, specialization, and personnel regulation."
He further states that "the nature of the self-restraint 
imposed as a result of the process of bureaucratization may 
be expressed most generally in the principle of equal treat­
ment for all employees."88 Vollmer maintains that as an 
organization grows and takes on more of the characteristics
Q *]0/Howard M. Vollmer, Employee Rights and the Employ­
ment Relationship (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University
of California Press, 1960), p. 17.
8 8Ibid., p . 18.
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of bureaucracy, it must at the same time impose certain 
restraints upon itself in order to rationalize and humanize 
its personnel relations. The employee representation plan 
of Standard Oil of New Jersey and the creation of a person­
nel department appear to have been attempts to do exactly 
this.
Employee Representation’s Influence Upon Organization 
Climate
Perhaps the most illusive factor to measure in an 
organization is the overall climate of feeling among 
employees. Although organization climate has been defined 
many ways, two definitions have been selected from current 
writings on the subject. One writer has defined the con­
cept in the following manner:
By climate we mean those characteristics that 
distinguish the organization from other organizations 
and that influence the behavior of people in the 
organization. It is in effect what we react to--the 
whole context of stimulation and confusion where we 
work.8 9
A second definition stresses the importance of 
executive behavior upon the climate of the organization:
Company climate is the total impact of the company's 
policies, executive philosophies and attitudes, deci­
sions, history, objectives, and prevailing values and 
sentiments. The leadership of top executives creates 
the company climate. Company climates vary greatly, 
ranging all the way from those reflecting sound
99B, Von Haller Gilmer, Industrial Psychology (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 19 66), p. 57.
135
employee relations to those inhibiting effective 
employee relations.90
More briefly, climate might be defined as the organization’s 
personality, or customary way of responding to its internal 
and external environment.
One researcher has sought to measure this person­
ality in terms of the following variables:
1. The effectiveness of the organization’s commun­
ication system.
2. The degree of employees’ participation in 
solving problems affecting them.
3. The way in which the organization deals with 
conflict.
4. The leadership style of supervisors and mana­
gerial personnel.
5. The level and'trend of turnover and absenteeism 
in the organization.91
It is with these variables that the company's organization 
climate will be measured both before and after the intro­
duction of the representation plan.
Adequacy of communication. Earlier portions of this 
chapter have shown that prior to the introduction of the 
representation plan, the communication system between 
management and operating workers was poor. The labor dis­
turbances of 1915 and 1916 were greatly influenced by this
®^Robert B. Buchele, "Company Climate and the 
Effectiveness of Personnel Management," Personnel, XXXI 
(January, 1955), p. 289.
^These variables were suggested by Rensis Likert, 
New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961),
Chapters 1-8.
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inadequacy of communication. With the creation of the plan 
new channels of communication were opened and were fre­
quently used, both upward from the rank-and-file workers 
and downward from management. The use of these channels 
influenced attitudes and actions on both sides.
With regard to the importance of the free flow of 
information, Likert has stated that good communication is 
a requirement for the successful functioning of an organi­
zation. Good communication and high performance go together. 
A healthier organization was in part the result of the new 
communication channels and the stimulation necessary for 
their use. Again it should be emphasized that the mere 
existence of communication channels does not insure that 
they have altered the attitudes of the organization member­
ship. Their lack of existence does, however, add to the 
chances that understanding will not occur.
Employee Participation. Closely related to adequate commun­
ication is employee participation in the affairs of the 
firm or perhaps in more accurate terms, the degree of per­
ceived employee participation. While participation does
not necessarily lead to higher morale and productivity, a
9 2number of studies have found such a relationship.
9 2Lester Coch and R. P. French, "Overcoming Resis­
tance to Change," Human Relations, I (1948), p. 512. This 
article is famous as one of the early explorations into the 
subject of participation. For more current research 
studies, see Richard Beckhard, "An Organizational Improve­
ment Program in a Decentralized Organization," The Journal 
of Applied Behavioral Science, II (January-March, 19 66),
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Although numerous writers have emphasized the impor­
tance of true employee participation in decision making 
rather than pseudo participation used for manipulative 
purposes, March and Simon have pointed out that felt par­
ticipation in decisions is the critical factor. "Thus 
actual influence over the specific decision being made is 
of less importance to the individual than acknowledgment of 
his influential p o s i t i o n ^
This approach to participation makes the task of 
evaluating any resulting beneficial effects much easier.
From a motivational standpoint, it is thus not as important 
whether employees had any really significant part in the 
making of decisions, but instead whether they believed that 
they had an influence.
It has been previously indicated that the company’s 
representation plan allowed for employee requests, griev­
ances , and suggestions to be registered through elected 
employee representatives. And like most of the other 
representation plans of industry the final decision on 
most matters usually rested with management. The degree to
pp. 3-25; and Robert H. Guest, Organizational Change: The
Effect of Successful Leadership (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1962), Chapter 7.
9 3James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley, 1958), p. 54.
138
which employees could in reality participate in decisions
94was thus greatly limited by the design of the plan.
The criterion adopted is, however, the degree of
felt participation by employees and the resultant effect
upon organization climate. All eight ex-employees who were
interviewed perceived a great increase in the participation
of rank-and-file workers in decisions affecting them. For
example, one interviewee commented that participation and
involvement by employees were significant effects of the
9 5plan’s installation. Another individual stated that 
after the plan was put into effect, the employees felt that 
they had a voice in the affairs of the company which 
affected them.^
The area of job enrichment, however, was not 
affected by employee representation. None of the eight 
individuals interviewed could recall any instances of in­
creases in planning or controlling responsibilities as a 
result of the representation plan. No information from 
company files gave any indication that job enlargement was 
one of the goals of the representation plan. Participation 
was thus limited to the operation of the plan itself.
Participation allowed for some degree of satis­
faction of the higher level egoistic and self-actualization
^See Chapter III for a more complete discussion of 
this topic.
^Hagen, op. cit.
q cHurley, op. cit.
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needs and in effect helped to ameliorate the worker’s 
demands for higher organizational position and status.
Since the vast majority of refinery workers could never 
expect to be promoted into supervisory or other managerial 
positions, service in the representation plan allowed not 
only a measure of recognition, but also a chance to use 
more of the abilities which they possessed. In the first 
year of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s plan, and observer 
commented on this advantage in the following manner:
. . . a sense of those differences in station [be­
tween workmen and management] has entered into the
social unrest we have had to contend with. . . . The 
worker has grown tired of being nothing but a worker.
But something now has been found at least to soften 
the sharper edges of these differences in station.
There is the highest value of all in this new touch of
democracy in industry. S'7
It should be observed that this advantage to the 
worker has also been attributed to labor union membership.
In the case of labor union membership, however, some of the 
employees’ loyalty is the organizational price of this 
benefit. At least in theory, employee representation not 
only gave employees greater recognition through partici­
pation, but also strengthened their loyalty to the business 
organization. Throughout the history of the plan, Standard 
Oil of New Jersey’s management stressed this aspect of 
representation. Clarence J. Hicks, the founder of the plan, 
was fond of referring to employer-employee relationships as 
collective dealing rather than collective bargaining and
^Kline, op. cit. , p. 8.
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of stressing the importance of the unity of interests of 
all those who were employed by the company.98 All eight of 
those interviewed agreed that the plan's purpose was to 
bring the managerial and non-managerial employees closer 
together and to place an emphasis upon unity of interests.
It did appear to have largely achieved this goal at Standard 
Oil of New Jersey.
Effect upon conflict. It would be naive to assume that 
employee representation eliminated all conflict between 
management and labor. And in fact the removal of all con­
flict would not be regarded as a characteristic of a 
healthy organization. It is the way in which conflict is 
handled which determines its effect upon the organization. 
Likert has stated that bitter, unresolved conflict may 
damage an organization. Where conflict is dealt with 
openly and constructively, the organization has a much 
greater chance for progress.
Certainly the plan provided a means whereby 
employees could openly express their wishes and fears to 
management. Earlier discussions of the plan as a channel 
of communication indicated that workers felt fairly free 
to state their opinions. The question was asked those 
interviewed whether the employees or their representatives 
might have been afraid of reprisals for voicing complaints.
98Clarence J. Hicks, My Life in Industrial Relations, 
op. cit., p. 88-89.
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None of the eight individuals felt that there were any
prejudicial actions taken by management as a result of
employee activities under the plan. For example, one
former employee stated that if management was prejudiced,
it was prejudiced in favor of the dissident employee. The
management was said to have taken great pains to treat such
a person fairly in order that no one could say the company
9 9dealt with its critics unjustly. A non-management 
employee agreed with this assessment. He stated that 
there were no reprisals. In cases where some foreman or 
department head attempted such action, the employee repre­
sentative of that department could and often did report it 
to a higher level of management. Such freedom effectively 
discouraged any attempt at reprisals.
Conflict did arise in the representation meetings. 
The minutes of the meetings indicate that throughout the 
years of the plan disagreements were not uncommon. One 
employee representative went on record before the top 
management of the company in expressing his dissatisfaction 
with certain aspects of the representation system. After 
praising the plan in general he made the following criti­
cal comments:
At one time it was considered an honor to be 
elected a representative to the plan; today it is 
taken in some departments as more of a joke. . . . The




asked and what happens? Some of those who have change 
of the administration and interpretation of that pro­
vision surround it with every technicality that can 
sound to the disadvantage of the employee.101
The validity of this representative’s criticisms cannot be
ascertained. What is most significant is that he was
willing to make such statements before members of the
corporation's top management.
Although no evidence could be found which indicated 
if management took action to investigate the above criti­
cism , minutes of the representation meetings indicate that 
it was standard procedure for any complaint which was 
voiced to be looked into. Solutions were sought which were 
satisfactory to both sides.-^2 it appears, therefore, that 
although management did not always please the workers with 
its decisions, it nevertheless did seek to correct what 
were believed to be injustices and when it did not take 
action, to explain why the action was not taken. Conflict 
was apparently more likely to be brought into the open and 
dealt with more constructively after the plan's intro­
duction .
Supervisory relationships. Perhaps as much as any other 
factor, the supervisory force had generated bitterness and 
unresolved conflict prior to the plan’s introduction. What
lOlThomas 0"Brien, Address at Joint Conference, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, New York City, 192 9. Standard
Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee Relations File, 1929.
lO^Hagen, op. cit.
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then was the effect upon supervisory-subordinate relation­
ships of the introduction and operation of the represen­
tation plan?
We have already noted that the power of the 
supervisor was limited by the institution of the plan and 
by attendant personnel policies put into effect at the same 
time.^^ As a channel of communication the plan bypassed 
him in both upward and downward flows. His power to hire, 
dismiss, and transfer was strongly limited as was his right 
to discipline his subordinates. He was no longer free to 
set his own labor policy.
The result of these limitations was an improved 
working relationship between the supervisor and his sub­
ordinates . Those who expressed an opinion on this
subject indicated that the primary reason for initial 
improvements was fear on the part of the supervisor that 
arbitrary actions by him would result in discipline for 
the supervisor.
The question must be asked whether there was an 
underlying hostility between supervisors and their subordi­
nates based upon the possible resentment by the supervisors
103For a discussion of the changing status of the 
supervisor in industry over the past half century, see 
Delbert C. Miller, "Supervisors: Evolution of an Organi­
zational Role," in Robert Dubin, Leadership and Productivity 
(San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 104-132.
lĉ Field, op. cit.; Reymond, op. cit.; Hurley, 
op. cit.; McAndrew, op. cit.; McGraw, op. cit.
105Ibid.
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of the loss of some of their power. Those working for the 
company at the time of the plan’s installation indicated 
that there was a definite period of adjustment for a number 
of supervisors who resented the reduction in their authority 
and power.^06 Resentment subsided in most cases after the 
plan had operated for a short while. In the Bayonne 
refinery a small percentage of the supervisors had to be 
replaced because they could not accept these new relation­
ships with their subordinates.
Although an analysis of the minutes of represen­
tation meetings reveals some grievances filed by employee 
representatives concerning the actions of supervisors, it 
is impossible to determine if these were the result of 
supervisory hostility generated by the representation plan.
A realistic generalization appears to be that 
supervisor-subordinate relationships were improved, at 
least in terms of the reduction of the number of arbitrary 
actions available to the company's supervision. As the 
years passed, the supervisor became more competent in 
handling his employees effectively. Those in Employee 
Relations did their best to improve his skills and put





Absenteeism and turnover. Throughout the decade of the 
1920's and 1930’s, absenteeism and turnover rates were 
apparently declining. Although the relationship between 
representation and the level of absenteeism and turnover is 
difficult to determine conclusively, there, nevertheless, 
appears to have been a link between them.
Early records of turnover and absenteeism in the
Standard of New Jersey refineries have apparently been
destroyed, if in fact they ever existed in any formalized 
109manner. Conclusions concerning the effect of the plan
upon these two factors can only be tentatively drawn.
Of the eight individuals who were interviewed, all 
expressed the opinion that the plan was at least a factor 
in the gradual reduction of absenteeism and turnover in the 
plants. None could cite any statistics to verify this con­
clusion.
One individual cited the creation of the personnel 
department as a stabilizing factor. Pointing out that 
supervisors could dismiss their subordinates at will prior 
to the plan's existence, the interviewee stated that many 
arbitrary dismissals were averted after the department's 
c r e a t i o n . A s  discussed earlier, the personnel depart­
ment was actively involved in the functions of discipline
^Executives in the company's home office and in 
three of its refineries doubt that these early figures were 
ever a part of the firm's records.
H^Field, op. cit.
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and discharge. This activity resulted in less power for 
the supervisor and a greater standardization of the circum­
stances under which an employee could be released from 
employment.
A note of caution must be injected regarding the 
causes of reduction in turnover and absenteeism. While 
employee representation is believed to have been a factor 
in their reduction, it must be noted that other variables 
could and probably did influence these trends. For example, 
at the time of the plan's installation the company 
unilaterally granted important economic concessions to the 
workers. A pension plan, wage increases, and health and 
welfare benefits were given to the workers by management. 
These concessions probably had a significant positive 
effect upon the reduction of absenteeism and turnover in­
dependently of the institution of the representation plan.
No doubt later concessions would have continued to have 
some favorable effect upon absenteeism and turnover even if 
no representation system had been established.
Moreover, refinery employment has had a history of 
stability. Standard Oil of New Jersey’s operations were 
and are characterized by long-term growth with few cyclical 
swings that would encourage employees to seek more stable 
employment.
It is therefore impossible to separate in any con­
clusive way these and other possible influences from the 
effect of employee representation. If the findings of the
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other segments of this chapter are valid, one would con­
clude that the majority of the workers would be less prone 
to leave the company or to be chronically absent. Because 
of the plan’s influence upon communication and upon the 
formation and operation of the personnel department, with 
the resultant rationalization of personnel policies, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that employee representation 
did contribute to failing levels of turnover and absentee­
ism. In addition, representation's impact upon the other 
measures of organization climate appears to have been a 
positive factor which influenced these two variables.
Summary. In terms of the variables being used for the 
measurement of organization climate, it appears that an 
improvement occurred after the introduction of the plan. 
There is no way to prove that employee representation 
caused this improvement. The evidence suggests, however, 
that the plan was an important factor in this change in 
organization climate.
Influence of Representation Upon the Willingness of the 
Working Force to Accept Unionization
Although representation appeared to be a positive 
factor in employer-employee relationships in Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, the plan was abandoned in 1937 as a company 
dominated union as defined by the National Labor Relations 
Act. The workers were, according to statements made in 
The Lamp, unhappy with this abandonment. A letter addressed
14 8
to the company’s president signed by five refinery workers 
from the Bayonne, Bayway, and Eagle refineries claimed to 
represent the feelings of their refineries’ employees and 
was printed in the April, 1937, issue of The Lamp. The 
essence of its message was contained in the following 
paragraph.
The position of our employees and the elected 
representatives is that we wish to fight to the last 
ditch for the continuation of our plan which has func­
tioned so successfully for the last twenty years. . . . 
In our dealings with the management during the years of 
operation of our plan, there has always existed a very 
amicable relationship and we wish assurance as to its 
continuance. H i
The eight individuals interviewed expressed similar
opinions of the workers’ feelings toward the discontinuance
of the plan. One of those interviewed stated that the
workers were upset, not really knowing which way to turn
after the plan was abandoned. Another commented that
there was no question that the plan was popular and that
113the employees were sorry to see it go. Whether all
employees in reality were sorry to see the plan discontinued 
cannot be determined. The actions taken after its abandon­
ment do, however, indicate that they would have preferred 
to keep it in force.
Soon after the plan's demise, each of the refineries 
formed unaffiliated plant-wide unions. In most instances





these new unions elected as their first officers the same 
individuals who had previously served as employee represen­
tatives. The unions were as much like the representation 
plan as the law would allow.
Thus employee representation made it both easier 
and more difficult to organize the work force. The workers 
were definitely in favor of collective action in their 
relationships with management. They were also on the whole 
apparently satisfied with their treatment by the company. 
They therefore wanted to maintain some form of labor organi­
zation but at the same time were not attracted by the 
militant spirit of the national unions of the 19 30’s.
Although management was officially neutral during 
the workers’ selection of a union, they were pleased that 
unaffiliated unions were chosen. These unions were formed 
without the interference of management, and their similar­
ity to the representation plan made management feel that
115good relationships would continue.
It is difficult to say what management’s attitude 
toward unionization would have been had there never been a 
representation plan. The plan did accustom the management 
to dealing collectively with the workers. It also strongly 




were much more acceptable to management than affiliation 
with a national union would have been.
The extent of managerial identification with these 
independent unions was revealed in a chance remark made by 
a retired member of the company's management. In discussing 
a representation election in 1960 between the unaffiliated 
union at the Baton Rouge refinery and a Teamster's union
liplocal, he stated that, "We had a tough fight, but we won."
His reference to "we" was the unaffiliated union.
The Employee Representation Plan of Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey in Summary
An analysis of the plan of employee representation 
in Standard Oil of New Jersey has led to the conclusion 
that it contributed significantly to the development of 
personnel administration within this company. The plan 
influenced the development and usage of new formal channels 
of communication between management and the work force. 
Through these channels employees filed grievances and made 
requests for improvements in wages, hours, and working con­
ditions. Using the channels for transmitting information 
to the operating employees, management explained their 
position on numerous matters of concern to the work force. 
Evidence was presented which indicated that both sides were 
fairly successful in influencing the attitudes and actions 
of the other through this communication.
I *1 C Reymond, o p . cit.
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Benefits granted by management were affected by the 
requests of the operating employees. The impact of these 
requests was primarily in terms of the timing and configu­
ration of the benefits received. Grievances were also 
frequently settled in favor of the workers. Management in 
turn influenced the attitudes of the work force by explain­
ing their position even when they could not grant a specific 
grievance or request.
The formation of the company's personnel department 
was encouraged by the establishment of the plan. Its pri­
mary task was a standardization and rationalization of 
personnel policies. These policies were formerly estab­
lished by each superior with resulting variations from 
department to department. The existing variations of 
personnel practices were unacceptable under the represen­
tation plan, and the personnel department was established 
to put an end to these variations and as a result, to help 
keep the promises management made through the plan.
Organization climate was improved after the intro­
duction of the representation system. Improvements in 
effective communication, employee participation, the manner 
in which conflict was dealt with, interpersonal relation­
ships between supervisors and their subordinates, and the 
level of turnover and absenteeism were all apparently 
positively influenced by the representation plan.
Employee attitudes toward unionization were affected 
by the plan. The employees were accustomed to dealing with
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management on a collective basis, and when the represen­
tation plan was ruled illegal by national labor legislation, 
unaffiliated unions were formed in each of the company's 
refineries. The employees were said to have favored the 
unaffiliated unions because of their general satisfaction 
with the former representation plan and their feeling that 
these past relationships could best be approximated by 
forming unions as similar to the representation plan as the 
law would allow.
In analyzing the employee representation system of 
this company and its success, it must of course be observed 
that the company was and is a part of a rich and successful 
industry. This industry has not been faced with serious 
seasonal or cyclical downswings, but has instead seen 
steady growth in demand for its products.
Steady growth has allowed the company to be in­
creasingly generous toward its employees and to give them 
greater employment security. An employee representation 
plan in such an environment had a greater chance of success 
than did one in a less stable industry with less overall 
growth.
On the other hand, it can be observed that employee 
relations were not satisfactory in the company prior to 
the installation of the plan. As has been previously noted, 
the representation plan served as the vehicle through which 
the advantages the company enjoyed were utilized more 
effectively to improve management-worker relationships.
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Standard Oil of New Jersey had developed a means 
whereby labor peace was achieved relatively successfully. 
The plan it developed had a significant impact upon person­
nel practices in the firm, putting into effect many of the 
recommendations that were to be made in later years by 
social scientists concerned with the healthy organiza- 
tion.117
It is interesting to note that Robert Blake, the
118developer of the Managerial Grid concept, worked for 
Standard Oil of New Jersey for a number of years. During 
these years he developed many of the ideas which he later 
formalized. The company had been practicing many of the 
concepts which he is now teaching.1^
While not a cure-all for organization problems, 
employee representation appears to have made a significant 
contribution to the development of modern-day personnel 
management at Standard Oil of New Jersey.
117Previous references to Rensis Likert’s New 
Patterns of Management provide examples of the company’s 
progress in this area.
118Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Manage­
rial Grid (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Company, 1964).
119Hagen, op. cit.
CHAPTER V
AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF EIGHT PLANS OF 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
With a survey of eight firms which utilized employee 
representation, this chapter seeks to further investigate 
the conclusions of the previous chapter.
Again it should be emphasized that this study does 
not attempt statistical verification of its conclusions.
It does, however, presume that by analyzing representative 
organizations, ■*• conclusions can be drawn concerning the con­
tributions of representation systems.
The firms to be discussed in this chapter are: 
Standard Oil Company of Indiana, Armco Steel Company, 
Dennison Manufacturing Company, International Harvester 
Company, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.
None of these organizations provided the amount of 
in-depth information obtained from Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey. Company records on this subject were much less 
complete, and fewer people were available for interviews
■i 'Chapter I explains the rationale for the survey of 
the eight firms surveyed.
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in any one company. Consequently, no firm could be analyzed 
to the extent of Standard of New Jersey. Nevertheless, a 
significant volume of data was obtained from these firms 
which allowed a comparison between their plans and that of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Methodology was essentially the same in this and the 
previous chapter. Primary reliance was placed upon personal 
interviews and upon information from company files. Upon 
occasion, data from secondary sources were also utilized.
In the selection of these eight firms, a comparison 
of two points of potential similarity was first made. These 
two areas were:
1. Employer motivations for beginning the plan.
2. The formal design of the plan.
These two areas were chosen because they indicate each 
company’s attitude toward the proper role of employee 
representation. The formal design of the plan gives some 
evidence of the company's view of how limited employee par­
ticipation should be. Similarly, employer motivations for 
beginning the plan suggest the intended function of the 
representation system.
If the plans are found to be largely similar in 
these respects, it can be said that they have been selected 
from the same universe, i.e., they can be validly compared 
in terms of the hypothesized areas of contributions to 
personnel administration. The end result should be a
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verification or modification of the conclusions of the pre­
vious chapter.
Accordingly, a discussion of the two areas listed 
above will next be undertaken. This discussion will pro­
vide both historical information concerning the eight 
companies and illustrations of their plans' similarities to 
that of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
Motivations of Employers for Introducing the Plans
An investigation of the motives of employers for 
beginning the plans was undertaken to determine if similar 
forces had influenced the plans’ formation. Findings 
centered around two employer motivations: a desire to
establish closer contact between management and the hourly 
worker and the wish to forestall the threat of possible 
unionization of employees. These reasons were of course 
often interlocking.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company, three rea­
sons were given by the management for the formation in 1919 
of the Dennison Employee Committee:
1. To promote harmonious relations between the 
company and its employees.
2. To help in the rapid solution of employee 
grievances.
o3. To improve working conditions in the company.
^Dennison Manufacturing Company, Constitution of 
the Employees’ Co-operative Plan (Framingham, Mass.: 
Dennison Manufacturing Company, 1919), p. 1.
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No company would formally state that it feared unionization 
and was taking action to prevent it. No evidence could, 
however, be found which indicated that the company felt 
threatened by a labor union or that employee unrest existed 
in the firm.
Dennison's plan was said to have been started by 
Henry Dennison, the president of the firm, because no labor 
union existed which was interested in the cause of semi­
skilled workers, especially if they were women.^ A retired 
employee representative stated that management wanted an 
effective means of direct contact with individual employees 
when it established the Dennison Employee Committee.^ This
same opinion was expressed by two other retired Dennison 
5employees.
All interviewees, then, expressed the view that 
management wanted a more effective means of reaching the 
rank-and-file employees, and none indicated that the threat 
of unionism was present or that there was significant labor 
unrest in the firm. Henry Dennison was a pioneer in many 
progressive causes, and this characteristic may explain his
3Interview with John Garvey, retired Production 
Manager of the company, February 27, 1970.
^Interview with John Curtis, retired photo-engraver 
with the company, March 3, 1970.
^Those interviewed included: Curtis Damon, retired
Superintendent, Printing Division, February 24, 197 0; 
Charles J. Richards, retired paper cutter, March 4, 1970.
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attitude toward the need for employee representation in the 
6company.
In the case of Armco Steel, the company’s official
statement on representation also expressed concern for the
need to establish closer contact between management and 
7labor. Its plan was put into effect in December of 1920, 
approximately one year after the nation-wide steel strike 
called by the National Committee for Organizing the Iron
Oand Steel Workers (AFL). Although no information obtained 
from the company or from the one interview with a managerial 
representative9 indicates that the strike of 1919 had any 
influence upon the firm in its decision to begin a represen­
tation plan, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
labor unrest in the industry had some effect upon this 
course of action.^
Bethlehem Steel, like Armco, was affected by the 
1919 steel strike. As a result of a 1918 War Labor Board
9See for example, Henry S. Dennison, Organization 
Engineering (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931).
7Armco Steel Company, Armco Advisory Committees 
(Middletown, Ohio: Armco Steel Company, December 1, 1928),p. 1.
8Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 3 55.
9Interview with J. R. Sexton, Manager, Industrial 
Relations, Armco Steel General Offices, March 2, 1970.
l^Taft reports that the 1919 strike had some effect 
upon all the major plants in the steel industry. Taft, 
op. cit., p. 358.
159
ruling, a plan of employee representation was already func-
1 1tioning in the firm. However, in 1919 a strike committee
headed by William Z. Foster, a union organizer, attempted
to negotiate with the company's management. The company
declined to bargain, and the strike did not result in a
12walkout of any significant number of men.
Bethlehem continued its representation plan after 
the war with some structural modifications. The company's 
stated purpose was to grant employees a voice in the deter­
mination of working conditions and to establish a means 
through which grievances could be processed. A retired 
employee agreed that these were the two major purposes of 
the plan. One other employee who had experience with the 
company's plan agreed with this view.'*'1*
Like Bethlehem Steel, International Harvester's 
stated objectives in installing its plan were to provide an 
effective means of contact between employees and the
■^Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Special Conference 
Committee, Bethlehem Plan of Employee Representation 
(Bethlehem, Pa.: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, April 29,
1929), p. 3.
1 9Ibid., pp. 4-5. Taft reports that the strike 
collapsed in every steel firm by January of 1920. Taft, 
op. cit. ,■ pp. 3 5 8-35,9.
*1 q Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Representation of 
Employees in Plants of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
(Bethlehem, Pa.: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, October,
1920), p. 3.
14Interview with W. L. Trumbauer, retired member of 
management, March 11, 197 0; Interview with E. W. Engerer, 
retired member of management, March 17, 197 0.
160
management and to allow the employees a voice in matters
affecting them. In this instance, however, there was
apparently no pressure upon the company for unionization.
A retired hourly employee stated that during the time of
the plan's formation there was no real union movement among
15the company's employees. One other retired employee of 
International Harvester was interviewed. He too was unaware 
of any threat of unionization at the time of the plan's 
formation.
In the case of Westinghouse, an attempt at union­
ization led to the establishment of a representation plan.
A strike was called in 1914- but was unsuccessful, and 
management decided to form a representation plan before 
more disruptions occurred. The plan's stated purpose was
to establish effective communication between the hourly
17paid workers and top management.
Although there was not direct threat of unionization 
at the time of the introduction of Standard Oil of Indiana's 
plan in 1919, the company's official history notes that 
"post war readjustments and the serious industrial unrest
^Confidential communication with a retired machine 
operator of the firm, February 3, 1970.
•^Confidential communication with a retired product 
inspector, February 10, 1970.
■^Confidential communication with a retired member 
of the company's personnel department, March 2, 1970; 
Interview with Harry Hillman, retired Director, Wage and 
Salary and Employee Benefits Administration, March 5, 1970; 
Interview with Harold W. Arlin, retired Manager, Industrial 
Relations, March 5, 197 0.
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throughout the world rendered more imperative than ever the
18adoption of the plan suggested.” Such a statement seems
relevant to all companies whose plans began during this
period. A retired non-management employee of the company
agreed that the company was reacting to the possibility of
19future union organization.
The other two firms surveyed also stated their 
reasons for their plans' adoption in terms of the need for 
more contact between the top and bottom levels of the 
organization. Goodyear’s statement was simply that the 
plan was intended to maintain communication and good
n nrelations between the company and its employees.
The current personnel manager of the company's
Akron plants pointed out that in 1910, Goodyear employed
2,50 0 people in Akron. By 1919 this number had grown to
20,000. Because of the company’s rapid growth management
had lost effective contact with its employees and thus
instituted the representation plan to aid in the reestablish-
21ment of this contact.
•^Paul H. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana);•
Oil Pioneer of the Middle West (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1955), pT 336.
-^Confidential communication with a retired Still­
man and later personnel clerk, February 12, 1970. This was 
the only interview obtained from Standard Oil of Indiana 
personnel.
^"Industrial Representation Plan," The Wingfoot 
Clan, 1919, p. 3.
^Interview with K. L. Reynolds, Personnel Manager, 
Akron Plants, March 12, 1970.
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American Telephone and Telegraph’s plan was simi­
larly designed "to provide regular facilities for the 
exchange of views and suggestions between [employees] and
the Management and thus to secure a spirit of mutual
2 2cooperation and confidence." A current member of manage­
ment agreed that the plan was designed primarily as a means 
of better communication between the hourly employees and 
management. He could recall no immediate threat of union­
ization to the company at the time of the plan's institution 
in 1919.23
In summary, the plans of the eight companies sur­
veyed appear to have been inaugurated by similar managerial 
motivations. Management in every instance recognized at 
least in formal policy statements that an improvement in 
the quantity and quality of communication was a necessary 
prerequisite to the elimination of employee grievances and 
the consideration of employee requests. It was also 
necessary before management had any hope of getting its 
point of view across to the rank-and-file worker.
In four of the eight companies surveyed, the fear 
of unionism was discovered to be a direct influence upon
22American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Consti­
tution of Association of Employees (New York: American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Division, August 
3, 1934), p. 1.
2^Confidential communication with an Assistant 
Vice President of American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
March 2, 197 0. This was the only interview obtained from 
American Telephone and Telegraph personnel.
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the formation of the plans. Apparently, the danger of 
union organization and labor unrest made these companies 
aware of their lack of success in dealing with the employees 
prior to their plan’s installation.
Although the other four firms in the survey did not 
experience a direct threat of unionization, they were never­
theless a part of the social and economic environment of 
the time. Chapter II has indicated that four factors in 
this environment encouraged employee representation immedi­
ately after World War I . These factors included labor 
unrest in the country and employers' fear of unionism, the 
significant amount of publicity given representation plans 
after the war, the demonstrated effectiveness of employee 
representation in improving efficiency in wartime operations, 
and a general concern of society for more democracy in 
industry.
It seems reasonable that these factors had some 
effect upon the eight firms in making them aware of the 
need to correct deficiencies in employer-employee relations. 
The plans were, as in the case of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, designed to correct these weaknesses. Thus in terms 
of employer motivations for beginning the plans, all eight 
basically were similar in nature to Standard Oil of New 
Jersey.
Patterns of Plan Design
Although Chapter III extensively analyzed the make­
up of the plans, a brief comparison of their characteristics 
will be made. The purpose of this comparison is to deter­
mine the degree of similarity of the design of these eight 
plans to that of Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Because Chapter III has discussed these character­
istics in detail, only a summary is provided at this point. 
Table III allows each of the plans to be compared in terms 
of previously discussed aspects of plan design.
A study of the table indicates a great similarity 
among formal aspects of the plans. In terms of the roles 
intended for both management and non-management employees, 
all eight plans and that of Standard Oil of New Jersey 
were essentially alike.
Rationale for Comparison
Because of the basic similarities of the eight plans
to the Standard Oil of New Jersey system, it appears rea­
sonable to compare each of them to this company in terms of 
the hypothesized contributions of employee representation.
As mentioned previously, the attempt will be made to verify
or modify the conclusions of the previous chapter.
The great similarities of these eight plans and 
the plan of Standard Oil of New Jersey also leads to the 
conclusion that they were typical of representation systems 
of the 19 20’s and 1930’s. Conclusions drawn from the
TABLE III











pation in Design None Significant Limited None
Automatic
Membership Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method of Selecting Elected by Elected by Elected by Elected by
Employee Repre­ employee employee employee employee
sentatives secret ballot secret ballot secret ballot secret ballot
Method of Selecting Appointed by Appointed by Appointed by Appointed by
Management Repre­
sentatives
management management management management
Structure of Repre­ Joint Joint Industrial Joint
sentation System Committee Committee Democracy Committee
Financing Financed Financed Financed Financed
Arrangement s entirely by entirely by entirely by entirely by
the company the company the company the company
Provisions for Two-thirds Two-thirds Two-thirds Two-thirds
Plan Amendment Majority of Majority of Majority of Majority of














None None None None None
Automatic
Membership
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ing Employee employee employee employee employee employee
Representatives secret secret secret secret secret
ballot ballot ballot ballot ballot
Method of Select­ Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed
ing Management by by by by by
Representatives management management management management management
Structure of Advisory Joint Advisory Joint Joint
Representation
System
only Committee only Committee Committee
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Provisions for No formal Two-thirds No formal Simple Two-thirds
Plan Amendment amendment Majority of amendment Majority of Majority of
procedure Both Sides procedure Both Sides Both Sides
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analysis of these plans and from secondary sources can 
therefore be generalized to employee representation in 
American industry.
The Plans and Downward Communication Channels
As in the previous chapter, a discussion of the 
plan’s effects upon communication channels will be under­
taken. First, it should be stated that the mere existence 
and usage of such channels offers no assurance of greater 
empathy of either side toward the other. However, the 
absence of available means of transmitting messages from 
one organizational level to another leaves little chance of 
understanding and support. Channels of communication are 
prerequisites for an appreciation of the points of view of 
others. This discussion shall therefore begin with an 
analysis of the plan's creation of downward channels and 
their frequency of usage. Then the effects of these factors 
will be analyzed.
In an earlier portion of this chapter, it was noted 
that all eight of the firms surveyed sensed their lack of 
success in getting the company's message across to the 
working force. Like Standard Oil of New Jersey, an admin­
istrative gap had arisen between top management and the 
operating employees.
Each of the eight companies was investigated to 
determine the reasons for such a gap. In all eight of the 
companies surveyed, those who had knowledge of this problem
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agreed in substance as to its causes. Three primary factors 
were isolated. The absence of a clearly stated labor 
policy by the company was identified as a determining fac­
tor. The operating employees had no real knowledge of what 
top management expected from them nor of what was thought 
of their performance.
To fill this administrative vacuum created by top 
management's lack of direction, the supervisor largely set 
his own labor policies. He did not in every department 
behave arbitrarily, but his relative autonomy allowed him 
to do so if he wished. Thus labor policy varied from 
department to department depending on the knowledge and 
wisdom of the individual supervisor.
Moreover, the supervisors in these companies were 
not effectively urged by top management to communicate with 
their subordinates concerning the reasons for'a course of 
action. Many supervisors followed the rather blunt approach 
of "do as I say or get out."^1*' Of course even if a super­
visor wished to explain the reasons behind top management's 
decisions, he was often powerless to do so since he too
was usually provided with only the decision in its final
, 25form.
^Garvey, op. cit.
2^The following individuals provided the above in­
formation concerning the ineffectiveness of downward 
communication in the eight organizations: John Garvey,
Dennison Manufacturing Company, op. cit.; W. L. Trumbauer, 
Bethlehem Steel, op. cit.; Confidential communication,
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As in the case of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the 
causes of the absence of downward communication were there­
fore :
1. Little or no attempt by top management to reach 
the work force.
2. Little consistency in the labor policy of the 
firm as interpreted by the first line super­
visor.
3. Little encouragement by top management for the 
supervisor to explain the reasons for either 
his own or his superior’s actions.
It is not surprising that the operative employee had little
understanding of why management chose a certain course of
action. It is also not surprising that he would often
interpret these actions as arbitrary whether or not they
were intended as such.
The eight companies’ responses to this problem were 
essentially the same as that of Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
They established an alternate channel of communication to 
the chain of command in the form of an employee represen­
tation plan. Although the command channel might have been 
strengthened in order to improve communications, these 
companies, like Standard Oil of New Jersey, chose to bypass 
it in favor of direct contact between top management and
American Telephone and Telegraph, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication, Standard Oil of Indiana, op. cit. ; Confi­
dential communications with two individuals, International 
Harvester, op. cit.; J. R. Sexton, Armco Steel, op. cit.; 
Harry A. Hillman, Harold A. Arlin, Confidential communi­
cation, Westinghouse, op. cit.; K. L. Reynolds, Confidential 
communication, Goodyear, op. cit.
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2 6representatives of the workers. Also it appears that be­
cause of their lack of knowledge concerning effective 
communication techniques, these firms chose to experiment 
with representation as a means of drawing the production 
employees closer to top management. In so doing, the 
supervisor was largely bypassed in the process.
Two new downward channels were created by the 
representation plans. The first of these were the periodic 
meetings between management and employee representatives. 
Representatives were exposed to management’s points of view 
and then in turn explained these views to their constit­
uents. In addition, all eight of the firms published the 
minutes of the representation meetings and either posted
them in prominent places or distributed copies of them to
27each employee. A second method for reaching the rank-and- 
file employee was therefore developed as the result of 
employee representation’s introduction.
Although the existence of communication channels are 
a prerequisite for their usage, their existence tells 
nothing about the quantity of communication passing through 
the channels. None of the companies surveyed were lacking
o cEmployee suggestion systems and opinion polls may 
be cited as modern-day examples of bypassing in business 
organizations.
2^Goodyear distributed copies of the minutes to 
management and employee representatives. Employees were 
free to request to see these copies. Each representative 
was also free to pass his copy among his constituents.
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in the desire and willingness to explain their viewpoints 
to the rank-and-file employees. In each instance, the 
companies utilized the representation meetings as a means 
of presenting official company positions to the workers' 
representatives. This was a major objective of the plans. 
The frequency of meetings varied among the firms, but they 
averaged once every two months with subcommittees meeting 
more often. Special meetings of the full committee could 
be called at any time. Thus management did have the oppor­
tunity to present its viewpoints on various subjects and 
was quite willing to do so.
More crucial, however, than the creation of down­
ward communication channels and management's willingness to 
use them was the effect of these messages upon the thinking 
of the work force. This effect will be explored in later 
sections of this chapter dealing with the topics of economic 
benefits received under the plans, the effectiveness of 
employee grievance processing, and the effect of the plans 
upon organizational climate.
It should be concluded that while the formation of 
new downward communication channels did not insure that 
workers would understand management's position, their 
opening did form the precondition for this understanding. 
Equally important was management's understanding of the 
labor force's wishes.
172
The Plans and Upward Communication
Prior to the adoption of the representation plans 
employee attempts to voice grievances and make requests in 
the eight firms were largely ineffective. In the Dennison 
Manufacturing Company those interviewed agreed that manage­
ment had no real understanding of workers’ wishes and
2 8desires prior to representation. There was little chance
for the workers to reach top management through the chain
of command. The supervisor controlled the information that
was passed to higher management and thus had the opportunity
to screen out information with which he did not agree. Nor
was the supervisor in any effective way encouraged to
listen to the complaints of his subordinates and to counsel
with them. Therefore there was no effective appeal pro-
2 9cedure available to the hourly employee.
Those interviewed in the other seven companies
expressed similar points of view. Because it would be
excessively tedious to quote those interviewed in each
company, it will be said that all who had knowledge of
these early years agreed with varying degrees of emphasis
that the operative employee had little chance to effectively
3 0make his feelings known to top management.
^Garvey, op. cit. ; Curtis, op. cit. ; Damon, op. 
cit.; Richards, op. cit.
2 9Garvey, op. cit.
^Information on this topic was provided by those 
individuals cited in footnote 25.
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With the introduction of the representation plans, 
a new channel of upward communication was opened. Again, 
the mere presence of the channel was insufficient to 
guarantee its effectiveness. Its existence did, however, 
give employees the chance to influence top management, and 
this was a chance which they had not had before, except 
through such action as a strike or other work disruption.
In each of the companies surveyed the employees could 
appeal the actions of their superior and make requests and 
suggestions through their employee representatives.
Grievance processing in five of the eight firms was
31similar to Standard Oil of New Jersey. The aggrieved 
employee was required to attempt to resolve the question 
with his supervisor, often in the presence of the depart­
mental employee representative. Failing to resolve the 
question here, the plea would be taken to one or more 
organizational levels above the supervisor. Then if no 
resolution occurred, the matter was brought before the 
management and employee representatives at their next 
meeting. A majority vote here settled the issue. If a tie 
vote resulted, the president of the firm made the final 
decision in the matter.
In this method of grievance processing, the organi­
zational chain of command, including the supervisor, was
^These five firms were: Standard Oil of Indiana;
Dennison Manufacturing Company; Goodyear; Bethlehem Steel; 
International Harvester.
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involved. The representation committee was brought into 
the matter only when line supervision was unable to success­
fully settle the matter. It should also be pointed out 
that the formal establishment of grievance processing was 
the result of the formation of the representation plans.
The fact that an employee could take his case to the repre­
sentation committee if he was not satisfied with manage­
ment’s actions increased the likelihood that management 
would conscientiously process the employee complaint.
In only one company did the representation committee 
enter the grievance process on a formal basis immediately. 
American Telephone and Telegraph’s plan provided for the 
filing of a grievance with the Executive Committee, a sub­
committee of the full representation body. These committee­
men, composed of non-management employees, had the right to 
accept or reject a grievance. If they felt the grievance 
was just, they would discuss the matter with the employee’s 
superior and attempt to arrive at a settlement. Either 
they or the aggrieved employee could appeal the decision to 
the entire representation body which would then vote on the 
matter. Again the decision could be appealed to the top
q olevel of the organization.
In the Westinghouse and Armco plans, the represen­
tatives had no formal administrative or legislative power.
^American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Consti­
tution of Association of Employees, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
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Their function was for informational purposes. Thus there 
was no formal procedure for bringing an issue before the 
committees and no formal vote on the worthiness of a griev­
ance. These plans did not require that an employee who was 
dissatisfied with an action of his superior first take up 
the matter with that superior. Instead, he could immedi­
ately issue a complaint to his departmental representative 
for presentation to management. Management then took 
whatever action it thought appropriate.33
In all eight plans a means of reaching management 
for the purpose of filing grievances was obtained. Five of 
the eight plans made the chain of command a part of the 
grievance processing procedure.
As with the filing of grievances, the plan provided 
employees with an opportunity to make requests and sug-
I
gestions to management. In all eight of the companies 
employees were allowed to raise questions in such areas as 
wages, hours, and working conditions. Their representatives 
brought these issues before the entire committee of workers 
and management at their regular meetings.
The representation plan thus established a method 
through which rank-and-file employees could be heard by 
management. While the effectiveness of this channel is not
33Armco Steel Company, Armco Advisory Committees, 
op. cit., pp. 1-2; Confidential communication, Westinghouse, 
op. cit. ; Hillman, op. cit.; Arlin, op. cit.
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evaluated here, its creation did allow the potential for 
fuller and freer upward communication in the firm.
Representations Influence Upon Economic Benefits and 
Grievance Processing
The effectiveness of the upward channel can be 
measured in part by the influence it had upon management's 
economic decisions. Equally important was the ability of 
management to persuade workers of the wisdom of not grant­
ing a specific benefit.
Since no records of the representation meetings 
were available in any of the firms surveyed, analysis of 
these influences was limited largely to the opinions of 
those who were interviewed. Upon occasion, information was 
also obtained from company records.
In all of the firms surveyed, those interviewed
expressed the belief that the representation plan had some
34-effect on the granting of benefits by management. It is 
interesting to note that out of a total of twelve indi­
viduals who had an opinion of this subject, nine believed 
that the majority of these benefits would have eventually 
been granted by management even if a representation plan
^ T h e  respondent from American Telephone and 
Telegraph believed that this effect was very slight and 
that benefits were almost exclusively decided upon by 
management alone.
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3 5had not existed. Emphasis was placed upon the timing of 
the granting of a particular benefit and the configuration 
of the benefit package. Both of these factors were impor­
tant to those workers affected by such changes.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company the opinion 
of a retired production manager was that benefits would
3 6have been granted but "only as the labor market dictated."
A former division superintendent stated that the plan gave
management a chance to find out what the workers wanted
rather than simply supplying benefits which might or might
3 7not be foremost in their minds. The problem of layoffs 
was, for example, reported to have greatly concerned a 
large percentage of the Dennison employees during the 19 2 0’s. 
In 1928 the employee representatives succeeded in persuad­
ing management to put aside a fund of one hundred thousand 
dollars for payment of benefits to those workers on layoff.
The fund was, however, exhausted in the depression year of 
1930.38
q  c These individuals were: Confidential communication,
Westinghouse, op. cit. ; Hillman, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication, Goodyear, op. cit.; Reynolds, op. cit.;
Garvey, op. cit.; Damon, op. cit.; Confidential communi­
cation, International Harvester, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication, International Harvester, op. cit.; Confiden­






In the case of Westinghouse, a retired management 
member stated that the plan resulted in management's 
granting some wage and hour improvements sooner than they 
otherwise would. This was believed to be the result of 
management’s better understanding of what the working force 
wanted in terms of economic benefits.33 The company’s 
former director of wage and salary benefits felt that 
although Westinghouse would have maintained a position of 
leadership in the area of compensation and working con­
ditions , the representation plan had some effect upon the 
overall composition of the economic package. Wage rate
changes for various occupational groups were cited as being
40most influenced by the plan.
A second measurement of the effectiveness of upward 
communication was the success which employees had in 
registering individual grievances with management. With 
regard to grievance processing, fifteen of the sixteen 
interviewed agreed that management had for the first time 
an effective method by which they could hear the complaints 
of the hourly employees.11'*' None of the eight firms had 
had a grievance procedure prior to the establishment of 
their representation plans. The same individuals expressed
3Confidential communication, Westinghouse, op. cit.
"^Arlin, op. cit.
^Only the respondent from American Telephone and 
Telegraph felt that his company's plan had no meaningful 
effect upon the settling of grievances.
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their belief that the plan resulted in a significant number
n oof employee grievances being affirmed by management.
Published data concerning economic concessions and 
grievance processing during these years was largely un­
available in the eight firms surveyed. Moreover, when such 
data were available, they were presented as if all benefits 
obtained were the result of employee requests made through 
the representation plans. Experience with the Standard Oil 
of New Jersey plan and the comments of those in the eight 
companies surveyed indicate that such claims for economic 
concessions were unrealistic. Nevertheless, a sample of 
the topics discussed and their disposition offers some clue 
as to the influence of employees and their representatives 
upon the benefits granted and grievances upheld under 
employee representation.
Table IV is a listing of the issues dealt with under 
employee representation at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation’s 
plant from October, 1918, to June, 19 33. It appears from a 
study of this chart that approximately two-thirds of the 
issues raised in the representation meetings were decided 
in favor of the employees. Missing in this presentation 
is the percentage of these requests which were individual 
grievances. Such information is not available.
Table V provides a partial record of the activities 
of Standard Oil of Indiana’s representation committee,
42Ibid.
TABLE IV
ISSUES RAISED AND RESOLVED UNDER BETHLEHEM STEEL'S 
PLAN OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION,
OCTOBER, 1918, TO JUNE, 1933
Disposition








Employment and working conditions 809 225 87 184 1,305
Wages, piecework, and hours 515 303 77 251 1,146
Safety and prevention of 
accidents 775 49 38 74 936-
Practice, methods, and economy 344 53 32 55 484
Health and works sanitation 346 23 36 48 453
Employees transportation 305 56 34 36 431
Pensions and relief 464 77 21 39 601
Housing, domestic economies, 
and living conditions 165 35 17 32 249
Education and publications 27 3 9 8 47
Athletics and recreation 37 4 9 5 55
Rules, ways and means 87 15 14 25 141
Miscellaneous 58 6 1 5 70
Total 3,902 849 375 762 5,918
Source: "Employee Representation in Bethlehem, 1918-1933," Bethlehem Review,
September 25, 1933, p. 2. 180
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called the Joint General Committee. Of the issues dealt with 
from 1919 through 1928, 87.2 percent were approved in full 
or in part by the committee.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company a discussion 
of the accomplishments of the Works Committee was published 
for the year 1920. The following gains were cited by the 
committee for that year:
1. Institution of an employee profit sharing plan.
2. The establishment of an unemployment fund for
company employees.
3. The establishment of a housing fund from which 
employees could borrow money at a low rate of 
interest.
4. A general increase in wages.
5. Longer wash-up time for employees.
6. Approval .of a plan of physical examinations for 
new employees.
7. Improvement in physical surroundings for workers.
8. Improvement in lunchroom equipment and in food
and drinks served.^3
No mention was made of grievance processing during the year
1920.
These examples indicate that regardless of the 
source of the suggestions, employee gains were realized under 
the representation plans. Relating these examples to the 
statements of those interviewed results in the conclusion
U 3Franklyn Meine, "The Introduction and Development 
of the Works Committee in the Dennison Manufacturing Com­




TOPICS DEALT WITH UNDER THE EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION PLAN OF STANDARD OIL 
OF INDIANA, 1919 THROUGH 1928
Subject Number of Cases Dealt With
Wages 6 2 1
Working Conditions 5 2 4
Conciliation 2 0 8
Total 1 , 3 9 3
Source: Stanolind Record, August, 1 9 2 8 ,  
p p .  2 6 - 2 7 .
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that management granted a number of benefits through the 
representation plan, some of which were influenced by the 
requests of employees and their representatives. Grievances 
were apparently often decided in favor of the employees.
Equally important in this evaluation is the extent 
to which management was able to persuade the workers of the 
wisdom of company actions, especially in those instances when 
the company chose not to grant a specific request or affirm 
an employee's grievance.
Evidence of management’s success in this area can 
only be of an indirect nature. Those interviewed were asked 
if the plan in their firm increased the working force’s 
knowledge and appreciation of management's problems and 
points of view. Fifteen of the sixteen persons interviewed 
answered this question in the affirmative.̂*4 Employees 
were exposed to the company’s problems and its viewpoints
and were often persuaded that its position on a matter was
Lf 5correct.
One amusing incident at Goodyear involves an example 
of the company's desire to persuade its worker represen­
tatives that a request for a wage increase was inappropriate 
at that time. The firm’s factory manager, Paul Litchfield, 
appeared before the assembly of worker and management
^ T h e  respondent from American Telephone and 
Telegraph doubted that his company's plan increased under­
standing in any significant way.
^Richards, op. cit.
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representatives to explain the company's position with 
regard to a wage increase. For illustrative purposes, 
Litchfield used a set of charts and graphs which showed the 
relationship between the current cost of living and wages 
being paid by the firm. The line which represented wages 
terminated at a slightly higher point than the line repre­
senting cost of living. At the conclusion of the presen­
tation, one employee representative stood up and reportedly 
said, "Mr. Litchfield, that was a great speech— but the 
only thing I can figure out from it is that we came within
Jl gone-half inch of getting a raise." The employee repre­
sentatives were said to have accepted the company’s reason­
ing for denying the request.
This example and the previous statements are not 
intended to imply that the employee representatives and 
the working force were in every case convinced of manage­
ment's wisdom. Those interviewed nevertheless did believe 
that employees better understood management’s point of view 
as a result of the representation meetings even when they 
did not agree with it.
A second indication of management's persuasiveness 
was the volume of strike activity during the plan's 
operation. While other forces had an influence upon the
l+6Hugh Allen, The House of Goodyear (Cleveland:
Corday and Gross, 1949), p . 228.
185
Ll 7employees' willingness to strike, the employees' satis­
faction with their economic situation nevertheless in­
fluenced their willingness to walk off the job.
In only two of the companies surveyed did a strike
ever take place during the life of the representation 
48plans. Although the absence of a strike does not prove 
that employees were in every way content with their economic 
situation, it does indicate that they were not so dis­
satisfied that they were willing to walk off the job.
Table VI presents strike activity nationally during the 
period from 1920 to 1938.
The employees' feelings toward the abandonment of 
representation offers a third measure of the plans' success. 
Employee attitudes in this area were the product of many 
forces, only two of which were economic conditions and 
grievance processing within their firms. Nevertheless, 
strong dissatisfaction with compensation policies and 
grievance procedures should have been reflected in a desire 
to see the representation plans replaced or in some way 
changed.
Only two of those interviewed felt that the major­
ity of employees in their firms were glad to see the plans
^ A s  mentioned previously, employee representation 
plans had no independent treasury, nor were they affiliated 
with any regional or national associations.
^®These firms were Bethlehem Steel and Goodyear.




WORK STOPPAGES IN AMERICAN 
INDUSTRY, 1920-1938






















*N.A. = Not Available 
Source: U.S. Department 
Statistics of the United States:
of Commerce, Historical 
Colonial Times to 1957.
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census , 1960), p . 99.
187
go.1*9 The respondent from American Telephone and Telegraph 
and one interviewee from Westinghouse expressed these feel­
ings. All others believed that the plans had general 
employee support until the time of their dissolution.
,A verification of these opinions could ideally be 
made by presenting the results of an election contest be­
tween each company’s representation plan and one or more 
outside labor unions. Unfortunately, no such election was 
held in any of the eight companies surveyed. Whether these 
companies would have permitted such a contest is a subject 
for speculation. The National Labor Relations Board did 
not, however, order such an election in any one of these 
firms. The Board viewed the representation plans as company 
dominated labor organizations and therefore not eligible 
for employee consideration.
Other evidence does offer some support to the 
majority opinion of the interviewees. In three of the 
firms, independent unions were formed after the represen­
tation plans were abandoned.^ These unions were as simi­
lar to the plans as the law would allow. The employees of 
these companies chose to deal with management without 
affiliation with a national union.
119Confidential communication, American Telephone 
and Telegraph, op. cit.; Hillman, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication with a Standard Oil of Indiana employee 
revealed no opinion on this subject.
^9These firms were: Standard Oil of Indiana, Armco
Steel; Dennison Manufacturing Company.
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Two companies did experience strikes during the
organizing drives of the 19 30's. In February of 193 6
Goodyear was struck by the United Rubber Workers of America
in an attempt to gain union recognition. Newspaper accounts
estimated that twenty percent of the company's workers par-
51ticipated actively in the strike. The five-week walkout
was unsuccessful, and the striking workers were reinstated
5 2without prejudice. The company's representation plan
continued until April of 19 37 when the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court. The plan was then abandoned, and the company was
organized by the United Rubber Workers.
A strike called by the Steel Worker's Organizing
Committee occurred at the Bethlehem Steel Company in 1936.
The company's management reportedly would not negotiate
with the union because of its lack of backing by the
employees of the firm.^ The firm reported in 19 3 6 that
9 6.1 percent of the eligible employees participated in
54elections of employee representatives. Although this 
election was not conducted between the representation plan
^"Goodyear Strike Ended by Accord," New York Times, 
March 22, 1936, p. 11.
^"Goodyear Workers Back," New York Times, March 23, 
1936, p. 40.
^Taft, op. cit. , pp. 519-520 .
^"96.1% Vote in Employees Elections," Bethlehem 
Review, July 3, 1936, p. 2.
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and an outside union, the employees could have registered 
dissatisfaction with the plan by not voting. The vast 
majority obviously did not choose to do this.
From the above three areas of investigation it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the managements of seven 
of the eight firms enjoyed some measure of success in con­
vincing the workers that the companies’ decisions were in 
the best interests of both the firm and the employees.
There is no substantial evidence that would point to a con­
trary conclusion.
Employee Representation and the Companies' Personnel 
Departments
It may be recalled from the previous chapter that
with the introduction of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s
representation plan, the company's personnel department was
also established. A similar situation was found to be true
5 5in two of the eight firms surveyed.
At Standard Oil of Indiana the department was 
viewed as the vehicle through which the objectives of the
r crepresentation plan were to be achieved. This new 
Department of Industrial Relations was made responsible for 
the operation of the representation plan and for insuring 
that all employees would be treated justly. At each plant
C CThese firms were Standard Oil of Indiana and 
International Harvester.
^Giddens , op. cit. , p. 337.
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an Assistant Director of Industrial Relations was appointed
and was directly accountable to the Director of Industrial
Relations. Duties performed by the department included
employment, safety, health and welfare, workmen’s compen-
57sation, statistics, and publication.
Standard Oil of Indiana’s Director of Industrial 
Relations acted as neither a representative of labor nor 
management at the representation meetings, but instead was 
moderator of the meeting, seeking to aid in the compromise 
of disputes and to provide factual information for decision
c omaking when either side requested it.
Many of the duties of the new department were taken
from the supervisors in each of the plants. Selection had
previously been in the hands of the supervisor. After the
department absorbed this function, the supervisor retained
only the right to accept or reject an applicant selected by
59those in Industrial Relations.
Similarly, his right to discipline and discharge 
was reduced by the representation plan’s formation with 
these powers given to the Industrial Relations Department.
A list of offenses for which an employee might be suspended 
or discharged without further notice was published. For
57Ibid.




any other offense, an employee could not be suspended or
discharged without a clear warning and a repetition of the
violation. If an employee felt that he had been disciplined
unfairly by his supervisor, he had the formal right to
appeal to first his departmental superintendent and then to
6 0the Assistant Director of Industrial Relations.
The personnel department did not take a signifi­
cantly active role in the representation meetings, and the 
plan could have functioned without the department's 
existence. But as in the case of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, the Industrial Relations Director and his assis­
tants in each of the plants were appointed to see that the 
promises made under the representation plan were kept.
Now that a formal grievance procedure existed, it was up 
to those in the personnel department to see that the need 
for grievance processing was infrequent. Thus while 
employee representation did not require the existence of 
a personnel department, it definitely was a major reason 
for its formation in Standard Oil of Indiana.
The International Harvester experience was similar 
to that of Standard Oil of Indiana. Upon the adoption of 
the representation plan, a new Department of Industrial 
Relations was formed. The department was "charged with 
the duty of giving special attention to all matters
^Giddens, op. cit. , p. 339 .
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pertaining to labor policies and the well-being of employ- 
fi 1ees." Again the department was given some of the duties
which supervisors had previously performed. Selection of
personnel subject to supervisory approval, transfer of
employees, and discipline and discharge were significant
6 2duties of this new department. As was the case in 
Standard Oil of Indiana the personnel manager was one of 
the steps in the grievance procedure. Thus an employee 
who felt he had been unjustly disciplined could appeal to 
higher levels of management, one of the steps in this 
appeal procedure being the personnel manager.
The personnel department in this firm was apparently 
formed for reasons similar to those in Standard Oil of 
Indiana and Standard Oil of New Jersey. While employee 
representation could have no doubt functioned without the 
department, it was nevertheless formed to rationalize and 
stabilize personnel policies so that the promises made 
under the plan could more readily be carried out.
While the personnel departments of both Standard 
Oil of Indiana and International Harvester might have been 
formed without the existence of employee representation, 
the plans encouraged their formation by emphasizing the 
need for standardized and rational labor policies.
R1 •International Harvester Corporation, Harvester
Industrial Council Plan (Chicago: International Harvester




Unlike the above two firms, the other six companies 
surveyed already had personnel departments at the time of 
their plans’ formation. In each of these firms, the 
personnel department was involved in the functioning of the 
representation system.
In Goodyear the company's Labor Department was 
formed in 1912, six years before the Industrial Council was 
begun. With the initiation of the representation plan the 
Labor Department’s duties were increased and its stature
fi Qwas said to have grown throughout the company. Specif­
ically, its new duties included the administration of 
benefits obtained through the plan, the processing of 
employee grievances under the plan's grievance procedure,
and the appointment of the department's head as the pre-
64siding officer over the representation meetings. The
department was functioning in the area of employee selection
even before the plan's existence. Its duties in the area
of discipline' and discharge were, however, increased due to
its role in the grievance procedure. The department in
essence had to approve a disciplinary action or a discharge
6 5if a grievance on these matters was filed.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company, the personnel 
department had been in existence since 1917. ' The primary




impact upon the department was again in the area of griev­
ance handling. The personnel department was the first step 
in the grievance procedure beyong the supervisor, and 
departmental representatives were given the task of investi 
gating each grievance, collecting information, and making
a decision as to whether the grievance would be denied or 
6 6upheld. Prior to the existence of the representation
plan the supervisor had almost complete autonomy in the
6 7areas of discipline and discharge.
Similar responses were obtained from represen­
tatives of three of the other firms which were surveyed. 
Although in none of these firms did the representation 
plan result in the formation of a personnel department,
the companiesT plans increased the duties of the department
6 8and added to its organizational importance. The increase
of duties centered around such areas as the administration
of benefits obtained through the plan, grievance handling,
69and presiding over the representation meetings. Only 
in the case of American Telephone and Telegraph was the 
plan thought to have had no significant influence upon the 
functioning of the personnel department. The principal
88Garvey, op. cit. 
fi 7Curtis, op. cit.
88Hillman, op. cit.; Arlin, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication, Westinghouse, op. cit.; Trumbauer, Bethlehem 
Steel, op. cit. ; Sexton, Armco Steel, op. cit.
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impact on this company was said to be only increased
7 0clerical work and record keeping.
In summary, it appears that representation had a 
significant effect upon the personnel departments of seven 
of the eight companies surveyed. In two of these firms the 
departments were formed at the time the representation plan 
began. In these two firms the personnel departments were 
apparently formed to fulfill the promises made under the 
representation plan. A large portion of these promises 
involved the stabilization of the companies' labor policies 
and thus the intention to treat employees fairly and 
equally. Through their activities in selection, transfer, 
discipline and discharge, health and safety, and benefit 
administration the departments were significant contribu­
tors to the accomplishment of the representation plans' 
objectives.
In the other six firms, personnel departments were 
in existence prior to the beginning of their employee 
representation plans. In five of these six companies the 
plans resulted in a significant elaboration of duties of 
these departments. These duties again centered around the 
need for a greater standardization and rationalization of 
personnel policies. In one of the firms no significant 
effect upon the personnel department's duties was found.
7 0Confidential communication, American Telephone
and Telegraph, op. cit.
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Employee Representation’s Impact Upon Organization Climate
The concept of organization climate was defined in 
some detail in Chapter IV. In brief, the term can be 
described as the organization’s personality, or customary 
way of responding to its internal and external environment.
As in the previous chapter, climate will be mea­
sured in terms of the variables developed by Rensis Likert. 
These include: effectiveness of the organization's commun­
ication system; degree of employees' participation in 
solving organizational problems affecting them; the way in 
which the organization deals with conflict; leadership 
style of supervisors and managerial personnel; and the 
level and trend of turnover and absenteeism in the organi­
zation.
Communicat'ion systems. It was noted previously that prior 
to representation, the effectiveness of vertical communi­
cation channels within the eight firms was rather slight. 
The eight organizations were lacking both in terms of the 
availability of adequate channels and the effective use of 
those channels.
The institution of employee representation did 
provide a new means of contact between the hourly employees 
and top management. The volume of cummunication in both 
directions was great. It was also previously pointed out 
that both sides apparently did influence the other's 
attitudes. Both the wisdom of management's decisions and
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the legitimacy of workers’ demands were more readily
acknowledged after the plan was in operation. This effect
was the real test of the significance of the channels. In
71only one firm was there no important impact in this area. 
Thus, seven of these eight firms were favorably influenced 
through the development of more effective communication 
systems.
Employee participation. Closely related to effective 
communication in the organization is the degree to which 
employees participated in the decision making processes of 
their firms. While participation and high productivity 
are not necessarily in a cause and effect relationship to 
one another, participation has been found to favorably 
effect productivity in a number of research studies.
Without question, the previous discussion demon­
strates that the hourly employees had a much greater voice 
in decision making than existed prior to the representation 
plans' creation. It should be remembered, however, that 
the degree to which employees could participate in 
decisions affecting them was significantly affected by the 
formal design of the plans. In every one of the eight 
plans the companies limited employee involvement in 
decision making to the making of suggestions and requests.
•^Confidential communication, American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, op. cit.
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In none of the plans were the employees allowed any decision 
making autonomy.
Even though employee participation was limited by 
the design of the plans, worker influence upon management 
was nevertheless much greater than in pre-plan days. In 
terms of both economic gains and grievance processing, 
management’s actions were affected by the workers and 
their representatives.
In none of the companies surveyed did the represen­
tation plans lead to any enrichment of hourly employees’ 
jobs. No increases in planning or controlling responsi­
bilities was reported. Employee participation under 
representation was thus limited to influencing economic 
benefits and to securing impartial treatment for the rank- 
and-file worker.
Interviews and company records do not reveal that 
either operating employees or management ever considered 
representation as a possible starting point for increasing 
planning and controlling responsibilities of rank-and- 
file employees. An unrealized potential for representation 
thus appears to have existed in this area. The plans 
could have provided a base for this sort of participation 
had they been so utilized.
Conflict resolution. While the operating employees did 
obtain a degree of participation in certain decisions and 
while greater identification with the company resulted,
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interviews indicate that conflict did in fact still exist 
within these organizations. And as was pointed out in the 
previous chapter, a healthy organization is one in which 
conflict is present. It is the way in which an organization 
deals with conflict that determines whether it is func­
tional or dysfunctional to organization climate. Likert 
has stated that open conflict which is resolved can be an
asset to an organization while bitter, unresolved conflict
7 2can be damaging.
Certainly the plans provided a means by which 
employees could make known those complaints and requests 
which they felt should be voiced. Previous discussion of 
the use of these channels indicated that the employees 
felt free to use them and apparently did so quite fre­
quently. Prior to the representation plans there was no 
effective way for employees to reach management in the 
eight companies surveyed.
Each interviewee was asked if employees felt free 
to raise any question without fear of management displea­
sure or retaliation. In every instance the reply was in 
the affirmative. Differences of opinion were also said 
to be common features of the representation meetings. No 
instances of reprisals were reported by either management 
or non-management personnel. As was indicated in Chapter 
III, the companies were apparently very sensitive to the
^2Likert, op. cit., p. 117.
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possibility of charges of employer domination, and did 
therefore take great care not to penalize individuals for 
statements made in the representation meetings.
It appears that while management and employee 
representatives did not always agree upon an issue, the 
meetings did allow and encourage a free exchange of views 
upon subjects considered. While management had the power 
to settle any issue in its own favor, the many instances 
Of rulings favorable to employees indicate that initial 
grievances and requests resulted in gains for the workers. 
Even in instances in which management ruled against the 
employees, each side had a chance to listen and to under­
stand the other's point of view. This situation was 
certainly preferable to the pre-plan relationships.
Supervisory leadership style. One of the factors contrib­
uting to unresolved conflict in the days before the 
representation plans was the relationship between the 
supervisor and his subordinates. In every company sur­
veyed, many instances of inept supervision were reported
7 3with regard to treatment of subordinates. Of course not 
all supervisors were thought to be unqualified in this
^Those who commented on this topic included: 
Hillman, op. cit.; Arlin, op. cit.; Confidential communi­
cation, Westinghouse, op. cit.; Garvey, op. cit.; Damon, 
op. cit.; Richards, op. cit., Confidential communication, 
International Harvester, op. cit.; Confidential communi­
cation, American Telephone and Telegraph, op. cit.; Sexton, 
op. cit.; Confidential communication, Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Company, op. cit.; Trumbauer, op. cit.; Confidential 
communication, Standard Oil of Indiana, op. cit.
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area, but there were enough such instances to make them 
fairly common.
For example, at Dennison Manufacturing Company 
supervisory willingness to treat employees fairly and con­
sistently was found to vary greatly from department to
department. Often, the attitude taken by the supervisor
7 4was reported to have been, "Do as I say or get out."
With the institution of the representation plan, 
the powers of the supervisor in Dennison and in other 
companies were significantly limited. Earlier discussion 
pointed out that the contacts made under the representation 
plan largely bypassed the supervisor. Only in the griev­
ance procedure of six of the eight firms was he included a 
a formal step. He did not normally take part in the pro­
ceedings of the representation meetings.
In addition to employees’ ability to reach higher 
levels of management without the supervisors’ approval, 
the plans also provided for a greater rationalization and 
standardization of personnel policies. As a result of the 
representation plans, personnel departments were created 
in two of the eight firms, and in five of the remaining 
six firms their duties were significantly enlarged. In 
each case the new duties of the personnel department were 
taken at least in part from the supervisor. The super­
visor’s power to hire, fire, and transfer was typically
"^Garvey, op. cit.
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reduced, and his right to discipline indiscriminately was 
limited by the grievance procedure.
While these limitations were imposed without the 
supervisors’ consent, the results in most instances were 
improved supervisory-subordinate relationships. In six of
7 5the eight firms those interviewed commented on this topic.
In five of these six firms those who were interviewed
indicated that relationships between the supervisors and
their subordinates generally improved after the plans were 
7 Rintroduced.
The management of these five firms apparently made 
it quite clear to the supervisors that the new regulations 
developed as a result of the plan were company policy 
and that they would be carried out. For example, in 
Dennison Manufacturing Company the supervisors attended a 
series of instructional meetings conducted by the company 
at the time of the plan’s introduction. If they did not 
comply with company policy in this area, they were told
7 7that they would not remain in their supervisory positions.
In the Bethlehem Steel Company a similar situation 
existed. The supervisory work force was clearly instructed
7 5J. R. Sexton of Armco Steel and the respondent 
from Standard Oil of Indiana had no knowledge of this sub­
ject.
^®The respondent from American Telephone and Tele­
graph saw no significant improvement in this area.
"^Curtis, op. cit.
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by management that the new personnel policies established 
by the company were to be followed and that the supervisor
7 8could expect disciplinary action if he chose not to do so.
Although supervisors were required to carry out the 
new policies under threat of discipline from higher levels 
of management, those interviewed in the five firms expressed 
the opinion that the majority of the supervisors accepted 
the changes without any noticeable hostility toward 
superiors or subordinates. Some supervisors did find it 
difficult to adjust to the new relationships, but for the 
most part the transition was seen as relatively trouble 
free.
As an example of this transition, the supervisory
force at Westinghouse was reported to have accepted the
7 9new relationship without a great deal of difficulty.
}Certain supervisors resented the restrictions upon their
freedom of action, but these individuals were forced to
8 0adjust or give up their positions. The supervisors’
ability to deal effectively with subordinates improved as
the years passed due to their greater adjustment to the
limitations upon their powers and to the effectiveness of
81supervisory training programs.
7 8Trumbauer, op. cit.
Confidential communication, Westinghouse, op. cit. 
8^Hillman, op. cit.
^Confidential communication, Westinghouse, op. cit.
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The data collected in five of the eight companies 
point, therefore, to the conclusion that supervisor- 
subordinate relationships improved with the introduction 
and operation of the representation plans. In one firm 
there was apparently no effect, and in two others no con­
clusions could be drawn.
Turnover and absenteeism. A final measure of organization 
climate was the effect of the plans upon absenteeism and 
turnover in the eight companies. In none of these firms 
were records available for absenteeism and turnover during 
the years of the representation plans' existence. Con­
sequently, reliance was placed upon personal interviews to 
determine any influence by the plans in these areas.
None of those interviewed believed that there was 
a relationship between turnover and absenteeism and 
employee representation. In three of the firms the
respondents indicated no knowledge of any influence of the
8 2plans in these areas. Those interviewed from the other 
five companies expressed serious doubts that any relation­
ship existed.
Summary. It appears that in terms of four of the five 
variables used to measure organization climate, all but 
one of the firms registered some gains after the intro­
duction of employee representation. The information does
8 2These firms were: Armco, Standard Oil of
Indiana, Goodyear.
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not prove that representation caused the improvements.
There are, however, strong indications that the plans 
encouraged these better working relationships.
Representations Influence Upon Unionization
Although employees in seven of the eight firms 
surveyed were generally satisfied with the workings of 
their representation systems, federal law resulted in 
their disestablishment in 193 7 or within a few years there­
after. The question here is whether representation had 
any effect on employees’ attitudes toward eventual union­
ization. Again, primary reliance was placed upon personal 
interviews to determine the effect of the plans in this 
area.
In two of the firms those interviewed saw no 
relationship between employees' attitudes toward union­
ization and the previous operation of the representation 
8 8plans. In each of the other six some effect was noted.
In three of these six firms, the employees formed 
unaffiliated or independent unions. Their motivations 
were said to be the desire to belong to an organization as 
much like their former representation plans as the law 
would allow.
At Standard Oil of Indiana, the employees were 
said to be disappointed at the removal of their represen­
tation plan. During the spring and summer of 1937, the
33These firms were Bethlehem Steel and International 
Harvester.
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employees of the company's six refineries organized un-
affiliated unions. Although the International Oil Field,
Gas Well, and Refinery Workers of America, CIO, tried to
organize the company's refinery workers during this period,
84they were unsuccessful in any of the six plants.
In the Armco Steel Company, a similar situation
existed. Although the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee,
which later became the United Steel Workers' Union,
attempted to organize the company's employees in 1937, the
workers rejected them in favor of unaffiliated unions in
8 5each of the Armco plants.
This company was the only major steel producing
firm which was not organized by the S.W.O.C. The lack of
success at Armco was attributed to the highest wage rates
and most generous fringe benefits in the industry coupled
with an entirely satisfactory communication system between
8 6management and the working force.
No national union attempted to organize the 
Dennison Manufacturing Company during this period. The 
employees were reported to have maintained their former
p h Confidential communication, Standard Oil of 
Indiana, op. cit. ; Giddings, op. cit., p. 568.
8 5Sexton, op. cit.
 ̂̂ Ibid. The company could not supply information 
concerning wages and benefits during this period.
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relationships with management by operating an independent
8 7union. This organization still exists in the firm today.
Three firms which affiliated with national unions
were reported to have been influenced in this action by
their former representation plans. American Telephone and
Telegraph employees were said to be so disappointed with
their plan's operation that they welcomed the chance to
join a union.88 Accordingly, after the plan was disbanded
in 1940 the employees affiliated with the National Feder-.
ation of Telephone Workers. This union changed its name
in 1947 to the Communication Workers of America. The
company's long-lines employees are presently a part of
this union which is a member of the AFL-CIO.88
Westinghouse employees were also thought to be
more receptive to union organization during the late 1930's,
not because of the failure of their representation plan,
but because they had become accustomed to dealing with
90management on a collective basis. A number of the elected
p 7Garvey, op. cit.; Curtis, op. cit.; Damon, op. 
cit.; Richards, op. cit. The Firm's union was in 19 69 
ruled by the National Labor Relations Board to be a company- 
dominated union under the provisions of the Labor Management 
Relations Act. The Board's decision was upheld by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals. See NLRB v. Dennison Manufacturing 
Company, et al., No. 7 304 CA 1 (December 10, 19 69), 72 LRRM 
2972 (1969).
88Ericson, op. cit.
88American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Labor 
Relations History (New York: American Telephone and
Telegraph, August 15, 19 64), pp. 1-2.
8^Confidential communication, Westinghouse, op. cit.
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representatives were said to have been the nucleus of union
organizing efforts with the result that these former
employee representatives became union officers after union-
91ization occurred. The employees affiliated with the
92United Electrical and Radio Workers of America in 1938.
In the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company a similar
experience took place. The employees had voted in 193 5 to
maintain their representation plan in favor of any outside
93labor organization. Nevertheless, when the plan was 
disbanded in 193 7, the employees affiliated with the United
gifRubber Workers shortly thereafter. The company’s
Industrial Assembly plan was believed to be a definite
factor in influencing the workers toward dealing with
management on a collective basis. Again, many of the
former employee representatives became local union officers
after affiliation with the national union. The past
experience they had in dealing with management was valuable
95in the negotiating process which followed.
In summary, the employees of six of the eight 
firms surveyed were believed to be influenced in their 
attitudes toward unionization by their experiences under
^Hillman, op. cit.
92Taft, op. cit., p. 52 6.




employee representation. In three of these companies the 
employees organized unaffiliated unions which were similar 
to their former representation plans. The employees of the 
three other firms joined national unions. In one of these 
firms the employees were so dissatisfied with their repre­
sentation plan, they gladly affiliated with a labor 
organization. The employees of the remaining two companies 
were not anxious to see their plans dissolved. They were, 
however, accustomed to dealing with management on a 
collective basis, and this was believed to have increased 
their willingness to affiliate with some sort of labor 
organization.
The Representation Plans of the Eight Firms in Summary
An analysis of eight plans of employee represen­
tation has revealed a number of significant contributions 
to the development of personnel management in this country. 
While findings in each of these companies were not entirely 
uniform, they do point out that representation plans 
generally were helpful to both the employees and the 
management of the companies involved. In only one of the 
companies was a largely negative impression found.
Representation plans were found to open new 
channels of communication between workers and management 
and to encourage their usage. Some changes in the atti­
tudes of both sides resulted from the usage of these 
channels. Both economic gains and the favorable disposition
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of grievances were also granted to employees through the 
plans.
The personnel departments of seven of these firms 
were in some cases created by the plans and in other in­
stances enlarged in importance. In every instance a 
greater standardization of personnel policies and practices 
resulted from management’s intention to make good the 
promises of the plans.
Organization climate was also found to improve 
through greater and more candid communication among manage­
ment and the workers, through greater employee partici­
pation, through the opportunity to resolve conflict more 
effectively, and through more effective supervisor- 
subordinate relationships.
Employees in six of the eight firms were influenced 
in their attitudes toward unionization as a result of 
their experiences with employee representation. In three 
of the six companies unaffiliated unions were formed which 
paralleled the former representation plans but which met 
the requirements of national labor legislation. In the 
other three firms the employees joined national unions. 
Their previous experiences with their firms’ represen­
tation plans were factors leading to this affiliation.
A comparison of these findings with those of the 
previous chapter largely verifies the conclusions concern­
ing Standard Oil of New Jersey's employee representation
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plan. While the Standard of New Jersey plan was in many 
ways a part of an ideal working relationships the major 
areas of contribution found to exist there were for the 
most part found to exist in the plans surveyed in this 
chapter.
It seems reasonable to conclude that employee 
representation in American industry did make significant 
contributions to the development of more effective 
management-worker relationships in many of the companies 
in which it was utilized. Variations in effectiveness 
among firms no doubt existed. This variation was illus­
trated in the limited sample of eight companies analyzed 
in this chapter. Nevertheless, the plans were a signifi­
cant step away from the authoritarian methods of management 
which predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. 
They can correctly be viewed as a part of the movement in 
this century toward more efficient techniques of managing 
the human resources of the enterprise.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Employee representation was a phenomenon which 
existed for approximately two decades in this country— from 
1919 until 1937. History remembers representation as a 
means by which employers sought to discourage unionism 
among employees, but little else has been written about 
this form of collective relationship. While there is no 
question that the fear of unionism motivated the establish­
ment of many of these plans, such an explanation is 
incomplete.
It has been the basic hypothesis of this study that 
employee representation made a number of contributions to 
the improvement of management-employee relations within 
companies in which it was used. These contributions have 
never been extensively explored with a resultant gap in our 
existing knowledge of labor-management history. This study 
was undertaken to fill this gap in historical research.
Summary of Results
Although results were not uniform in each of the 
nine firms surveyed, a number of findings were consistent 
from company to company. These results will be dealt with 
in terms of each of the areas of investigation.
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Communication channels. The plans' effects upon the estab­
lishment and usage of communication channels between 
management and operating personnel were first examined. In 
every one of the nine companies studied, the creation of a 
representation plan resulted in a new communication channel 
between top management and the rank-and-file employees of 
the firm. Through the medium of the plan, top management 
had the opportunity to present their point of view to the 
employees on a wide variety of topics and vice versa.
Management was in each of the nine firms quite 
willing to utilize the new channel in an attempt to both in­
form and persuade the employees of the wisdom of the com­
pany's action. In no case was there a paucity of information 
generated by management.
Through their elected representatives employees were 
equally willing to communicate with management on matters of 
individual grievances and on demands for improvements in 
wages, hours, and working conditions. The companies surveyed 
had for the first time given their operating employees a 
means to reach top and middle levels of management without 
first obtaining the approval of the first line supervisor. 
Evidence suggests that the working force of these firms were 
for the most part eager to communicate with management and 
readily did so.
While the existence and frequent usage of the new 
form of contact between the operating employees and manage­
rial personnel did not in itself insure that benefits would
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accrue to either side, the lack of such contact in the past 
virtually guaranteed that some misunderstandings would occur. 
The availability of an effective means of contact was thus 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for improving 
management-worker relations in these firms. The effective­
ness of these points of contact was measured in other 
portions of the investigation.
Economic benefits and grievances. The influence of employ­
ees upon the economic benefits obtained from management and 
upon grievance processing was a significant measure of the 
impact which the plan had upon overall working relation­
ships . Equally important was management’s ability to 
persuade the work force of the wisdom of its decisions 
when a request or grievance was denied. This topic was 
therefore explored in detail.
In all but one of the nine firms surveyed the 
employees and their elected representatives were found to 
have influenced the disposition of economic benefits.
Although the managements of these companies often granted a 
benefit unilaterally and then gave the plans the credit for 
obtaining it, the available evidence indicates that the 
representatives influenced the timing and composition of 
changes in the benefit package.
Employees were quite willing to use the grievance 
procedure which was created by the plans. Especially in 
the early years of the plans’ existence, there were a large
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number of individual requests and complaints. Published 
data indicated that these grievances were frequently 
decided in favor of the employees. The majority of those 
interviewed agreed with this observation.
Management in eight of the nine firms was generally 
effective in persuading the employees of the wisdom of 
decisions which denied a request or grievance. Certainly, 
there were disagreements between the two sides, and not all 
of these disputes were resolved to the satisfaction of all 
concerned. However, when compared to the relationships in 
pre-plan days, the companies were much more successful 
after the introduction of employee representation in 
obtaining employee support for their decisions.
Personnel department formation. The effect of the plans 
upon the formation or expansion of the companies’ personnel 
departments was found to be significant in eight of the 
nine companies in the study. In three of these eight firms 
the personnel department was formed at the time that the 
representation plans were introduced. In the other five 
firms the duties of the department were significantly 
enlarged. In each instance there was a recognition of the 
need to standardize and rationalize the companies’ person­
nel policies, many of which had previously been individually 
determined by departmental supervisors.
The firms had committed themselves to fair and 
equal treatment of employees through representation.
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The personnel departments were given the duty of seeing 
that the promises made under the plan were kept. Thus 
while the nature of employee representation did not require 
a personnel department, it definitely caused the creation 
or encouraged the expansion of such a department in the 
firms studied. Duties were commonly assigned to the 
personnel department in the areas of selection and place­
ment, transfer, discipline and discharge, benefit adminis­
tration, and grievance processing.
Organization climate. Although the organization climate 
within any firm is illusive and difficult to measure, an 
attempt was made to do this in each of the nine firms. A 
number of variables were selected which were believed to 
adequately reflect the state of an organization's health. 
These variables included:
1. The effectiveness of the organization's commun­
ication system.
2. The extent of the employees' participation in 
solving problems which affected them.
3. The way in which the organization dealt with 
conflict.
4-. Leadership styles of supervisory personnel.
5, The level and'trend of turnover and absenteeism 
in the organization.
Each of these variables was investigated before and after
the introduction of the representation plan.
The measurement of these factors resulted in the
following improvements after employee representation was
introduced:
217
1. Communication improved both in quantity and 
effectiveness in eight of the nine firms.
2. Employees in eight of the companies were allowed 
to participate to a limited extent in a number 
of economic decisions affecting them.
3. Conflict was dealt with more openly and more 
constructively in eight of the organizations.
4. In five of the nine firms supervisor-subordinate 
relationships improved.
5. In one company a reduction in turnover and 
absenteeism was linked to the operation of the 
plan.
While the information obtained does not prove conclusively 
that representation was the cause of these changes, there 
are strong indications that at least a partial causal 
relationship did exist.
Unionization. The effect of the plans upon eventual union­
ization in the nine firms was mixed. In four of the firms, 
independent or unaffiliated unions were formed. The 
employees of these companies were found to have been satis­
fied with their representation plans and thus formed unions 
which were as much like them as the National Labor Relations 
Act would allow.'1' Union officers in these firms-were
-̂ -These firms included: Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey; Standard Oil Company of Indiana; Armco Steel Company; 
Dennison Manufacturing Company (a paper products producer). 
These four firms have maintained their independent unions 
to the present time. Their industries, however, are largely 
organized by national unions. The percent of the workers 
in each industry organized by national unions follows: Oil,
7 8%; Steel, 83%; Paper products, 100% (est.). United States 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory 
of National and International Labor Unions in the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 84.
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typically former employee representatives. In the other 
five firms in the survey, the employees affiliated with 
national unions. Although general worker satisfaction with 
the plans appeared to exist in all but one of these com­
panies, they nevertheless, aligned with national unions as 
their plans were declared illegal and as union organizing 
drives picked up momentum in the late 19 3 0's.
In every company surveyed both management and 
operative employees agreed that the experience they had 
had under employee representation made the transition to a 
unionized.relationship less traumatic. In each firm it had 
become the custom for management to deal with the employees 
on a collective basis. Bargaining and contract adminis­
tration were therefore not entirely foreign to either side.
Conclusions of the Study
The historical importance of employee representation 
rests largely in the motivational insights and experience 
which developed from its usage. It has been noted through­
out this study that after World War I many companies 
realized the need for an improvement in their personnel 
policies. Employee representation offered a possible 
vehicle for this improvement while at the same time dis­
couraging the organization of the firm's employees by a 
labor union. These were the basic motivations for estab­
lishing the plans.
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It appears that in most instances these firms were 
not quite sure where representation would lead them in 
terms of their relationships with their working force. The 
plans were thus experiments during the time when personnel 
management and motivation theory were in their infancy.
In a period in which employees were viewed by many 
as primarily economic men who responded almost exclusively, 
to monetary incentives, the ideas behind representation 
were indeed radical. To say that employees had the right 
to help determine the conditions under which they would 
work and the wages which they would earn was considered 
heresy by many businessmen of the early 1900's.
Employee representation thus was a move away from 
the traditional autocratic management of the times toward 
a more democratic and humanistic orientation. In more 
specific terms the plans did allow the worker a greater 
chance to move up the needs hierarchy that Abraham Maslow 
was to write about in later years. Satisfaction of 
economic, social, status, and self-actualization needs of 
employees were more fully achieved under representation 
than in the pre-plan period.
The workers did in many companies induce management 
to make concessions in the areas of wages, hours, and 
working conditions. While it has been observed that 
management had the strongest hand in the determination of 
these benefits, employees nevertheless had some influence. 
The physiological and security needs which Maslow was to
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cite as the most basic for man were thus more adequately 
satisfied after the introduction and operation of represen­
tation .
The plans further sought to achieve a greater unity 
of interests and identification with management among the 
work force. Changes in organization climate after the 
introduction of the plans suggest that this goal was largely 
accomplished in the majority of the firms studied.
Likert has suggested that the most effective work 
team is one in which there is a high level of group co­
hesiveness and identification with the formal organization's 
2goals. Representation appears to have been a significant 
factor in accomplishing this identification. While labor 
unions work for cohesiveness among their membership, they 
do not encourage identification with management and the 
firm.
Further, representation did allow the worker a 
chance to satisfy to some extent his egoistic need for 
status and recognition. While the plans did not and could 
not result in promotions for the working force, they did 
add to the satisfaction of the need for status in two ways. 
First, they allowed a number of rank-and-file employees to 
hold leadership positions in the representation plans and 
thus satisfy in part their need for recognition. Although 
holding such a position added nothing to their pay checks,
^Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p . 99.
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employees who were not upwardly mobile obtained a measure 
of importance that they otherwise would not have possessed.
More broadly, every employee working under a well- 
administered plan had some chance for individual recognition 
through his right to contact management representatives 
with his requests and grievances. While this right offered 
only limited satisfaction of the egoistic need, it was 
nevertheless a gain over pre-plan days.
Through the performance of their duties, the 
employee representatives were often given the chance to 
utilize more fully the abilities they possessed. To a 
limited extent the self-actualization needs of these indi­
viduals were also satisfied as a result of employee repre­
sentation.
Thus from a historical viewpoint it can be observed 
that employee representation provided a step forward in the 
satisfaction of a number of psychological needs of the 
worker long before their significance was widely understood 
by most members of management. Perhaps unknowingly, the 
firms which had experimented successfully with represen­
tation were a part of the human relations movement which 
Elton Mayo popularized in the 1930’s and 1940's. They were 
thus pioneers in the utilization of new and more effective 
means of dealing with employees.
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Implications of the Study
Beyond the historical significance of the study, 
what implications does this research have for current-day 
management-worker relations? Regardless of the success of 
many of these early plans, they cannot be utilized in their 
original form today. These representation systems were 
classified as company dominated labor organizations by the 
National Labor Relations Act of 193 5 and were declared 
illegal. As explained earlier, this was the reason for 
their abandonment in the late 19 30's and early 1940's.
Any contributions which the findings concerning represen­
tation can make to current labor-management relations can­
not therefore be in the form of revived representation 
plans. The lessons learned through representation can, 
however, be of value to today's management.
A prerequisite to the satisfaction of employee 
demands is the need for effective contact between management 
and the employees. The lesson learned by a number of firms 
over fifty years ago was that if employees cannot get 
management's attention through formalized methods, they 
will utilize other means such as strikes and unionization.
A parallel of this situation can be drawn with the 
white collar and professional workers of today. The grow­
ing militance of these employees poses new problems for 
management and offers opportunities for union leaders.
Both in private industry and government service, these
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employees have grown increasingly restive and more sympa-
3thetic to the appeals of unions.
To fully analyze the problems of professional and 
white collar workers is beyond the scope of this study. 
Remedies for these problems are therefore also beyond its 
scope. Nevertheless, some suggestions for strengthening 
the traditional ties between management and these employee 
groups can be made by drawing upon the lessons of represen­
tation. These suggestions will center around the. improve­
ment of communication methods in the organization.
Without the necessity of a formal representation 
plan or of a union, management might establish a formal 
appeal channel for any employee or group of employees in 
the firm. This channel could be used to process grievances 
and for the direction of requests and suggestions to upper 
levels of management. Far from being a duplicate of the 
rather unsuccessful open-door .policy of the past, this 
technique could be established as a path outside the formal 
chain of command with succeeding appeal steps culminating 
with consideration of the question by the president.
See, for example, A. Kleingartner, "Professionalism 
and Engineering Unionism," Industrial Relations, VIII (May, 
1969), 224-235; A. A. Sloan” "Prospects for the Unionization 
of White Collar Employees," Personnel Journal, XLVIII 
(December, 1969), 964-971.
Approximately ten percent of the labor force classi­
fied as white collar are members of unions. United States 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.l United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), p. 236.
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While an arrangement such as this could certainly 
fail, its primary chance of success would rest upon the 
exercise of good faith on both sides. As was the case 
with employee representation, each group would have the 
opportunity to better understand the other, and problems 
would have a greater chance of being resolved in their 
early stages.
Such a non-union appeal system is not an entirely 
new idea. It has been successfully used in a few companies 
for some time.*4 Nevertheless, there are relatively few 
firms that are not unionized which use such systems. The 
assumption is often made that the formal chain of command
is sufficient to pass information upward to top management.
5This is often not the case. Whether done intentionally 
or not, screening of information can and often does occur 
before it reaches the top levels of the organization. 
Especially with regard to problems of motivation and morale, 
top management may not know that a problem exists until 
after it has become serious.
Beyond the advantage of giving management an early 
warning system for employee discontent, such a channel of 
communication could also be used to allow the employees to
4,'Bo s s  and Worker: Better Communications Between
Them Boosts Output, Companies Find," Wall Street Journal, 
October 13, 1955.
^Charles E. Redfield, Communication in Management 
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1958 ), p. 181.
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participate in the solution of problems raised by both 
sides. Especially among professional employees who typi­
cally have some latitude in the way their job is performed, 
there is a strong desire to participate in decisions which 
affect them and their work. Hence, an opportunity to 
participate with management in solving problems which 
affect the work force logically should aid the white-collar 
and professional employee in the satisfaction of his higher 
level needs through greater participation and identifi­
cation with the organization.
Although the above remarks concerning the need for 
better understanding between current-day management and 
employees could have been stated without an investigation 
of employee representation, the study nevertheless provides 
useful verification. Investigation of the surveyed firms 
demonstrated that effective contact did a great deal to 
improve understanding and promote labor peace.
A Final Note
The above observations apply with equal force to 
the non-private sector of our economy. Within the past 
few years unrest among government employees has been grow­
ing. In the first few months of 197 0 the nation witnessed 
the first postal strike in this country's history. The 
strike has been attributed in part to the inability of 
rank-and-file workers to effectively register their
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grievances with the Post Office Department and with Con- 
6gress.
Disruptions in many of our major universities also 
point to the need for effective appeal channels. Our 
country’s labor history has shown clearly that when sub­
ordinates have no method for registering complaints and 
requests with their organization's top management, they 
will often resort to disruptive behavior.
The creation of the means of contact.is, of course, 
only the first step, whether in industry, government ser­
vice, or in the university. Its success will depend upon 
the willingness of both sides to use it effectively to 
promote their mutual interests.
g "Untangling the Mess in the Post Office," Business 





Harold W. Arlin joined Westinghouse in 1917 as a Works
Engineer in the Mansfield, Ohio plant. He became 
a supervisor in 19 23 and held various posts in 
management throughout his career. He retired as 
Manager of Industrial Relations at the Mansfield 
Plant in 1961. Arlin served as a management repre­
sentative throughout the life of the Westinghouse 
representation plan.
John H. Curtis was employed by Dennison Manufacturing
Company in 19 21. He worked in a number of depart­
ments doing skilled and semiskilled work. He 
retired in 1961 as a photo engraver. He served for 
twelve years as an employee representative on the 
Dennison Employee Committee.
Curtis Damon was hired by Dennison Manufacturing Company in 
1922 as a research chemist. He became a member of 
management in 19 26 when he was appointed foreman of 
the Gummed Paper Department. During his career he 
served in a number of management posts, retiring in 
1963 as superintendent of the Printing Division.
E. W. Engerer joined Bethlehem Steel Company in 192 2 as a
piece work clerk. In 19 2 9 he was named to the post 
of Compensation Supervisor. He retired in 1963, 
having served in various management positions dur­
ing his career.
Harry D. Field was employed by Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey in 1917. He held a variety of-jobs in the 
Bayonne, New Jersey, plant, spending the majority 
of his career as a mechanical tradesman. He 
retired from the company in 196 0.
John Garvey was employed as a personnel assistant by Dennison 
Manufacturing Company in 1919. He later became 
personnel director for the firm. At his retirement 
in 1957 he was the company’s production manager. 
Garvey was active in Dennison’s representation plan 
throughout its existence.
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Milton C. Hagen went to work for Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey in 1929 in the Bayonne, New Jersey, plant. 
He served as'the plant’s training director from 
1929 to 1934. He then became its personnel director 
from 1934 to 194 0. After serving in World War II, 
he joined Industrial Relations Counselors with whom 
he is employed today. During his years as personnel 
director, he was actively involved in the company’s 
representation plan.
Harry A. Hillman joined Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
in Pittsburgh in 19 2 3 as an electrical engineer.
He later became a member of the company’s account­
ing department, and was named as the director of 
payroll accounting in 1941. In 1953 he became the 
director of the company’s wage and salary benefits 
program, retiring in 19 61.
Clement A. Hurley was hired by Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey as a messenger boy in 19 21 at the Bayonne 
plant. He became a member of the Mechanical Depart­
ment, spending most of his years with the company 
as a carpenter. He retired in 19 59. He served for 
three years as an employee representative from his 
department.
Richard Lackey was employed by Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey in 1921. He served in a number of manage­
ment positions in the Bayway, New Jersey, refinery. 
During the operation of the plan, his position was 
that of secretary or assistant to the plant manager.
Willard G. McAndrew became a Standard Oil of New Jersey
employee in 1910, when he was hired as a water boy 
in the Baton Rouge refinery. He became a member of 
the lubricating department and served as its first 
employee representative from 1919 until 1921. He 
later became a member of supervision, serving in a 
number of departments until his retirement in 1960.
L. M. McGraw joined Standard Oil of New Jersey's Baton Rouge 
refinery in 1923. He was employed in the packaging 
and shipping department where he remained until his 
retirement in 1965. During his career he was 
president of the refinery’s independent union for 
two years.
William Reymond was employed in the Baton Rouge refinery of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1919 as an engineer.
He became a member of its personnel department in 
1932 where he served until his retirement in 1961.
At his retirement he was the refinery’s personnel 
director.
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K. L. Reynolds currently holds the position of personnel 
manager fpr Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company's 
Akron plants. He joined Goodyear in 1927 as a 
member of the company's personnel department, 
serving as moderator of the representation meetings 
during the plan's existence.
Charles J. Richards became an employee of Dennison Manufac­
turing in 19 20. He held positions in a number of 
departments, retiring in 1961 as a paper cutter.
For seventeen years he served as an employee repre­
sentative on Dennison's employee committee.
J. R. Sexton is presently the industrial relations manager 
of Armco Steel's Middletown, Ohio, plant. He 
joined the company in .1941 as an industrial engi­
neer, later moving into supervisory positions be­
fore becoming a member of the Industrial relations 
staff.
Walter L. Trumbauer was employed by Bethlehem Steel Company 
in 1910 as an apprentice in the die making trade.
He later became a supervisor in the company's 
metalurgical department. He retired in 19 61 as the 
company's training and safety director.
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Baton Rouge, La. 70803
Gentlemen:
I am beginning research for a doctoral dissertation 
in business administration at Louisiana State University. 
My proposed topic is in the area of management history, 
specifically relating to the employee representation 
plans that were popular in many firms in the 1920's and 
1930's .
In a survey of the existing literature on the sub­
ject I have found your company's name mentioned several 
times. I am wondering if information concerning such 
factors as the motivation for the beginning of the plan, 
its method of operation, and reasons for its dis­
continuance are still in your files and if I might 
obtain copies of this material. I will be happy to pay 
the copying cost if this material is available. I would 
also like the names of present or retired employees who 
had experience with the plan so that I could interview 
them on this subject.
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed more 
light on what I believe to be an important contribution 
to employer^-employee relations in our country. If your 
company is able and willing to be a part of this research, 







QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
1. Position(s) held in the company during the time of the 
operation of the plan.
2. Were you a representative of either management or the 
workers on one of the shop committees of the company at 
any time—during the operation of employee represen­
tation?
A. Position held.
B. Length of time held.
C. Duties performed.
3. What, in your opinion, were the primary motivations of 
management for installing the plan?
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4. The following questions involve the functioning of the 
plan in terms of its formal design.
A. What was the procedure for- electing employee repre­
sentatives?
B. What was the procedure for choosing management 
representatives?
C. What was the procedure for raising issues to be 
discussed?
D. Did either or both sides (management and worker
representatives) have the right to meet separately 
in addition to joint meetings? If not, why not?
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E. How frequently were meetings held?
F. How were issues raised at the meetings resolved 
(majority vote3 for example)?
G. How many representatives did each side select?
H. How was an unresolved question decided?
(1) Appeal to top management.
(2) Impartial arbitrator.
(3) Other individuals.
I. How much formal legislative power did the
management-worker committee have?
(1) Resolution of questions without referring 
them to top management (assuming worker and 
management representatives agreed.)
(2) Resolutions subject to top management approval.
(3) No legislative power; purely informational in 
order to acquaint each side with the other's 
views.
(4) Other relationship.
J. How did employees become members of the represen­
tation- plan?
(1) Automatic membership.
(2) Could decide to either join or not become a 
member.
K. Were there any membership dues?
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L. Was the plan financed by the employer, the employ­
ees , or some sharing arrangement?
M. Did the employees have the right to strike under the 
plan?
N. Did a strike in fact ever occur during the oper­
ation of the plan?
(1) What were the issues involved?
(2) What part, if any did the employee represen­
tation plan play in the strike’s occurrence 
and/or its resolution?
0. Did the plan provide for a formal collective
bargaining contract for a specified time period?
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P. Was there any procedure for amending the plan 
itself?
(1) For example, could the powers of employees or 
of the employer under the plan be changed?
(2) Was such a change negotiable or in the hands 
of the employer?
5. The following questions involve the plan's actual 
,operation.
A. To your knowledge, were there any deviations from 
the formal methods of plan operation in actual 
practice? Please specify.
(1) For example, were election procedures followed 
as outlined in the plans?
(2) Were employees completely free to raise any
issue without fear of management displeasure?




C. What, if any, was the nature of change in the plan?
What effect, if any did the installation of the plan 
have upon the flow of communications between management 
and labor?
A. Did management use the plan as a vehicle for expla­
nation of its objectives, policies, and procedures?
(1) State the specific manner in which this was 
accomplished.
(2) Was there evidence that such communication 
increased the worker’s understanding of 
management’s goals?
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B. Did the plan stimulate worker initiation of commun­
ication with management?
(1) Did the number of grievances increase as 
compared with pre-plan days?
(2) Was there any increase of suggestions for cost 
savings by workers?
(3) Was there any increase in requests for wage
increases (group and/or individual), improve­
ment in working conditions, fringe benefits, 
etc. ?
7. Did the plan have any significant effect upon the
benefits granted to workers (tangible and intangible)?
A. Effect upon wages and'hours?
B. Effect upon physical working conditions?
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C. Effect upon fringe benefits?
D. Would these benefits, in your opinion, have been 
likely to have been granted if the plan had not 
been in existence?
E. Was there, in your opinion, any noticeable change 
in the philosophy of management toward the working 
force during the operation of the plan?
(1) What evidence can be cited to support this 
view?
(2) What specifically did the change involve?
8 . Was turnover and absenteeism noticeably affected by 
the operation of the plan?
A. What was the effect?
B. Could any other* forces have been involved?
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9. Was productivity significantly affected by the plan?
A. To what extent?
B. What concerning the plan affected productivity?
10. Did the plan's operation in your opinion make the
employees more ready to join a union at a later date, 




11. Did the plan have any significant effect upon job con­
tent of workers?
A. Was there an enlargement of duties of any signif­
icant number of non-management jobs as a result of 
the plans?
B. Did employees obtain more responsibility (such as 
in the area of planning) as a result of employee 
representation?
12. What was the effect, if any, of employee representation 
upon the firm’s personnel department (assuming the 
existence of one)?
A. Formation.
B. Increase in duties or elaboration of existing ones.
C. Overall significance and importance of the depart­
ment .
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13. What part, if any did foremen (or supervisory personnel) 
play in the representation plan?
14. In your opinion was management's labor policy clearly 
stated by management and clearly understood by the 
workers in the days before a representation plan 
existed? Please explain your answer.
15. How effective was the supervisor (or foreman) in inter­
preting management’s labor policy (assuming one existed) 
prior to the installation of the plan?
16. Were the supervisors encouraged to communicate with
subordinates about the company’s labor policy when the 
company had no representation plan? Please explain.
17. How widespread in your opinion was the reading of the
minutes of the representation meetings by rank-and-file 
workers?
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18. Did the plan remain popular with the workers throughout 
its existence as a means of making requests and 
suggestions to management? Please explain.
19. In your opinion, did management better understand the 
feelings of the workforce as the result of the repre­
sentation plan?
20. Was employee participation in company affairs affected 
to any extent by the plan? In what ways?
21. Did supervisory personnel lose any of their authority 
or power as a result of the representation plan? If 
yes, in what way were their authority and power affected?
22. Did the supervisory personnel appear to resent any above 
mentioned loss of power and authority? If yes, did this 
resentment affect their relationships with subordinates? 
If yes, in what way?
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